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Providing a defensible basis for allocating resources for critical infrastructure and 
key resource protection is an important and challenging problem.  Investments can be 
made in countermeasures that improve the security and hardness of a potential target 
exposed to a security hazard, deterrence measures to decrease the likeliness of a security 
event, and capabilities to mitigate human, economic, and other types of losses following 
an incident.  Multiple threat types must be considered, spanning everything from natural 
hazards, industrial accidents, and human-caused security threats.  In addition, investment 
decisions can be made at multiple levels of abstraction and leadership, from tactical 
decisions for real-time protection of assets to operational and strategic decisions affecting 
individual assets and assets comprising a regions or sector.   
The objective of this research is to develop a probabilistic risk analysis 
methodology for critical asset protection, called Critical Asset and Portfolio Risk 
Analysis, or CAPRA, that supports operational and strategic resource allocation decisions 
at any level of leadership or system abstraction.  The CAPRA methodology consists of 
six analysis phases: scenario identification, consequence and severity assessment, overall 
vulnerability assessment, threat probability assessment, actionable risk assessment, and 
 
benefit-cost analysis.  The results from the first four phases of CAPRA combine in the 
fifth phase to produce actionable risk information that informs decision makers on where 
to focus attention for cost-effective risk reduction.  If the risk is determined to be 
unacceptable and potentially mitigable, the sixth phase offers methods for conducting a 
probabilistic benefit-cost analysis of alternative risk mitigation strategies.  Several case 
studies are provided to demonstrate the methodology, including an asset-level analysis 
that leverages systems reliability analysis techniques and a regional-level portfolio 
analysis that leverages techniques from approximate reasoning. 
The main achievements of this research are three-fold.  First, this research 
develops methods for security risk analysis that specifically accommodates the dynamic 
behavior of intelligent adversaries, to include their tendency to shift attention toward 
attractive targets and to seek opportunities to exploit defender ignorance of plausible 
targets and attack modes to achieve surprise.  Second, this research develops and employs 
an expanded definition of vulnerability that takes into account all system weaknesses 
from initiating event to consequence.  That is, this research formally extends the meaning 
of vulnerability beyond security weaknesses to include target fragility, the intrinsic 
resistance to loss of the systems comprising the asset, and weaknesses in response and 
recovery capabilities.  Third, this research demonstrates that useful actionable risk 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation and Problem Description 
Providing a defensible basis for allocating resources for critical infrastructure and 
key resource protection is an important and challenging problem.  Investments can be 
made in countermeasures estimated to improve the security and hardness of a potential 
targets exposed to a variety of security events, deterrence measures to decrease the 
likeliness of a such events, and capabilities to mitigate human, economic, and other losses 
following an incident.  Multiple types of initiating events must be considered, including 
naturally occurring phenomena, technological accidents, and malicious attacks.  In 
addition, investment decisions can be made at multiple levels of abstraction and 
leadership, from tactical decisions for real-time protection of assets to strategic decisions 
affecting asset portfolios, regions, and infrastructure systems.  To accommodate the 
complexity of the decision variables, the multitude and uncertain nature of possible 
threats, and the need for defensible risk results to better inform resource investment 
decision making at all levels, a mathematically sound methodology that quantifies 
knowledge and expresses uncertainty in a meaningful way, accounts for all major risk 
contributors, and can be scaled to accommodate different levels of abstraction is required 
(Garrick et al. 2004). 
Decisions to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources 
center of choosing from among a variety of preventive, protective, response, and 
recovery strategies to meet risk reduction objectives given finite available resources.  
Risk management strategies are of two general types – strategies to reduce the frequency 
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of adverse events and strategies for mitigating the ensuing consequences given their 
occurrence (Pate-Cornell 1986).  While both natural and anthropic (i.e., human-caused) 
events are within the scope of homeland security, particularly troublesome are those 
intentional attacks initiated by an adversary that has motivation (e.g., selfish, political, 
economic, and religious), possesses variable and broad capabilities (e.g., weapons, 
manpower, and education), and is adaptive by being responsive to countermeasures 
(Hoffman 1998; Jackson 2001; Sandler and Lapan 1988).  To the decision maker’s 
benefit, there are many options available for mitigating security risks than those arising 
from natural hazards given that both probability and consequence can be affected through 
risk reduction strategies, such as through a combination of enhanced security and 
deterrence at critical sites and measures to maintain continuity of lifeline services before, 
during, and following a malicious attack.  Many of these options have a collateral effect 
of reducing risks attributable to naturally occurring events, such as hazard neutral 
emergency response measures.  In order to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of 
risk mitigation strategies across all hazards, levels of leadership and system abstractions, 
a common analytical framework is needed that accommodates all-hazards risk analysis. 
 
1.2. Objectives and Scope 
In order to provide defensible risk information that facilitates judgments of risk 
acceptance or non-acceptances and benefit-cost analysis while accommodating all 
uncertainties, a quantitative framework for risk assessment and management is needed.  
The overarching objective of this research is to develop a quantitative risk analysis 
methodology for critical asset protection in light of security events, terrorist attacks in 
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particular, that supports operational and strategic resource allocation decisions at any 
level of abstraction. 
Risk studies help decision makers cope with the uncertainties present in their 
strategic environment.  Accordingly, the results from any risk assessment methodology 
must, in general, (1) be aligned to produce information that is timely and relevant to the 
needs of the decision maker, and (2) follow from a process that is meaningful and 
acceptable to the consumer (Blockley 1992).  Prior to the establishment of any risk 
analysis process, the questions and issues demanding the attention of a decision maker 
needs to be identified.  The nature of these issues drives the appropriate mathematical 
structure to use so as to provide meaningful results with sufficient resolution to support 
decision making.  The following general requirements can be established for a 
quantitative risk analysis framework that supports critical asset protection decisions: 
 
• The methodology must be designed to inform resource allocation decisions for 
critical asset and portfolio protection by producing actionable risk information.  
That is, the methodology must be tailored to answer the question “where should 
decision makers focus their attention to achieve cost effective risk reduction?” 
and then provide the means to evaluate alternative risk reduction strategies. 
• The methodology must build upon current accepted thinking and practices in 
security risk analysis.  Accordingly, the methodology must consider all relevant 
aspects of the security risk analysis problem (i.e., threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence).  Clear operational definitions of model parameters to facilitate their 
interpretation, analysis, and measurement must be specified. 
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• The mathematical structure must be sound, logical, and transparent to explain all 
relationships between cause (initiating events) and consequence.  Moreover, it 
must produce risk information that properly propagates all uncertainties present in 
the inputs (i.e., the methodology should be faithful to the information provided). 
• The methodology must be scalable to accommodate the needs of decision makers 
at all levels of abstraction and leadership, including operational and strategic 
asset, sectoral, and regional analysis.  While there is no expectation that needs of 
each decision maker will be the same, the general philosophy underpinning the 
methodology must be consistent and scalable.  This feature promotes 
compatibility of risk information at various levels of abstraction under a common 
framework. 
• In the case of malicious attacks where the initiating events demonstrate intent and 
choice, the methodology must accommodate the dynamic nature of human 
adversaries, particularly their tendencies to shift preferences in response to 
security investments.  For strategic analysis, the methodology must capture the 
shifting of adversary attention from protected assets to less protected assets, from 
difficult to less difficult attack modes, etc. 
 
1.3. Outline of Dissertation 
The outline of this dissertation is as follows.  Beginning with a comprehensive 
review of the research literature on risk analysis for infrastructure protection and related 
security problems in Chapter 2, this dissertation develops a quantitative methodology for 
critical asset and portfolio risk analysis (Chapter 3) that meets the requirements outlined 
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in the previous section.  The sources of risk considered in this methodology are malicious 
security threats affecting the interests of those decision makers (e.g., asset owners, 
regional leadership, etc.) responsible for the proper functioning and operation of critical 
infrastructure and key resources and the health and safety of the people under their care.  
The proposed methodology is generic in that it identifies, at a high level, all relevant 
dimensions of risk and how they interact to describe risk.  Moreover, the quantitative 
framework underlying the methodology can accommodate information on the constituent 
parameters expressed in a variety of quantitative forms and derived from different models 
which is then aggregated in a probabilistic framework.  To demonstrate different qualities 
and aspects of the proposed methodology, Chapters 4 and 5 provide case studies applying 
the methodology to different problems.  In particular, Chapter 4 applies a purely 
probabilistic implementation of the methodology to the analysis of a notional 
infrastructure facility (i.e., asset-level analysis), to include systems reliability modeling 
and the use of maximum entropy arguments to construct distributions from minimal data.  
Chapter 5 leverages techniques from approximate reasoning and imprecise probabilities 
to propagate highly uncertainty probabilistic information through an otherwise 
probabilistic framework to support analysis of a region containing multiple assets of 
concern to a regional decision maker.  Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation with a 
summary of the research findings and directions for future work.  Mathematical details to 
support the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, which includes much of the author’s own work, 
if provided in Appendix A. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Risk Analysis for Security 
Risk analysis is a technology for overlaying uncertainty about future events atop 
societal values to inform decisions on how to minimize the potential for undesirable 
impacts on people, property, and essential services.  The philosophy of risk analysis, to 
include risk assessment and risk management among other risk-related activities (Society 
for Risk Analysis 2008), is embodied by the “six questions of risk” as follows (Kaplan 
and Garrick 1981; Haimes 1991; and later paraphrased by McGill and Ayyub 2007 and 
refined later by McGill 2008): 
 
Risk Assessment 
(1)  What are potential causes of harm? 
(2) What specific consequences are of concern?  
(3)  How likely are these pairings of cause and consequence? 
 
Risk Management 
(4)  What can be done to reduce the potential for undesirable consequences or 
increase the potential for favorable outcomes? 
(5)  What real options are available and what are their tradeoffs in terms of their 
associated benefits, costs, and risks? 




In the context of homeland security and critical asset protection, the common conceptual 
expression for security risk, or the potential for harm of loss resulting from a the 
occurrence of a threatening event (e.g., natural, technological, accidental, or malicious) 
afflicting a valued target, system, or societal element, is traditionally written as (see 
Broder 1984; Matalucci 2002; Moteff 2005; Willis et al. 2005; US Department of 
Homeland Security 2006b): 
 
 eConsequencityVulnerabilThreatRisk ××=  (2-1) 
 
where the total risk is the combination or Cartesian product of all relevant security events 
(the “threat”), system weaknesses (the “vulnerability”), and undesired outcomes resulting 
when these security events interact with or exploit the vulnerabilities (the 
“consequence”).  With regards to the first three questions, risk assessment for security 
problems focuses on constructing a full suite of plausible initiating events or attacks, 
assessing their likeliness of occurring, and assessing the likeliness of various 
consequences given attack considering security countermeasures and consequence 
mitigation strategies (Broder 1984).  Security risk is, then, a probabilistic statement 
centered on the intersection of a particular cause and a particular consequence, or more 
generally, as the uncertainty constructed on the consequence dimensions considering all 
relevant security events (i.e., risk as uncertainty of consequence per Aven 2003). 
Risk, as Eq. 2-1 suggests, tells a series of stories of all that could go wrong from 
initiating event to final outcome, where the heart of these stories - the vulnerabilities - 
describe those weaknesses that must manifest in order to make this risk scenario true.  
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Here we define a risk scenario as the pairing of a particular event and a particular 
consequence.  In this sense, vulnerability provides a mapping between the set of initiating 
events and the set of outcomes, such as is shown in Figure 2-1 (McGill and Ayyub 
2007b).  This interpretation is in agreement with Aven’s (2008) definition of 
vulnerability as the uncertainty on consequence given the occurrence of an initiating 
event.  Any statement of vulnerability or risk to a given initiating event must always be in 
reference to some adverse outcome or degree of loss, whether descriptive, qualitative or 
quantitative in nature.  Generic statements, such as “my vulnerability is high” or “the risk 
is moderate” are inherently ambiguous unless they are associated with a specific cause 
and a particular consequence, if even expressed on an arbitrarily constructed or vaguely 
defined numeric scale (e.g., “my vulnerability to undesirable outcomes from my exposure 






Figure 2-1. Vulnerability as the mapping between initiating events (i.e., cause) to 
resulting degree of loss (i.e., consequence) 
 
2.2. From Cause to Consequence: Initiating Events and Dimensions of Loss 
According to the conceptual security risk analysis formula in Eq. 2-1 and the 
discussion of risk in the previous section, any statement of risk, whether qualitative, 
descriptive, or quantitative, requires specification of a cause and a consequence, either of 
which may be vague or precise depending on the needs of the decision maker and the 
nature of the available information.  This section briefly describes the role of decision 
maker world view in establishing the scope of a risk analysis and discusses the nature of 




2.2.1. Risk Analysis for Decision Support: The Role of World View 
The role of the risk analyst is to provide sufficient and relevant information that 
empowers decision makers to exercise their own judgments (Pate-Cornell 2007), though 
risk reduction decisions must be made with or without formal deliberate analysis (Deisler 
2002).  As a decision support activity, risk analysis must be sensitive to the world view of 
the decision maker (Berresford and Dando 1978).  World view is shaped by the decision 
maker’s personal interests and that of his constituency (e.g., the people in a representative 
democracy).  To narrow the scope of a risk analysis and tailor the process to meet the 
unique decision support needs of a decision maker, it is important to focus attention on 
those events that are plausible and relevant to a decision maker, and then study how these 
events can result in consequences deemed unfavorable.  The key to generating all 
relevant pairings of cause and consequence, i.e., risk scenarios, is to first understand the 
needs of the decision maker (American Society for Industrial Security 2003). 
Cox (2002) offers a technique for framing the interests of a decision maker to 
assist in defining risks.  Referred to by its acronym STEM, this technique starts by 
defining the sources (S) of risk (e.g., hazards, initiating events) that are of concern to the 
decision maker, identifies the targets (T) that could be affected by one or more of these 
source of risk, identifies what the effects (E) out outcomes that can result when the source 
of risk afflicts a susceptible target, and seeks to describes the mechanisms (M) by which 
these effects our outcomes occur.  A revised version of the STEM technique that is 
helpful for framing both risk assessment and risk management could be relabeled as the 
VEST, POST or PEST model for variables (or parameters) that characterize the decision 
maker’s ability to act in his environment, effects (or outcomes) of concern, sources of risk 
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that could plausibly interact with vulnerabilities to yield these outcomes (e.g., event 
types), and targets that are susceptible to these sources of risk.  Either the STEM or the 
VEST/POST/PEST techniques helps risk analysts establish the context from which to 
construct risk scenarios and carry out the risk analysis. 
According to Ericson (2006), risk assessment is “an uncertainty knowledge claim 
about contingent future events that cannot be fully known,” and that any decision made in 
the process of risk management must “bear the uncertainty of false positives and false 
negatives.”  In general, as suggested in the 2002 Department of Energy guideline for 
vulnerability assessment, the value added of performing a risk or vulnerability assessment 
is to build and broaden awareness of security and risk issues among senior management; 
establish or evaluate against a baseline; identify vulnerabilities and develop responses; 
categorize key assets and drive the risk management process; develop and build internal 
skills and expertise; promote action; and to kick-off an ongoing security effort (US 
Department of Energy 2002).  Irrespective of the results generated by the assessment, at 
the very least risk studies offer a systematic process for building institutional knowledge 
of potential sources for harm and the manner in which such harm can be realized 
(Herabat 2003). 
 
2.2.2. The Nature of Threat and its Assessment 
In the security sense, threat has traditionally been defined as an intention and 
capability to undertake actions that are harmful or detrimental to an asset (US 
Department of Homeland Security 2006b; US Department of Defense 2005).  Aven 
(2008) equates the words hazard and threat with initiating event, where the word hazard 
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is used to speak of naturally occurring phenomena and threat is used to speak of 
deliberate actions.  Yet, it is common to speak of anything that exposes an individual to 
potentially unacceptable outcomes as a threat regardless of its nature.  Building on the 
definition of a hazard as a source of risk (Ayyub 2003), a more general notion can be 
established for threat as a hazardous event (hereafter called an “initiating event”) with the 
potential to adversely affect those aspects of life that decision makers care about (e.g., 
health and safety, property, future revenue, essential services).  That is, further qualifying 
a hazard as a threat implies that there is at least a possibility of the hazard adversely 
affecting the decision maker’s interests to result in undesirable outcomes.  Take for 
example a strong hurricane, a peril that without question is a major source of risk in the 
United States.  If one examines the meteorological record of the US to estimate 
probability or rate of recurrence for tropical storms in different geographical regions, 
strong hurricanes are threatening to residents of southeastern coastal communities, less 
threatening to more inland and northeastern coastal communities, and not threatening at 
all to individuals situated in the upper mid-western portion of the nation.  From the 
regional decision maker’s point of view, if the likeliness of a strong hurricane afflicting is 
extremely rare, then it is not a threat despite being objectively labeled a hazard and 
regardless of whether the system is susceptible to harm if such an event were to occur.  
Yet, hurricanes are still objectively a hazard regardless of them not being a threat.  
Similarly, even if an event is frequent, it may not warrant being labeled a threat if the 
response and recovery capabilities of the afflicted system are sufficient to contain loss.  
For example, seismic building codes adopted by the State of California impose 
requirements that all structures be capable of withstanding minimal-defined loads 
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imposed by the ground motion of a large earthquake (Mileti 1999).  Prior to the 
implementation of these codes, magnitude 6 earthquakes (on the Richter scale) were a 
major source of risk, whereas now the potential for loss given their occurrence is much 
less.  Thus, from some decision makers’ point of view, a magnitude 6 earthquake 
afflicting southern California is no longer a threat despite having been so in the not too 
distant past.  In this case, the threat has been largely neutralized through improved 
engineering design, materials, and construction practices.  This latter point echoes the 
sentiment of Arnold (2002) who reminds us that disasters and extreme events arise from 
some disequilibrium between environmental events and the vulnerabilities of human 
communities.  As Haque and Etkin (2007) put it, humans cause disasters, not naturally 
occurring events.  That is, we suffer from disasters because we create the conditions in 
which to experience disaster, whether unwittingly or deliberate; unless such extreme 
events affect people, they are merely events with no social significance. 
The foregoing reasoning suggests that calling an event a threat imposes the 
subjective judgment of a decision maker atop an otherwise objective event according to 
its perceived likeliness for occurring and seriousness of the ensuing outcomes.  Initiating 
events can take on many forms in the homeland security context.  Classes of initiating 
events of concern to homeland security decision makers include, but are not limited to, 
naturally occurring phenomena (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, solar flares), industrial 
accidents and technological failures (e.g., chemical release, train derailment, refinery 
fire), and malicious attacks (e.g., bombing, sabotage, chemical attack).  A listing of 
many, though by no means complete, initiating event types compiled from a variety of 
sources is provided in Table 3-1 divided into categories labeled “naturally occurring” for 
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those events due to acts of nature and “anthropic” for events derived from the behavior 
and artifacts of humans (Fontaine et al. 2007).  The focus of the current research is on 
malicious anthropic events (explosive attacks, in particular), though the methodology 
developed in this research is broadly applicable to all types of events (Ayyub et al. 2007). 
 
Table 2-1. Partial list of naturally occurring and anthropic events 
Partial List of Naturally Occurring and Anthropic Events 
 
Naturally Occurring Anthropic (Unintentional) 
• Earthquake • Industrial Accident 
• Tropical Storm / Hurricane • Technological Failure 
• Blizzard / Winter Storm Anthropic (Intentional) 
• Tornado • Explosive 
• Tsunami • Projectile / Ballistic 
• Volcano Eruption • Incendiary 
• Landslide • Chemical 
• Flooding • Biological 
• Wildfire • Radiological 
• High Wind / Windstorms • Nuclear 
• Extreme Temperature • Radiofrequency / EMP 
• Disease Outbreak • Sabotage 
• Drought • Cyber 
• Meteorite / Asteroid • Laser 
 
 
The description of an initiating event alone is insufficient to commence a risk 
analysis unless it is in reference to some target of its effects, whether physical, societal, 
logical, etc.  The assessment of risk insists that it be placed into a decision making 
context that considers the unique interests and concerns of the decision maker.  For 
decision makers charged with protecting infrastructure, whether at the asset, sectoral, or 
regional level, a prime concern is the impact of various initiating events on the 
performance of the elements that enable the asset to function, including hardware, time, 
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people, and information.  Many risk-related methodologies spell out a process for “asset 
characterization” or “asset identification” whether as a specific step (see American 
Society for Industrial Security 2003) or part of some other step (such as scenario 
identification in McGill et al. 2007), as a prerequisite for a full scale risk or vulnerability 
assessment. 
In the absence of reliable information or evidence supporting a judgment of which 
types of events are possible at a given location, a complete set of plausible initiating 
events can be identified based solely on the inherent susceptibilities of collocated system 
elements to a wide spectrum of plausible event types and without the need for 
intelligence supporting adversary intent.  This style of analysis has been referred to as an 
asset-driven approach (McGill et al. 2007) or asset-based approach (Center for Chemical 
Process Safety 2002).   An asset-driven analysis estimates the consequences and 
probability of adversary success for an exhaustive set of plausible initiating events 
without regard to their probability of occurrence, and then overlays their likeliness of 
occurrence if such information is available.  As Lave (2002) suggests, asset-driven 
approaches search for sensitive points that adversaries can exploit to kill a lot of people 
and destroy a lot of property, that is, the focus is on finding and correcting vulnerabilities 
regardless of whether a specific type of event has occurred.   In contrast, threat-driven or 
event-driven approaches employed in many risk assessment methodologies begin with a 
predefined set of initiating events based on assumed adversary capabilities (e.g., design 
basis threats such as in Center for Chemical Process Safety 2002) justified by intelligence 
or historical record, and proceeds through the remainder of the analysis constrained by 
the definition and scope of these events.  For example, a threat-driven approach in the 
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context of regional and national preparedness planning might focus exclusively on the 15 
national planning scenarios defined by DHS (US Department of Homeland Security 
2006c) and shown in Figure 2-2.  In fact, as Hollenstein (2002) showed, about 80% of the 
available models for vulnerability assessment (as of 2001) are designed for a specific 
combination of source and target.  Event-driven approaches are appropriate for studying 
initiating events that are well understood and whose rate of occurrence can be reliably 
predicted from historical data; however, they ultimately fail to consider emerging or 
unrecognized threats devised by an innovative adversary or those naturally-occurring 
events for which there is no human-recorded record (Woo 1999).  An asset-driven 
approach brings all plausible threat scenarios to the forefront in attempt to reduce 
ontological uncertainty and defeat the potential for surprise without limiting attention to 
only what is known about adversary intent. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. DHS National Planning Scenarios (US Department of Homeland Security 
2006c) 
 
The level of specificity and detail chosen to articulate each initiating event and 
consequence affects how likeliness is assessed (Kaplan et al. 2001).  Given a collectively 
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exhaustive set of all possible distinct initiating events of specified type (e.g., explosive), 
highly detailed event descriptions are larger in number than more general events, require 
more analytical effort to ascertain and assess in terms of time and attention, but provide a 
high resolution account and understanding of total risk.  In contrast, less specific event 
descriptions are fewer in number than specific ones, but coincide with greater uncertainty 
in the consequence dimension to accommodate the increased number of variations in the 
nature and sequence of events between cause and consequence.  Moreover, meeting the 
exhaustiveness requirement for initiating events oftentimes requires one to include a 
residual, perhaps unknown, initiating event to account for all scenarios not otherwise 
stated (Hunter 1984).  This residual event is a proxy for open-world thinking (Smets 
1988) in a closed-world setting, and essentially accounts for all other events that can 
happen besides those that are explicitly articulated.  Any probabilistic statement made in 
the absence of this residual event assumes a closed set, and is thus equivalent to a 
conditional probability given no residual event.  The challenge for risk analysts is to 
construct a set of events that is general enough to be studied in a timely manner, yet is 
specific enough to support decision making with minimal potential for strategic surprise 
resulting from an unknown scenario (McGill and Ayyub 2008).  As Aven (2008) 
suggests, the right balance must be struck between the need for precision and the need for 
decision support. 
For example, consider the very specific scenario “a medium-sized car bomb 
attack occurring at the federal building in downtown at 9:00am on Thursday.” The details 
of this scenario permit a very good assessment of vulnerability to different degrees of loss 
given its occurrence, but to complete the overall risk picture requires the decision maker 
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to consider all event variations in time, date, location, delivery system, and threat type.  A 
less specific version of this scenario such as “an explosive attack occurring in the region 
this year” is inclusive of all specific scenarios similar to the previous example, but as 
such it is difficult make an assessment of aggregate vulnerability due to the wide 
variations, or incertitude, in circumstances.  Since vulnerability was defined to be a 
mapping from cause to consequence, it is thus important to construct scenarios that 
permit meaningful statements of vulnerability that can be used to inform risk 
management decisions. 
 
2.2.3. The Nature of Consequence and its Assessment 
According to mathematical logic, the consequent Y in a conditional statement of 
the form “if X then Y” describes what is also true given that the premise X is true (Copi 
1959).  In the context of risk analysis, the premise X describes the initiating event and the 
consequent Y describes the outcomes given the occurrence of X.  Since we are often 
uncertain as to what exactly Y will be given X, risk analysis considers all such statements 
“if X then Y” for a given X and assigns a probability distribution over this set of such 
statements according to their likeliness of being the correct statement for a future context.  
The previous section (section 2.2.2) described the nature of the premises X; this section 
describes the nature of the consequences Y of concern to homeland security decision 
makers. 
Consequence in the homeland security context describes the undesirable 
outcomes following the occurrence of an initiating event.  Since our present focus is on 
risk analysis for informing security decisions, the prime concern is negative or adverse 
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outcomes, that is, pure risk situations (Ayyub 2003) (this is in contrast to speculative risk 
where both positive and negative outcomes are considered).  The focus on negative 
outcomes is appropriate for security analysis since from the decision maker’s point of 
view, the primary concern with naturally occurring and anthropic events is whether his 
interests are protected against harm or loss (Purpura 2008).  There is a wealth of research 
indicating positive externalities resulting from such harm or loss in the wake of a disaster 
(e.g., Skidmore and Toya 2002), or as the proverb goes, one man’s loss is another man’s 
gain (Oxford University Press 2004).  However since risk analyses are tailored to meet 
the unique needs of a specific decision making body, these externalities are external to 
the scope of analysis and therefore are often not considered. 
In general, one could identify an exhaustive or comprehensively nested set of 
undesirable outcomes following any initiating event (e.g., loss of containment, death of 
employees).  These outcomes would initially assume the form of narratives, but could 
then map to a prescribed measure or representation of loss spanning one or more 
consequence dimensions (e.g., economic impact, property damage, loss of life, etc.).  For 
example, the 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets articulates five dimensions of loss, to include impacts to 
public health and safety, the economy, public confidence, governance, and national 
security (White House 2003).  Other methodologies prescribe different terms for 
consequence assessment, such as environmental damage (Moore et al. 2007) and 
aggregate regional and geographic impacts (US Department of Homeland Security 
2006a).  Some methodologies are less rigid in their specification for which consequence 
dimensions to consider; for example, the Center for Chemical Process Security 
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Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) methodology empowers SVA teams with the flexibility 
to define those dimensions that are relevant to each facility and decision maker (Center 
for Chemical Process Safety 2002).   
The crispness of any consequence dimension is a property that characterizes how 
well it is understood and how well it can be assessed.  A crisply defined consequence 
dimension possesses clear guidance on its assessment and can be extended to countable 
units of measure (e.g., dollars, time, lives, injuries).  In contrast, a vaguely defined 
consequence dimension lacks clear units and often relies on subjective constructed scales 
for its assessment (Keeney 1981).  For example, property damage, while qualitative in 
nature, is largely extendable to monetary measures despite the inherent ambiguities in the 
value of any given object or collection of objects.  Loss of life and categories of injury 
are also largely extendable to countable units (e.g., number of people) at different 
subjectively assigned injury levels (e.g., the “abbreviated injury scale” or AIS described 
by Copes et al. 1969), and in some instances have been extended further to monetary 
measures via a statistical value of life for fatalities (Viscusi and Aldy 2003) or Quality 
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) for injuries (Hammit 2002).  In contrast, vaguely defined 
measures such as national security (Wolfer 1952) and public confidence (Baldwin et al. 
2008) offer no clear definition for their measurement, though it should be noted that 
significant progress has been made in clarifying an interpretation of public confidence for 
practical use in national-level homeland security risk analysis. 
The ultimate goal of consequence valuation is to provide a basis for assessing the 
severity of adverse outcomes valued in equivalent economic terms that can support 
meaningful benefit-cost analysis.  The valuation or disutility of each consequence 
21 
 
dimension can be left in disaggregated form, or if desired by the decision maker, one 
could combine them to produce a single aggregate consequence metric using a multi-
criteria decision analysis approach (Grabisch et al. 2007; Apostolakis and Lemon 2007). 
However, this approach begs for value judgments on how loss valued in one dimension 
(e.g., lives) equates to loss valued in another dimension (e.g., dollars), a task which 
extends beyond risk analysis into the realm of decision analysis (Pate-Cornell 2007).  
Consequence or loss conversion factors can be used for this purpose (Ayyub 2003).  On 
the other hand, some risk studies may simply leave the results in terms of focused 
narratives, thus leaving it to the decision maker to assign a personal value to 
consequences and risk (Mairal 2008).  Such an approach is common in the intelligence 
community where the reasoning and story is often more important than any expression of 
risk in qualitative or quantitative terms. 
 
2.2.4. Screening of Initiating Events 
Given a complete set of distinct initiating events, the determination of whether an 
event is a threat worthy of further analysis is typically done through the use of screening 
methods.  A number of screening methodologies are available to help decision makers 
sort through typically expansive lists of risk scenarios to identify those for focused 
attention (National Infrastructure Institute 2006; Moore et al. 2007; among others).  For 
example, McGill et al. (2007) outline a simple method for determining which initiating 
events are relevant to a decision maker according to the inherent susceptibilities of key 
elements to a variety of malicious anthropic events.  According to this approach, 
initiating events are filtered in according to whether undesirable outcomes are achievable 
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when afflicting an asset.  The list of relevant initiating event-asset pairings comprises an 
exhaustive set of threats for further consideration.  The Risk Analysis and Management 
for Critical Asset Protection, or RAMCAP, methodology (Moore et al. 2007) also 
describes a screening process that focuses on the asset to determine whether its 
compromise warrants attention on the basis of perceived value to the decision maker and 
the nation.  The CARVER methodology (US Department of the Army 1998; Vellani 
2007) goes one step further by examining at a high-level the criticality, accessibility, 
recognizability, vulnerability, effects, and recuperability of an asset in light of a variety of 
attack modes to arrive at a relative rank ordering of initiating event-asset combinations on 
the basis of importance.  Other more generic methods can be used for the purpose of 
screening and ranking, to include failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis or 
FMECA (Modarres et al. 1999) and hazard and operability analysis or HazOp (Haimes 
2004).  Hybrid models can also be used, such as one that merges concepts from both the 
CARVER and FMECA methodologies. 
 
2.2.5. Risk and Surprise 
A particularly menacing problem that exploits closed-world thinking is that of 
surprise.  Surprise manifests itself in the unknown, unrecognized, and unrealized, and is a 
direct byproduct of a failure of imagination.  According to Grabo (2002), surprise occurs 
when a defender is either unaware of potential hazards or unprepared to defend or 
respond to unexpected consequences from known, but ignored hazards.  Each aspect of 
the security risk formula from Eq. 2-1 has elements that contribute to surprise, such as is 
shown in Figure 2-3 with a few examples (McGill and Ayyub 2008).  The scenario may 
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be unexpected or the resulting consequences may be unanticipated (i.e., pure surprise), or 
the likeliness of its occurrence may be understated (i.e., as in a counterexpected event).  
In general, surprise exploits defender ignorance, and may manifest by chance or the 
deliberate action of human adversaries.  Figure 2-4 shows the various types of ignorance, 
all of which contribute to a defender’s vulnerability to surprise (Ayyub 2001).  Defeating 
surprise rests in a decision maker’s awareness of possible scenarios and their outcomes, 
as well as in his preparedness to mitigate a full range of consequences following such 




Figure 2-3. Some sources of surprise in risk analysis for critical infrastructure protection 


























Figure 2-4. Hierarchy of ignorance types highlighting those types that contributes to 
overall vulnerability to surprise 
 
A surprising event is one that is outside the realm of our expectations.  Examples 
of surprise can be found in many areas related to homeland security.  In the 
counterterrorism context, adversaries seek to leverage defender ignorance about their 
intent, capabilities, and operations to achieve an asymmetric advantage over their targets.  
For instance, the use of airplanes to attack the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11 
was arguably a surprise given that a majority of defenders were unaware that such 
vehicles would be used as projectiles to attack buildings (Kean et al. 2004).  Other attack 
types discussed in the literature that are arguably potential sources of surprise for 
mainstream decision makers and security professionals include hemorrhagic fever (Borio 
et al. 2002), laser weapons (Bunker 2008), high-powered microwaves and intentional 
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electromagnetic interference attacks (Van Keuren et al. 1991; Parfenov et al. 2004), non-
explosive radiological materials and particle accelerators (Acton et al. 2007; Chowdhury 
and Sarkar 2008), and forest fires (Baird 2006).   
Manunta (1999a; 2002) highlights the propensity of adversaries to seek 
opportunities for achieving surprise, and argues that this behavior renders the security 
problem incompatible with the Bayesian analysis paradigm.  In the international affairs 
arena, Cadell (2004) notes that potential adversaries engage in deception to deliberately 
mislead or confuse their opponents to prevent them from learning the deceiver’s true 
intentions or activities.  In this sense, deception thrives by manipulating uncertainty to 
affect a target, and surprise occurs when the actions of the deceived leads to them 
experiencing unintended and potentially undesired outcomes.  For natural hazards, Woo 
(1999) asserts that “there are many arcane geological hazard phenomena which are 
beyond the testimony of the living, which would be met with incredulity and awe were 
they to recur in our own time.  Such “black swans” are highly intense scenarios that are 
either unknown or have a perceived probability so low as to be considered negligible 
(e.g., counterexpected), yet would result in significant feeling of surprise were they to 
occur (Taleb 2007).  In highly complex technical systems, Johnson (2006) suggests that 
surprise occurs due to unexpected emergent behaviors stemming from the interaction 
between system components and their environment.  Critical infrastructure is among such 
highly complex technical systems, where unknown interdependencies between 
infrastructure services may lead to unpredictable cascading consequences (Rinaldi et al. 
2001; see also Mendonca and Wallace 2006), some of which may cause the event to be 
labeled as extreme (Kunreuther 2002). 
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The primary source of surprise arises from an inappropriate or insufficient 
characterization of uncertainty, whether epistemic or ontological (Elms 2004).  When a 
situation or decision problem is novel or unique, the challenge is to use the knowledge 
one has available to set bounds on the scope of imagined future outcomes (Chapman 
2006); more knowledge reduces uncertainty, whereas lack of knowledge must entertain a 
wider range of possibilities.  According to this point of view, all initiating events 
regarded as possible (e.g., non-zero probability) must at least be considered initially 
irrespective of the assessed magnitude of their likeliness.  If the focus is on the outcomes 
of a scenario, the goal is then to mitigate or constrain the scope of possible consequences 
from a event-neutral point of view by structuring preparations and responses to cover a 
wide range of possibilities (Ackerman 2006). 
 
2.2.6. Levels of Analysis 
Risk assessment and management for critical infrastructure and key resource 
protection can be performed at a variety of levels (Ayyub et al. 2007).  At the asset or 
facility level, a survey of an asset’s mission critical elements coupled with knowledge of 
the consequences of disruption, physical and security vulnerabilities to a wide range of 
initiating events, and perceived attractiveness provides insight into actions an asset owner 
can take to reduce his overall risk exposure.  An asset in this context is anything of value 
to its owner, such as a monument, vehicle, or facility.  At the portfolio or system level, 
the total risk associated with a portfolio or system of assets (e.g., regional, national, 
sectoral) can be assessed in order to compare investment alternatives that aim to reduce 
overall portfolio risk.  Figures 2-5 and 2-6 illustrate a portfolio of assets in a state and 
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nation, respectively.  Figure 2-7 shows how single assets can belong to multiple different 
asset portfolios.  A portfolio in this sense is a collection of assets with common attributes 
or linkages.  Regional analysis, for example, would define a portfolio from the top-down 
by first identifying the critical functions and services of the region, and then assigning 
membership to regional assets that contribute directly to these mission areas.  In contrast, 
a portfolio can be built from the bottom-up by first defining a set of assets, then 
examining how they relate with one another.  In both cases, knowledge of the physical, 
geographic, cyber, and logical interdependencies among portfolio assets is important for 
assessing the potential for cascading consequences (Rinaldi et al. 2001). 
To facilitate comparison of risk across sectors and aggregation of risk to higher 
levels of abstraction, risk analysis for critical asset protection at all levels should share a 
common analytical framework; this quality enables information collected at the asset-
level to support decisions made at the portfolio-level and vice-versa.  To date few 
methodologies claim to possess this characteristic, and this observed deficiency has in 
fact inspired attention toward standards for comparison and compatibility by professional 















Figure 2-5. Notional portfolio of assets in a state (Ayyub et al. 2005) 
 
 












Figure 2-7. Various asset portfolios defined by locale, sector, etc. 
 
2.3. Notions and Measures for Security Risk Analysis: Threat and Vulnerability 
Given a pairing of cause ei and consequence cj, the risk Rij can be expressed 
mathematically as the triplet of a initiating event, ei (i = 1, 2, … m), and the probability of 
this scenario, pij, and a particular consequence, cj (j = 1, 2, …, n) as follows: 
 
 jijiij cpeR ,,=  (2-2) 
 
The expression above defines the risk triplet (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981), where 
according to one interpretation (McGill and Ayyub 2007b) the initiating event describes 
the cause of loss, the consequence is a description or valuation on the final outcome 
resulting from this cause, and the probability measures the likeliness that initiating event 
30 
 
ei will lead to the consequence cj.  The total risk, R, is the set of all ordered triples, i.e., R 
= {Rij}.  The probability term, pij, in Eq. 2-2 is the joint probability of ei and cj, or: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )iijjiij eeccep Pr|Pr,Pr ==  (2-3) 
 
where the operator Pr(.) denotes the probability of the event contained in the parentheses.  
Note that while the expression in Eq. 2-3 is represented in discrete form, cj can represent 
the event that the loss exceeds some prescribed value C, and thus Eq. 2-3 offers an 
expression for exceedance probability given a continuous probability distribution on loss.  
Kept in discrete form, cj can be a narrative of consequence, a consequence level from a 
finite set of bins, etc. 
 
2.3.1. The Nature of Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is the manifestation of the inherent states of a system, whether 
sociological, economic, technological, or a combination of these, that render it 
susceptible to harm or loss (Haimes 2006).  Hollenstein (2005) characterizes vulnerability 
as the change in system states relative to a change in the intensity of the parameters of 
initiating events, that is, vulnerability considers the sensitivities of a system and its 
structures (Hollenstein 2002).  This definition follows suit with vulnerability as the 
degree of loss attributable to a given element or set of elements at risk resulting from the 
occurrence of a hazard offered by Lamadrid (2002), which considers the characteristics 
of the system and its structures, way of life, demographic conditions and economic 
factors.  McGill and Ayyub (2007b) proposed an operational definition for vulnerability 
31 
 
as the many-to-one mapping of initiating event to consequence, where the process of 
vulnerability analysis examines all the ways in which a system can induce harm or loss to 
society following the occurrence of an initiating event.  According to their interpretation, 
a system is said to be vulnerable to a specified degree of loss following the occurrence of 
a specified event if there exists a potential for at least one array of system states to form a 
bridge from event to consequence. 
According to Eq. 2-3, the term Pr(cj | ei) defines a probability distribution over C 
that accounts for the all the variations in subsequent events that lead to similar 
consequences.  In this view, Pr(cj | ei) gives the probability that an initiating event ei will 
lead to a consequence cj, or more generically, gives the probability that ei will map to cj.  
In light of the discussion on vulnerability as a mapping from cause to consequence in 
Section 2.1, it can be said that this probability is a measure of vulnerability with respect 
to consequence cj due to an initiating event ei, where Pr(cj | ei) = 1 if ei definitely leads to 
cj (i.e, the decision maker is completely vulnerable), Pr(cj | ei) = 0 if it is impossible for cj 
to result from ei (i.e., the decision maker is invulnerable), and 0 < Pr(cj | ei) < 1 according 
to degree of likeliness that ei will lead to cj in light of existing interventions.  For 
example, in the case where there are no interventions to prevent or mitigate loss, such as 
a naked man standing in a remote open field during a lightning storm, vulnerability 
assessment is easy: given that an intense bolt of lightning aims for this man, there is 
nothing to stop it from striking, nothing on the man to minimize its effects, nor are there 
first responders nearby to treat the man once zapped.  Thus, the man’s probability of 
realizing the consequence cj = “immediate death” given that ei = “the man is struck by 
lightning” is high, perhaps around 0.9 (the residual probability of 0.1 is allocated toward 
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the complementary event “not immediate death,” which includes the consequences 
“delayed death” and “survival” with and without injury).  Indeed, most practical 
situations encountered by homeland security practitioners are much more complicated 
than the “man in the field” scenario.  Often, there are numerous interventions in place 
that seek to prevent a certain degree of loss following the occurrence of an initiating 
event, such as measures to harden critical assets against the damage-inducing effects of 
various threats, redundancies in the affected systems that isolate or limit cascading 
effects, response and recovery measures that seek to mitigate potential loss after an event, 
and measures to detect, respond to, and defeat adversaries in the case of malicious 
attacks. 
Common representations of vulnerability include fragility curves, such as those 
used in engineering risk analysis for assessing the probability of different damage states 
as a function of hazard intensity.  The insurance industry refers to fragility curves as 
vulnerability curves which characterize the mapping between hazard intensity and 
economic loss.  Some risk methodologies interpret vulnerability in a general qualitative 
way using linguistic labels such as “Low,” “Medium” and “High” to characterize 
potential for realizing an undesirable end state, whether explicit (e.g., “adversary success) 
or implied (e.g., net dissatisfaction).  In general, any statement pertaining to the likeliness 
that some initiating event or cause will result in a particular undesirable consequence is a 
statement of vulnerability.  In this light, the commonly encountered “probability of 
adversary success” is a quantitative statement of vulnerability, albeit narrow in the sense 
that the cause is an adversary attack and the consequence is adversary success where the 
undesirability of adversary success is implied but not valued.  Similarly, a statement of 
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resilience, or “the ability to recover quickly from illness, change, or misfortune” in the 
narrow context of infrastructure (American Heritage Dictionary 2007), is also a statement 
about vulnerability, albeit in the positive sense.  That is, resilience describes the likeliness 
that a system will return to a predefined functional state or better within a specified 
amount of time (consequence) given that it has been damaged or disrupted (cause).  The 
equivalent statement of resilience in terms of vulnerability rephrases the consequence as 
the system not returning to a predefined state or better in an amount of time that exceeds 
some value. 
The process of vulnerability assessment seeks out the various ways in which 
different states of a system align to render it susceptible to harm at either a micro (e.g., 
personal, asset) or macro (e.g., system, portfolio) level.  Contributors to vulnerability 
include the ability of a security system to detect, engage, and defeat adversaries, the 
hardness of system elements, the importance of the elements to higher-level system 
functions, and the effectiveness of response and recovery capabilities (McGill and Ayyub 
2007).  A significant class of contributors to the vulnerability of an asset, region, sector or 
more generally a system to loss is the internal and external interdependencies among 
system elements (Rinaldi et al. 2001; Lee et al. 2007).  While much attention has been 
afforded to “infrastructure interdependencies” in recent years (President’s Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997), dependencies that bear on system 
performance objectives of all sorts have been studied for decades using techniques such 
as event sequence diagrams (Swaminathan and Smidts 1999a; Swaminathan and Smidts 
1999b), system block diagrams, and fault tree analysis (Modarres et al. 1999).  Tools 
such as these, however, are typically used to study a system that is owned and operated 
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by a single decision making body. Yet, these smaller scale systems are, in actuality, 
subsystems or a larger interconnected network of systems that service society (e.g., a 
“meta-system” or “megastructure” per Amin 2002).   
One cause for concern is the dependence between systems owned by one decision 
making body (e.g., asset owner) and systems owned by another with dissimilar interests 
(e.g., utility provider), both of which may service the same set of customers (e.g., the 
public, other asset owners).  While system decomposition may be feasible at a small 
scale, it is much more difficult if not impossible to do in the context of a system of 
systems, particularly when some of these systems lack a deterministic logical structure 
(e.g., sociological systems, financial markets) that define how one system element relates 
to another, either directly or indirectly.  To study such large scale systems, researchers 
typically infer system response and performance from statistical data describing past 
infrastructure performance, such as through the use of input-output matrices (Haimes and 
Jiang 2002; Cheng et al. 2006).  Recent work has attempted to study system 
interdependencies in a more analytic manner, such as through the use of linear 
programming models (Lee et al. 2007) or simple first-order interdependency matrices 
(Ayyub et al. 2007), the former being a rigorous approach for modeling physical 
interdependencies and the latter being a coarse but general approach for 
interdependencies of all types.  Regardless of form, understanding how a system responds 
to events afflicting its elements is important for accurately describing the susceptibility of 




2.3.2. Probability of Occurrence for the Initiating Event 
In contrast to naturally occurring, accidental or technological initiating events, 
security events are initiated by deliberate, innovative, and arguably unpredictable human 
adversaries that choose from among many possible targets and potentially innovative 
attack modes based on their perceptions of risk, reward, and opportunity (Hoffman 1998).  
Perpetrators of security events have an asymmetric advantage over a defender: whenever 
possible, potential adversaries will leverage the force multiplying effect of surprise to 
achieve success against defenders that are either unaware of the nature of the event or 
unprepared to defend themselves against unknown tactics (McGill and Ayyub 2008).  
Accordingly, the security threat landscape is constantly changing, and as such it is 
extremely difficult to forecast attacks since adversaries adapt by improving their tactics, 
enhancing their capabilities or developing new capabilities, and seek opportunities to 
catch their opponents off guard (Manunta 2002).   
The probability of initiating event component of Eq. 2-1 is arguably the most 
uncertain aspect of the security risk problem.  Actually, this argument holds for both 
naturally occurring and anthropic event, as the scientific community currently lacks 
reliable techniques to estimate the when and where the next event will occur for both 
categories (Woo 2002).  Yet, unlike natural forces, adversaries have the freedom to 
choose an attack mode and target type that, when combined, come closest to meeting 
their goals (Fedra 2008).  Consequently, recent events has prompted the security 
community to accept malicious attacks as a new species of trouble (Slovic 2002), which 
puts defenders in the frame of accepting malicious attacks as part of normal course of 
business (Resnyansky 2006).  That is, the idea that a malicious attack will occur is often 
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taken as a given (e.g., the probability of attack is taken as one), and the emphasis is then 
placed on where attacks are likely to occur. 
Assuming rational adversaries with specified goals, preferences, and attitudes 
(Hoffman 1998), several game theoretic analyses have shown that they shift their 
attention toward softer targets and less logistically complicated threat types in reaction to 
the security investments made by defenders (Sandler and Lapan 1998; Bier et al. 2005; 
Enders and Sandler 2005).  Given a specified type of security event, one can assume that 
potential adversaries assign greater weight to assets with higher perceived utilities from 
the point of view of the defender with respect to their intentions and capabilities (Pate 
Cornell and Guikema 2002; Martz and Johnson 1987; Cox and Babayev 2003; Woo 
2002).  One must also consider the visibility of the asset and potential scenarios to the 
adversary; for example, it is reasonable to assume that an asset or plausible scenario with 
significant coverage in open-sources is more visible to potential adversaries than one with 
little or no coverage and that more visible assets are more likely to be chosen as targets 
for attack (Pluchinsky 2002; Department of Justice 2000).   Security risk analysis must 
capture the changing preferences of an observant and creative adversary, and should 
recognize the fact that not all assets are necessarily visible to the adversary. 
 
2.3.3. Previous Methodological Work 
A number of qualitative, semi-quantitative, and quantitative approaches that touch 
on the threat and vulnerability aspects of Eq. 2-3 have been proposed in the last several 
decades.  Martz and Johnson (1987) developed a model that focuses on theft of nuclear 
munitions by armed aggressors, and employs logical event tree modeling to assess the 
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probability of adversary success, a subcomponent of  based on the effectiveness of 
available countermeasures to protect these assets.  Dessent (1987) developed a similar 
model for prison security system design that focused on preventing prisoner escape.  Both 
of these models consider the vulnerability portion of Eq. 2-1 (and Eq. 2-3) as a security 
problem, and divide it into measurable parameters such as probability of detection, 
adversary delay and defender response time; however, since the consequences of security 
system failure are implied for these problems (e.g., theft of nuclear materials, prisoner 
escape), neither model captures the non-security contributors to vulnerability, such as 
emergency response measures or lack thereof.  The Center for Chemical Process Safety 
Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) methodology (Center for Chemical Process 
Safety 2002) is similar in this regard, but applies the so-called “security event” principle  
for assessing conservative (i.e., worst case) consequences given adversary success.  The 
Common Risk Model developed by Morgeson et al. (2006) also does this in their 
definition of consequence as the “worst reasonable case” valuation for loss.  In essence, 
these two methodologies assume a worst-case vulnerability condition following 
adversary success. 
Pate-Cornell and Guikema (2002) proposed an overarching model for assessing 
terrorism risks where threat is taken as product of relative scenario attractiveness and 
probability of intent, vulnerability is taken as the probability of adversary success, and 
consequences are described by expected disutility associated with a threat scenario from 
the U.S. perspective.  According to this model, the attractiveness of a scenario might 
decrease in response to security investments, thus giving rise to an increase in the relative 
attractiveness of alternative scenarios.  This model seems to capture the behavior of 
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rational adversaries; however, since relative attractiveness is assessed with respect to a 
strict set of scenarios derived from threat intelligence (i.e., as in a threat-driven 
approach), the model may not capture plausible scenarios for which no supporting 
intelligence is available.  Lack of awareness of plausible threat scenarios renders a 
decision maker susceptible to surprise, and thus contributes to overall vulnerability.  
Moreover, the utility of this threat model is predicated on accurate insight into adversary 
perceptions and motivations, which is often difficult to assess in general since all 
potential adversaries surely differ in their intent and capabilities.  However, the general 
approach is in agreement with suggestions made by other leading researchers in the field 
(Cox and Babayev 2003; Woo 2002). 
A number of other researchers, companies, non-profit organizations, and 
government entities have developed their own methodologies for assessing threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and risk in the security context.  These include a variety of 
qualitative and semi-quantitative vulnerability and risk assessment methodologies 
(Livermore 2002; American Chemistry Council 2002; American Petroleum Institute 
2003; American Society for Industrial Security 2003; Association of Metropolitan 
Sewerage Agencies 2002; Barnett et al. 2005; US Federal Highway Administration 2003; 
Cepan et al. 2006; Chapman and Leng 2004; Chen et al. 2002; Chen et al. 2005; US 
Department of Homeland Security 2006a; Einarsson and Raussand 1990; US Federal 
Emergency Management Agency 2003; ExxonMobil 2002; Hart 2002; Gutting 2008; 
Herabat 2003; Karimi et al. 2005; Kemp 2007; Leone and Liu 2006; Masse et al., 2007; 
National Rural Water Association 2002; Ren 1999; Science Applications International 
Corporation 2002; Taylor 2002; Veatch et al. 2002; Flax et al. 2001; Moore 2006; Leung 
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et al. 2004; Wang and Liu 2006; Wu and Zhang 2005; Zhang et al. 2003; Zhang et al. 
2004; Zhao et al. 2006), as well a quantitative methods based on an additive model (Ray 
2007), geometric model (Kowalski 2002), multi-attribute utility theory (Apostolakis and 
Lemon 2005), project risk management (Rosoff  and von Winterfeldt 2007),  simple 
probability theory (Kaplan 2002; Matalucci 2002; Moore et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2006), 
structural reliability analysis (Mahoney 2007; Stewart and Netherton 2007), simulation 
(Arboleda 2007), Markov models (Doyon 1981), evidence theory, possibility theory and 
fuzzy sets (Darby 2006; Eisenhawer et al. 2003; Karimi 2006; Karimi et al. 2007), and so 
on.  Notwithstanding the differences in opinion as whether and how numbers are assigned 
to the threat, vulnerability, and consequence components of their respective models (see 
Manunta 1999; Harris 2004), all of these methods in general share a philosophical basis 
for security risk analysis that is consistent with pre-2001 thinking (see US Department of 
the Army 1994; Ezell et al. 2000).  However, what most of these models do not share is a 
common framework that promotes consistency across assets and aggregation to support 
decisions at higher levels of abstraction and leadership (as noted by National Research 
Council 2002), nor do most quantify risk in such a way that accommodates all sources of 
uncertainty and facilitates meaningful benefit-cost analysis.  Thus, in order to quantify 
risk in a meaningful way as required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
Number 7 (Bush 2003) and to support defensible benefit-cost analysis for critical asset 
protection (US Department of Homeland Security 2006b), a general quantitative risk 
analysis framework that accommodates varying degrees of resolution, levels of 




2.4. Actionable Risk Information 
From the point of view of a homeland security decision maker, guidance on where 
to focus attention on reducing risk is at least as important as the risk results alone.  For 
example, conveying insight into which risk contributors (variables) should be targeted for 
risk reduction is as important as the magnitude of risk.  Borrowing on the concept of 
actionable intelligence (Kipfer 2005), actionable risk assessments produce actionable 
information that has practical and relevant use to the decision maker for the purposes of 
identifying viable options for risk reduction (Ayyub et al. 2007). 
To provide actionable risk information means to provide both a measure of risk 
and suggestions on what to do about it, which essentially addresses the fourth question 
defining risk analysis in section 2.1.  Making risk information “actionable” amounts to 
performing a sensitivity analysis as described in many books on probabilistic risk 
analysis for nuclear power plants (see Kumamoto and Henley 2000).  Combined with the 
risk profiles determined for each initiating event, sensitivity and importance measures 
provide insight into which risk contributors should be targeted for cost-effective risk 
reduction, and thus communicate actionable risk information. 
 
2.5. Risk Management: Countermeasures and Mitigation 
The process of risk management begins immediately when a decision maker 
receives the results of a risk assessment.  Given a baseline risk exposure as determined 
via risk assessment, there are four broad risk management options available to the 
decision maker: accept the risk either temporarily or permanently (tolerate the risk), 
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transfer the risk to someone else (e.g., insurance, such as described by Kunreuther 2002), 
avoid the risk (e.g., change design, do something different), or manage the risk through 
countermeasures and mitigation (Ayyub 2003).  For risk management, Masse et al. 
(2007) citing a recent RAND study posed the following question for consideration by 
decision makers: “should resources be allocated based on risk, risk reduction, or 
something else?”  In accordance with the fifth question of risk (section 2.1), the 
Department of Homeland Security’s response to this latter question advises decision 
makers to accept benefit-cost analysis as the prime determinant in homeland security 
decision making (US Department of Homeland Security 2006b).  According to one 
interpretation, the benefit should be measured in terms of risk reduction and the costs 
measured in terms of life-cycle cost to implement and sustain the action in addition to the 
constraints the action places on future decisions (Ayyub 2003; Haimes 1991).  McGill et 
al. (2007) also suggests that risk management decisions should also consider whether 
each alternative is affordable and whether it meets risk reduction objectives.  Sandman 
(1989), however, cautions that any proposed objective risk reduction must also be 
mindful of stakeholder perceptions as these perceptions, however incorrect they are, are 
the dominant factor in risk reduction investments.  Consequently, some decisions may 
limit the ability of a decision maker to act in the future (per the six question of risk in 
Section 2.1). 
Options available to homeland security decision makers consist of any purchase, 
action, program, etc. that yields a favorable improvement in the parameters of Eq. 2-3.  In 
the process of identifying options for risk reduction, the decision maker should consider 
ways to decrease the probability of occurrence of high risk events and decrease the 
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vulnerability of their system to highly unfavorable consequences by improving site 
security and reducing potential consequence.  Bashor (1998) highlights that preparedness 
for terrorism and other threatening events should span three domains: prevention, 
preparedness, and response.  Hammond (2005) echoes this sentiment in his suggestion 
that hospitals must improve their level of preparedness to respond to mass casualty and 
disaster incidents.  DHS adhered to this guidance by offering disaster preparedness 
planners a framework for establishing protection priorities for regional planners in terms 
of a target capabilities list, or TCL (US Department of Homeland Security 2006c).  The 
TCL provides a list of 37 capabilities spanning five broad categories – common, 
prevention, protection, recovery, and response – as shown in Figure 2-8 – with 
recommended target performance levels that provides a basis for assessment of current 
capabilities and a means for determining where improvement is needed.  Other risk 
mitigation options includes physical security systems that lessen the chances of adversary 
success (Garcia 2006), deterrence measures aimed at dampening adversary attractiveness 
(Fuqua and Wilson 1977), measures to decrease the fragility of structures and systems 





Figure 2-8. DHS target capabilities list (US Department of Homeland Security 2006c) 
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Chapter 3.  Methodology 
 
3.1. Risk Analysis Framework 
In the context of this research, risk is defined as the potential for harm or loss as 
perceived by the decision maker (Ayyub 2003).  The following sections develop a event-
tree or logically-driven security risk analysis framework for critical asset protection 
called Critical Asset and Portfolio Risk Analysis or CAPRA based on the view that ei ∈ E 
defines a set of initiating security events at a specified location where the probability 
Pr(ei) is the probability that the initiating event will occur at this location in a specified 
time period, and cj ∈ C defines a set of consequences (finite or continuous) that could 
result from these initiating events where the vulnerability term Pr(cj | ei) gives the 
probability that consequence cj follows from ei.  This framework consists of six phases as 
shown in Figure 3-1, namely Scenario Identification, Consequence and Severity 
Assessment, Overall Vulnerability Assessment, Threat Probability Assessment, 






















Figure 3-1. Framework for asset- and portfolio-level risk analysis 
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As required for any meaningful risk analysis (Elms 1992), the stated objective of 
the CAPRA methodology is to support operational and strategic resource allocation 
decisions at the asset or portfolio levels by providing meaningful measures of overall risk 
that lend themselves to a judgment of acceptability and, if necessary, quantitative benefit-
cost analysis.  Results from the first four phases produce information that combines in the 
fifth to make actionable statements about risk.  The sixth phase provides tools for 
evaluating alternative strategies for managing risk if the assessed risk was determined to 
be unacceptable, unavoidable, and non-transferable. 
Throughout the subsequent sections, values for all parameters of the CAPRA 
model, in principle, can be obtained via a combination of data analysis, systems 
modeling, expert elicitation, and evidential reasoning (Ayyub 2001; Cooke and Goosens 
2004).  The proposed framework adopts the view of information as a generalized 
constraint (Zadeh 2005), where such information is used to reduce the uncertainty on 
what values a model parameter can take.  In the event of missing information, this 
methodology errs on the side of caution by assuming a default worst-case value (e.g., the 
probability of attack is one) unless less-conservative values can be justified on the basis 
of available information and judgment.  Depending on the information available to 
support analysis, model parameters may be specified in terms of point estimates, 
moments, intervals, probability distributions, imprecise probabilities (Walley 1988), or 
hybrid numbers, and may be provided by various compatible models.  The case studies in 
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate how the CAPRA framework can leverage information 
represented in various forms and from a variety of different compatible models to 
perform an asset-level assessment (Chapter 4, a traditional probabilistic analysis) and 
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portfolio-level assessment of regional assets (Chapter 5, with approximate reasoning and 
random sets) that expresses risk in a form that remains faithful to the real uncertainties 
present in the supporting information. 
To accommodate the fact that many practical situations suffer from constraints 
(e.g., time, fiscal) on available resources for analysis, results may be screened to 
determine which threat scenarios warrant further analytical treatment.  In lieu of a 
complete analysis in each stage, conservative values are employed by default to facilitate 
rapid completion of the analysis process.  That is, by default the CAPRA approach 
assumes the worst-case values for each parameter.  These conservatisms can be revisited 
later if they are determined to have a significant effect on the final results.  
 
3.2. Scenario Identification 
The scenario identification phase constructs an exhaustive set of plausible 
initiating events afflicting an asset or system based on the inherent susceptibilities of its 
constituent elements to the damaged-inducing mechanisms associated with a wide range 
of naturally occurring and anthropic events.  The scenario identification process begins 
with a complete characterization of an asset or system, including its mission and key 
elements.  Nominal performance of an asset or system can be described by a success 
scenario (Kaplan et al. 1999).  Key elements are those whose compromise would disrupt 
the nominal performance of an asset or system, and can be identified from fault trees, 
reliability block diagrams, or other systems modeling techniques (Modarres et al. 1999).  
Once identified, each key element is classified according to its fundamental 
characteristics and functionality to facilitate mapping to relevant event types using a 
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target susceptibility diagram such as is shown in Figure 3-2 or a target susceptibility 
matrix such as the one shown in Table 3-1.  An exhaustive partitioning of the event space 
into initiating events is generated using this procedure, where each event defines a unique 
combination of key element and threat type.  Alternatively, one could define an initiating 
event as the combination of threat type and occurrence location, and only those events 
occurring in proximity to key elements would be in the set of relevant risk scenarios.  
These scenarios can be qualitatively screened-in based on the potential effects and their 
severity following an attack using such tools as a modified failure modes, effects and 
criticality analysis (FMECA) procedure to determine which scenarios warrant further 
consideration.  An expanded target susceptibility and risk scenario screening matrix 
based on elements of the FMECA (Modarres et al. 1999) and CARVER (National 
Infrastructure Institute 2006; US Department of the Army 1998; US Food and Drug 
Administration 2007) methods is shown in Table 3-2. 
 
 
Table 3-1. Target susceptibility matrix for a notional asset 



































Explosive X X X X X 
Projectile / Impact X X X X - 
Incendiary X X - - X 
Chemical - - - - - 
Biological - - - - - 
Radiological - - - - X 
Laser - - - - - 
Radiofrequency - - - - X 
Cyber - - - - X 
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HAZMAT Storage 10 10 Failure to contain hazardous materials 9/4 8/4 2/2 -- -- -- -- -- 6/3 -- -- -- -- 
Release of hazardous 
materials followed by  
exposure of employees 
to lethal chemicals; 
damage to storage tank; 
disruption of mission 
6 2 5 4 6.7 45 
Building 10 10 
Failure of building 
to house internal 
functions 
8/3 3/1 7/2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Loss of building 
structure; injury or death 
of occupants 
4 2 5 1 4.7 (2) 
Pipeline 7 4 
Failure to transit 
products from 
storage tank to rail 
cars 
6/3 4/1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 8/2 -- -- -- -- 
Loss of ability to transit 
materials from tank to 
rail car; environmental 
contamination 
2 4 5 8 4.3 (5) 
Rail Car 10 10 
Failure to provide 
means for shipping 
chemicals to 
customers 
4/3 5/1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 7/5 -- -- -- -- 
Temporary loss of 




5 1 4 1 5.6 5 
Computer Network 5 6 
Failure to provide 
electronic means of 
communication 
9/3 -- 9/2 -- -- 2/5 -- 6/5 10/2 -- 4/1 -- -- 
Lost ability to 
communicate between 
computers, store and 
recover data, 
communicate to the 
Internet 
2 4 3 1 4.5 (3) 
Criticality: Measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack Accessibility: Ability to physically access and egress from target Effect: Amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production 





























Targetable Element Event Type (Threat Item)Risk Agent (Phenomenology)
Lines that connect 
phenomenology to 
targetable element define 
target susceptibility
Lines that connect risk 
agent to phenomenology 
define threat capability
 
Figure 3-2. Mapping from event type (threat item) to targetable element via risk agents 
(phenomenologies) 
 
3.3. Consequence and Severity Assessment 
The consequence and severity assessment phase estimates the maximum potential 
loss for each consequence dimension of concern to the supported decision maker.  That 
is, this phase bounds the scope of imagined outcomes for all dimensions of loss that are 
applicable in the current decision making context, whether crisp (e.g., fatalities, dollars) 
or vague (e.g., psychological, public confidence).  The maximum potential loss is the 
worst case loss that would result in the worst possible circumstances (Ayyub 2003).  Four 
“crisp” or “natural” dimensions of loss are initially considered as described in Table 3-3.  
These loss dimensions are crisp in the sense that their units of measure are natural and 
can be, in principle, expressed in consistent units such as dollars through the use of 
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appropriate loss conversion factors (Ayyub 2003; Viscusi and Aldy 2003).  Meaningful 
measures for “softer” loss dimensions such as public confidence, governance and national 
security (White House 2003) remain elusive and are therefore not currently considered in 
this analysis. 
 
Table 3-3. Crisp loss dimensions and associated units of measure 
Loss Dimension Description Unit of Measure 
Casualty 
 
Measures the number of people injured or killed 
 
 
Number of fatality 
equivalents (Ayyub 2003) 
Economic Measures direct economic damage including property 
loss, repair and cleanup costs, and environmental losses 
 
Current Year Dollars 
Mission 
Disruption* 
Measures degree of mission disruption for each 
relevant mission 





Measures the time to reconstitute lost functionality and 
production capacity 
 
Time (Days or Years as 
appropriate) 
* Aggregate disruption is the product of mission disruption and recuperation time, and is expressed in units of %-time 
 
 
3.4. Overall Vulnerability Assessment 
As described in Chapter 2, Section 2.3, the overall vulnerability of an individual 
decision maker to a given consequence cj due to the occurrence of an initiating event ei 
can be viewed as the probability that ei leads to cj, or Pr(cj | ei).  Given the occurrence of 
an initiating event, the assessment of overall vulnerability requires a thorough 
consideration of all intermediate interventions, whether active, passive, deliberate, or 
unintentional, between cause and consequence.  The event tree shown in Figure 3-3 
illustrates a high-level logical sequence of interventions that seek to limit loss following 




1. The attack defeats all security measures 
2. The attacker successfully imparts a load on the target 
3. The target suffers damage from this load 
4. The system responds to this damage 
5. Response and recovery fail to prevent this degree of loss 
 
A quick observation of this event tree suggests that the vulnerability to a given degree of 
loss with respect to an initiating event requires all intermediate interventions between 
cause and consequence to fail.  In other words, only one intervention needs to work 
(albeit perfectly) to prevent loss.  In this context, the interventions behave in a manner 
consistent with a parallel systems reliability model (Modarres 1992), where total success 




Figure 3-3. Logical sequence of interventions between initiating event (cause) to resulting 
degree of loss (consequence) 
 
Upon observation of Figure 3-3, one can divide the scope of overall vulnerability 
into two categories: protection vulnerabilities and response vulnerabilities.  This division 
is similar to the categorical make-up of the DHS Target Capabilities List (Department of 
Homeland Security 2006d) for dealing with the effects of an initiating event, where the 
protect mission area describes capabilities for decreasing protection vulnerabilities and 
the response and recovery mission areas describe capabilities for decreasing response 
vulnerabilities.  Protection vulnerabilities include all weaknesses between the initiation of 
a security event and physical damage of the targets. Interventions in this category include 
countermeasures aimed at decreasing the probability of adversary success, denying 
access to critical targets, and measures to improve hardness (or lessen the fragility) of 
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potential targets with respect to the damage-inducing mechanisms of the threat type.  
Response vulnerabilities include all deficiencies in responding to damage following 
exposure and damage which can be mitigated through such interventions as emergency 
response capabilities to treat injured survivors and measures to quickly reconstitute 
lifeline services following disruption. The following sections describe contributors to the 
overall vulnerability from each of these two categories and develop a mathematical 
expression for overall vulnerability that facilitates its quantitative expression. 
 
3.4.1. Protection Vulnerability 
Protection vulnerability describes the probability distribution over a range of 
possible damage states following the occurrence of an initiating event considering the 
fragility of critical elements, target accessibility, and security system weaknesses (McGill 
and Ayyub 2007b).  This category of vulnerability considers all contributors to overall 
vulnerability between the initiating event and damage of targets.  That is, given the 
occurrence of an initiating event, protection vulnerability measures the probability of 
suffering a specified level of damage, whether in terms of damage or compromise of 
afflicted elements or size of an exposed human population.  If damage cannot be reliably 
prevented following an initiating event, then a target is vulnerable to any degree of loss 
unless the system compensates with suitable strategies to control the ensuing losses. 
According to the event tree in Figure 3-3, a simple mathematical expression for 
protection vulnerability, ( )kiP deV , , to a specified level of damage, dk ∈ D, where D is a 
set of damage states, can be obtained as follows: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ikiikiP eSKdeSKeSdeV ,,|Pr,|Pr|Pr, =  (3-1) 
 
where Pr(S | ei) is the probability of adversary success for initiating event ei, Pr(K | S, ei) 
is the probability that the adversary will successfully impart his load on the target given 
adversary success (i.e., accessibility), and Pr(dk | K, S, ei) is the probability that the target 
will then suffer damage dk given adversary success and successful imparting of its load.  
According to this equation, an adversary must defeat a defender’s security measures, 
successfully execute the damage-inducing mechanisms of the attack, and then damage or 
compromise the target at a specified level dk to achieve success.  Equation 3-1 assumes 
that failure of the attacker to overcome the security system OR failure of the attacker to 
successfully execute his attack given the opportunity OR failure of the attack to cause 
damage dk will result in no loss.  Expressed in terms of favorable defender characteristics 
where higher values for the descriptive parameters are desired, Eq. 3-1 can be rewritten 
as: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )kiHiKiSkiP deIeIeIdeV ,111, −−−=  (3-2) 
 
where IS(ei) = 1 – Pr(S | ei) is the effectiveness of security system interventions with 
respect to the initiating event ei, IK(ei) = 1 – Pr(K | S,ei) is the effectiveness of denial 
interventions (intrinsic and extrinsic) that seek to deny execution of the attack against the 
specified target according to ei, and IH(ei, dk) = 1 – Pr(dk | K,S,ei) measures the 
effectiveness of hardness interventions (intrinsic and extrinsic) of the target to damage 
state dk given exposure to the damage inducing mechanisms associated with ei.   
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Based on Eqs. 3-1 and 3-2, the three primary dimensions of protection 
vulnerability are security system weaknesses, target accessibility, and fragility of target 
elements.  In the case of no security, complete target accessibility, and fragile targets, IS = 
IK = IH = 0 and VP = 1.  In contrast, the presence of just one perfect intervention (e.g., IS = 
1) results in VP = 0.  A discussion of each dimension of protection vulnerability is 
provided in the following sections. 
 
3.4.1.1. Security System Weaknesses 
In order to minimize the probability of adversary success given an attempt, the 
defender force must possess capabilities to effectively detect, engage, and neutralize 
determined adversaries considering a full spectrum of possible threat types and attack 
profiles.  Security system effectiveness is based on the weakest link model – failure to 
detect, engage, or defeat a potential adversary amount to adversary success at overcoming 
security (Hicks et al. 1987), such as would be the case in the absence of effective security 
countermeasures.  Furthermore, as with most technological systems, the reliability of a 
security system, in general, is a function of hardware, software, and human elements, all 
of which are intertwined in complex ways.  Security is thus a complex function of 
characteristics associated with the asset, defender, adversary, and the situation at hand 
(Manunta 1999b). 
The assessment of security system effectiveness begins by identifying a complete 
set of plausible intrusion paths leading to each key asset element.  Intrusion paths begin 
at the outside perimeter of a facility since it is the first line that must be crossed by an 
intruder to gain access to a protected element (Fischer and Green 2004).  Each intrusion 
 56
path consists of a sequence of discrete security zones; a security zone is defined as a 
discrete region within the asset perimeter containing a distinct set of countermeasures and 
features.  Security zones are generally separated by static detection measures. The cross-
section of an intrusion path shows the sequence of security zones connecting the asset 
perimeter to the target element, such as is shown in Figure 3-4 (Dessent 1987).  For a 
given threat type, compatible attack modes (e.g., ground vehicles for explosive threats) 
are identified for each intrusion path.  The combination of attack mode and intrusion path 
defines an attack profile.  The set of attack profiles partitions a given threat type into an 
exhaustive set of non-overlapping combinations of attack mode and intrusion path.  
Identification of the attack profiles can be achieved via an attack profile compatibility 
matrix such as that shown in Table 3-4. 
 
 
Figure 3-4. Cross-section of an intrusion path 
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Table 3-4. Attack profile compatibility matrix for an initiating event 





































On Person X X X X - 
Ground Vehicle X X - - - 
Waterborne Vehicle - - - X - 
Aerial Vehicle - - - - X 
 
Detection requires capabilities to sense the environment, recognize whether an 
attack is taking place, and annunciate these observations to a responder (e.g., watch 
guard) for action.  For example, a security system comprised of a closed-circuit television 
system (CCTV) system equipped with intrusion detection software, trained watch 
personnel, and effective alert policies possesses all the required elements of an effective 
detection capability.  Similarly, a team of guards standing visual watch over a well lit, 
security-friendly environment (Crowe 1991) also possesses the ability to sense, assess, 
and annunciate, even if not supported by modern security technology. 
Detection measures come in two types – static (demand-based) measures and 
active (time-dependent) measures.  The performance of a static detection measured is 
specified as a probability of detection that is a function of attack mode and adversary 
capability.  For example, the probability of detection for a trip wire depends on device 
placement, adversary awareness of this device, and ability of the adversary to overcome 
this measure, whether deliberately or by accident.  In contrast, a key measure of 
effectiveness of active detection measures is the mean time to detect a given type of 
adversary and attack mode; the value of this parameter is affected by the choice of 
detection elements and degree of implementation, to include policies, procedures, 
 58
personnel training, and predictability.  For example, the probability of detection for a 
naïve loiterer trespassing in a restricted area subject to random patrols of watch personnel 
increases for larger exposure times. 
Engagement requires that the security system delay determined adversaries long 
enough for defenders to respond to and engage the adversary.  Delay measures include 
the distance between the boundary of the protected perimeter of an asset and the target 
element, as well as any physical barriers along the way such as gates, fences, moats and 
bollards.  A key measure of effectiveness for delay measures is time to defeat, which can 
be conservatively specified as a minimum value, characterized by the mean and 
coefficient of variation of a probability distribution, etc.  For example, the effectiveness 
of security doors are specified in units of time to defeat under a set of standardized 
conditions (e.g., a 2-minute door).  Measures to respond include suitable numbers and 
proper placement of guard forces or other response vehicles so as to minimize the 
defender response time.  Engagement is achieved if the defender response time is less 
than the time remaining for the adversary to execute an attack once detected. 
Neutralization requires that defenders possess the ability to defeat determined 
adversaries once engaged.  When viewed from a stress-strength point of view (Kotz 
2003), neutralization occurs when the “strength” of the defender force exceeds the 
“stress” imposed on it by the adversaries.  The strength of a defender force largely 
depends on the capabilities of security guards, which considers the size of the security 
force, available weapons, quality of training, and complex social and organizational 
factors such as morale, team coherence, etc. (see Apostolakis 2004; Bunn 2004; Carroll 
2004; Sagan 2004; Westrum, 2004).  In principle, human reliability analysis (HRA) 
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techniques can be used to estimate the probability of neutralization, such as by 
establishing a baseline probability of neutralization that is then modified according to the 
states of various adversary performance influencing factors or performance shaping 
factors such as skill, number of adversaries, and determination (see Smidts et al. 1997; 
Chang and Mosleh 2007). 
 
3.4.1.2. Target Accessibility 
Given failure of the security system to successfully prevent the execution of an 
attack, adversary success still requires that the attacker successfully accesses and 
successfully imparts its load on the target.  In many cases, access is assured given the 
opportunity to do so, thus leaving to chance whether the attack will go off as intended 
(e.g., a “dud” explosive).  However, in some cases such as a physically enforced standoff 
attack, target access depends on the size of the target with respect to standoff distance.  
From a given distance, a small target is more difficult to hit than larger target.  A cyber 
analog is access to an air-gapped SCADA system via the Internet: in this situation, access 
is denied since the chosen intrusion path cannot lead to the desired target. 
 
3.4.1.3. Target Fragility 
The fragility or hardness is a physical property of target elements that describes 
the degree of damage resulting from exposure to a hazard of specified intensity (Woo 
1999; Filliben et al. 2003).  The performance of target elements under the load imparted 
by a given hazard is typically expressed in terms of a fragility curve that specifies the 
probability of realizing a certain state of damage as a function of intensity of the damage-
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inducing mechanisms of the hazard (e.g., Ellingwood 2001).  For populations of humans 
exposed to biological or chemical hazards, the analog to fragility curves are dose-
response curves (Kowalski 2002).  An element is said to be “hard” with respect to a given 
threat type if the probability of damage is sufficiently low relative to the range of possible 
intensities.  Conversely, an asset is said to be “soft” or “fragile” if small intensities lead to 
significant damage.  (Admittedly, the descriptive phrases “hard,” “soft,” and “fragile” are 
quantitatively ambiguous despite clear intensions, a characteristic which begs for the use 
of fuzzy sets (Zadeh 1965)).  In general, the hardness of an asset or system element can 
only be improved through reengineering (e.g., blast retrofitting, vaccination).  For 
example, Newland and Cebon (2002) discuss ways in which the buildings could be 
retrofitted to prevent collapse in the event of deliberate aircraft impacts. 
 
3.4.2. Response Vulnerability 
Response vulnerability describes the probability distribution on loss associated 
with a given damage state considering the intrinsic susceptibility of the target system to 
loss in light of system interdependencies and the availability of response and recovery 
measures (McGill and Ayyub 2007b).  This category of vulnerability consists of all 
contributors to vulnerability that influence the degree of loss that would be realized given 
that a specified initiating event ei resulted in damage state dk.  That is, response 
vulnerability measures the probability of a specified consequence or outcome associated 
with a given damage state.  If loss cannot be effectively controlled, then the asset is 
vulnerable unless this deficiency is compensated for by effective security 
countermeasures that minimize probability of adversary success.  According to the event 
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tree in Figure 3-3, a simple mathematical expression for response vulnerability, VR(cj, dk), 
for a given degree of loss cj resulting from damage state dk can be expressed as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∑=
m
kmPmPjkjR dcccdcV |Pr|Pr, ,,  (3-3) 
 
where Pr(cP,m | dk) is the probability that a loss cP,m could result from damage state dk 
(which is a measure of the intrinsic resistance of the target systems to loss, or basis loss), 
Pr(cj | cP,m) is the probability that the actual loss is cj in light of the effectiveness of 
response and recovery capabilities given that the basis loss was cP,m, and the summation 
is taken over all m states of potential loss.   Equation 3-3 assumes that the response 
vulnerabilities are assessed independently of the scenario that initiated damage state, dk, 
which may be true for the “crisp” consequence dimensions such as direct economic 
damage and number of fatalities, but less true for the “softer,” less ascertainable 
dimensions such as psychological impact where the nature of the attack itself prompts 
loss irrespective of the resulting damage (e.g., an unsuccessful bomb attack).  Expressed 
in terms of favorable defender characteristics, Eq. 3-3 can be rewritten as: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∑ −−=
m
kmPImPjRkjR dcIccIdcV ,1,1, ,,  (3-4) 
 
where IR(cj, cP,m) = 1 – Pr(cj | cP,m) is the effectiveness of response and recovery 
capabilities and II(cP,m, dk) = 1 – Pr(cP,m | dk) is the intrinsic resistance to loss.  Based on 
Eqs. 3-3 and 3-4, the two dimensions of response vulnerability are the intrinsic 
susceptibility of a system to loss following damage and the weakness of (or lack of) 
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response and recovery capabilities.  A discussion of each dimension of response 
vulnerability is provided in the following sections. 
 
3.4.2.1. Basis Loss 
Given some level of damage associated with a target element, the ensuing loss 
depends on the system or asset’s intrinsic resistance to loss that accounts for the value of 
the target, and the physical, geographical, cyber and logical connectedness (Rinaldi et al. 
2001) of the target element with respect to a larger system defined by the needs and 
concerns of a specific decision maker, such as an asset owner, regulating agency, or 
regional policymaker.  For example, damage to a redundant component of a power plant 
might be significant from an asset owner’s perspective since the component must be 
repaired or replaced, but may be inconsequential from the perspective of those 
responsible for the regional energy grid so long as the total supply of power to the grid 
continues to meet or exceed consumer demands.  Intrinsic resistance is expressed as a 
probability distribution (however imprecise) over loss in the absence of response and 
recovery measures (i.e., basis loss), and as such depends on the definition of the system 
and its interdependencies, the context in which it the system is viewed, and dimensions of 
consequence considered in the analysis. 
 
3.4.2.2. Response and Recovery 
The loss following the occurrence of an adverse event can be tempered with 
measures to respond and recover from an event.  Response measures seek to quickly 
contain immediate loss, such as responding to a mass casualty or mass exposure incident 
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with effective triage and treatment capabilities.  For example, measures to enhance 
community and regional disaster preparedness fall under this category (McGill 1957).  
Recovery measures seek to restore an affected asset or system to as close to its pre-
incident condition as possible, such as by reducing the duration of accumulating losses.  
The effectiveness of response and recovery capabilities is assessed conditionally for each 
degree of basis loss. 
 
3.4.3. Overall Vulnerability 
Overall vulnerability is a multidimensional property of a system that describes the 
probability of realizing a specified degree of loss following the occurrence of an initiating 
event (McGill and Ayyub 2007b).  Given the expressions for protection vulnerability, VP, 
in Eq. 3-1 and response vulnerability, VR, in Eq. 3-3, the overall vulnerability, VT, of a 
target to a given consequence, cj, resulting from initiating event ei can be expressed as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∑=
k
kjRkiPijT dcVdeVecV ,,,  (3-5) 
 
Using the expressions for VP in Eq. 3-2 and VR in Eq. 3-4, the overall vulnerability can be 
expressed in expanded form in terms of interventions as: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∑∑ −−−−−=
k m
kmPImPjRkiHiKiSijT dcIccIdeIeIeIecV ,1,1,111, ,,  (3-6) 
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where the summations are taken over all m states of potential loss and all possible 
damage states k.  Equation 3-6 permits statements about the vulnerability of a system to a 
specified degree of loss resulting from a specified initiating event. 
For example, a team of analysts and engineers can employ Eq. 3-6 to assess the 
overall vulnerability of an enterprise to 100 or more fatalities following a truck bomb 
attack in the underground parking structure.  To make statements about overall 
vulnerability of the company to 100 or more fatalities resulting from an explosive or 
malicious attack in general (considering all delivery modes, targets, and intrusion paths) 
requires an aggregation of the overall vulnerability for each individual attack profile and 
initiating event considered (see Section 3.5.3).   
Implicit in the correct use of Eq. 3-6 is a complete awareness of plausible 
initiating events (Gibson 2003) and awareness of potential outcomes following an event.  
Arguably among the most significant of the security weaknesses, lack of awareness of 
plausible security events and attack profiles facilitates the potential to be surprised by 
potential adversaries who actively seek to exploit these unidentified weaknesses, or from 
unanticipated outcomes following the occurrence of an otherwise considered threat type 
(McGill and Ayyub 2007b).  For example, insufficient awareness of plausible scenarios 
and outcomes may lead to a false impression of security, particularly if these errors of 
omission are significant.  One useful indication of whether a decision maker is 
sufficiently aware of plausible scenarios and their effects is the degree to which a 
decision maker would feel surprised were they to occur (Shackle 1969).  Though difficult 
to measure quantitatively, any significant feeling of surprise should be examined to 
determine whether it is justified: scenarios of maximum surprise should coincide with 
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impossible scenarios, whereas scenarios unaccompanied by any feelings of potential 
surprise should be considered perfectly possible.  Scenarios in between these extremes of 
surprise should be considered regardless of whether they are considered likely, since 
anything considered possible carries with it some degree of likeliness, however small 
(Dubois et al. 2008). 
 
3.5. Threat Probability Assessment 
3.5.1. The Basic Model 
Any statement of probability of occurrence for an initiating event must be in 
relation to number of times, whether “none,” “once,” “more than once,” etc., it is 
believed will occur in a specified time horizon.  In general, an annual recurrence rate, λ 
(in number of events per year), for each initiating event or class of events can be 
estimated, whether based on historical data or expert judgment, so long as it is 
accompanied by appropriate confidence bounds that accounts for all relevant 
uncertainties (expressed as a possibility distribution (Karimi and Hüllermeier 2007), 
probability of frequency (Kaplan and Garrick 1981), etc.).  This recurrence rate or 
frequency provides a basis for estimating the probability of N events in a given time 
period T based on a Poisson model as follows (Ang and Tang 1975): 
 
 






Pr  (3-7) 
 
The use of a Poisson model to estimate number of events in a given time period is 
justified on the basis of maximum entropy arguments in light of the available information 
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on mean annual recurrence rate (Kapur 1990).  Alternatively, one could express the 
probability of an event occurring sometime over a given time span directly. 
Of interest is the probability that some number of potentially adverse initiating 
events will occur over a specified time period.  This probability can be determined from 









λ is the annual rate of occurrence for each type or class of initiating events, 
where A1 ∪A2∪…∪Ak = A and A1∩A2∩…∩Ak = ∅.  The reciprocal of Eq. 3-8 gives the 






=   (3-9) 
 
Equation 3-9 can also express the annual rate of occurrence for a given class of initiating 
events in terms of the total annual rate of initiating events and the conditional probability 
of realizing the particular class of initiating events given an adverse event, A, has 
occurred: 
 















|Pr  (3-11) 
 
Any given class of initiating events can be further decomposed based on specific threat 
types, intensity of event or attack mode, and location of occurrence such as is shown in 
the possibility tree of Figure 3-5.  Defining a scenario ei as the occurrence of a specific 
type of initiating event type, EA, of a characteristic intensity, IE, affecting a given 
location, L, the annual rate of occurrence for this scenario can be determined as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )AAEILAAEIAAEAA kAEkAEkAkAsi ,,,|Pr,,|Pr,|Pr|Prλλ =  (3-12) 
 
It is required that the set of all initiating event types EA for a given threat class Ak, the set 
of all characteristic intensities IE for a given initiating event type, and the set of affected 
locations L be disjoint and exhaustive with respect to a predefined scope to ensure an 
exhaustive set of scenarios; this is an essential requirement for probabilistic analysis.  
Note that L is a general event for an attack occurring at a given location, and may be 
designed so as to include multiple simultaneous attacks at different locations or targets.  
Depending on the scope of decision making, the location can be interpreted as a region 
(such as a city, state, or portion thereof), portfolio of assets (such as in a sector, owned by 
a single entity, or simultaneously affected), or a single asset or small area.  Moreover, the 
events and probabilities in Eq. 3-12 can be further decomposed, but for present purposes 
the expression as presented has sufficient resolution when supported by a suitable 
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description of A.  Comparing the expression in Eq. 3-12 with that of Eqs. 3-10 and 3-11, 
the probability of a given scenario, ei, given the occurrence of A, can be determined as: 
 











,,,|Pr,,|Pr,|Pr|Pr|Pr  (3-13) 
 















Figure 3-5. Possibility tree for threat probability assessment 
 
3.5.2. Proportional Attractiveness Model 
For malicious anthropic initiating events such as an explosive attack, the threat 
probability assessment phase estimates the annual rate of occurrence for each attack 
profile based on the perceived attractiveness of each asset, initiating event type, and 
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attack profile.  More specifically, the annual rate of occurrence, λP, for an attack profile 
can be obtained as: 
 
 λP = λEAAASAP (3-14) 
 
where λE is a baseline annual rate of attack occurrence for a given threat type or class of 
threat types E, AA is the probability of attack at a specific asset given the occurrence of an 
attack of specified type (i.e., asset attractiveness), AS is the probability of occurrence for a 
specific threat scenario given the occurrence of an attack of specified type at a specified 
asset (i.e., scenario attractiveness), and AP is the probability of occurrence for a specific 
attack profile given the occurrence of a specified threat scenario of a given type at a 
specified asset (i.e., profile attractiveness) (McGill et al. 2007).  Comparing Eqs. 3-13 
and 3-14 suggests that: 
 
 ( ) PSAi AAAe =Pr   (3-15) 
 
In contrast to tactical threat analysis that attempts to estimate the probability of 
attack based on available intelligence information to produce warnings and allocate 
tactical resources (McGill and Ayyub 2006; Pate-Cornell 1986), operational or strategic 
threat analysis, in general, seeks to estimate an representative annual rate of occurrence 
or probability for plausible security events and attack profiles in order to obtain 
quantitative expressions for total annual risk.  For operational and strategic decision 
support, the probability of a given initiating event is a function of the annual rate of 
occurrence of the threat type affecting a portfolio of assets to which the asset belongs, 
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and the probability of realizing a specific attack profile given its occurrence.  This latter 
parameter takes into account the relative attractiveness of all assets, their key elements, 
and potential attack profiles with respect to an adversary’s perceptions of probability of 
success for attacking via the corresponding intrusion path and attack mode, gains from 
success, losses from failure, and costs to prepare for and execute an attack.  
Attractiveness also depends on whether the adversary is aware of a particular intrusion 
path to the target or of the target itself; less visible intrusion paths and targets are less 
likely to be considered due to lack of information available to the adversary on their 
existence, and are therefore less attractive. 
Considering the perceived probability of success, ∗SP , gain from success, G
*, loss 
from failure, L*, cost to attack, C*, associated with a given attack profile, the utility of the 
attack profile as perceived by the adversary, UP, can be generically expressed as: 
 
 UP = f(PS*, G*, L*, C*) (3-16) 
 
In order to ascertain the form of the functional f in Eq. 3-16, it is important to first 
characterize the beliefs and capabilities of a notional adversary and how these translate 
into values for the parameters (Drake 1998; Bier et al. 2007).  Such a characterization can 
be generic or specific to a given adversary or group of adversaries.  For example, 
alternative adversary types such as a success oriented adversary (e.g., proportional to 
perceived probability of success, or UP = kPS*), gain seeking adversary (e.g., proportional 
to perceived gain, or UP = kG*), or one seeking to maximize the benefit-to-cost ratio or 
expected utility can be considered as suggested by Yager (2006).  Moreover, adversaries 
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may focus on losses of a specific type, systems of a certain type, or assets situated in a 
given location. 
Assuming a rational adversary, attack profiles perceived to have a higher expected 
utility are more attractive than attack profiles with lower utilities.  Considering the four 
variables comprising the adversary utility function shown in Eq. 3-16, the expected utility 
of an attack profile can be expressed as: 
 
 UP = PS*G* – (1 – PS*)L* – C* (3-17) 
 
If one assumes that the potential adversary (1) seeks to maximize total expected loss, (2) 
has perfect knowledge (i.e., the same as the defender’s knowledge) of loss given success 
and probability of success for each visible attack profile and element, (3) has no 
expectations of survival after the attack regardless of whether the attack was successful, 
and (4) the relative cost to attack is negligible with respect to the expected gain from 




jTjP cPVcU ,  (3-18) 
 
where cj is a quantitative expression for degree of loss, VT(P, cj) is the overall 
vulnerability to realizing cj given ei = P from Eq. 3-5, and the summation is taken over all 
states of loss j.  Note that Eq. 3-18 can be generalized to integral form if the consequence 
is specified as a continuous probability distribution function.  From the four assumptions 
proposed, Eq. 3-18 suggests that the expected utility of a given attack profile from the 
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adversary perspective is equal to the expected loss given the occurrence of the attack 
profile as assessed by the defender. Further assuming that probability of a specified attack 
profile is directly proportional to the relative expected utility with respect to all other 
attack profiles raised to some non-negative power, it seems to follow that the assumptions 
leading to Eq. 3-18 yield a conservative estimate of risk; any deviation in adversary 
perceptions or preferences under these assumptions will apportion a greater degree of 
attractiveness to less consequential scenarios from the defender’s point of view, and thus 
results in a lower estimate of actual risk.  Accordingly, one strategy to maximize risk 
reduction under this assumption might be to promote adversary indifference by 
implementing strategies to reduce the expected conditional risk of all attack profiles to 
the same level. 
An alternative, yet similar formulation to the utility function in Eq. 3-17 is to 
replace the cost to implement the attack (assuming cost to be irrelevant since alternative 
investments are not within the scope of an adversary’s desired options) with a probability 
of achieving the capability needed to implement the attack, or PC.  If the adversary can 
achieve the capability to attack, then the expected utility is taken as before in Eq. 3-17 
without the cost term; otherwise, there is no net gain or loss.  This revised model 
expresses the expected utility from the adversary perspective as: 
 
 UP = PC*(PS*G* – (1 – PS*)L*) (3-19) 
 





jTjCP cPVcPU ,  (3-20) 
 
Note that the form of Eq. 3-20 is the same as Eq. 3-17 with the exception of an added 
probability term PC. 
Similar to the attractiveness model described by Pate-Cornell and Guikema 
(2002) and touched on by Martz and Johnson (1987), the relative attractiveness of the i-th 
attack profile, 
iP
A , can be defined as the ratio of the adversary perceived expected utility 
for a single profitable attack profile (i.e., UP > 0) raised to some non-negative power to 





















where b is a bias parameter and PU ′  is the perceived expected utility of the attack profile 
obtained as: 
 




δ  is a binary variable whose value is 1 if the attack profile is considered (i.e., is 
visible) and zero otherwise.  By convention, 0=
iP
A  if the denominator of Eq. 3-21 is 
zero.  The choice of b greatly influences how probability is apportioned; a value b = 0 
defines a state of complete indifference in adversary preference where all attack profiles 
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are afforded equal probability, a value b = ∞ defines a state where all the probability is 
assigned to the attack profile with the largest utility, and increasing values of b toward 
infinity from zero specify increasing degrees of bias toward higher attractiveness attack 
profiles.  A value in the neighborhood of b = 2 has been suggested by some researchers 
(Powers 2008). 
The relative attractiveness of the i-th threat scenario, 
iS
A , can be defined as the 
ratio of the perceived expected utility for a single threat scenario to the sum of all threat 























U ′  is taken as the maximum perceived expected utility among all attack profiles 








δ  is a binary variable whose value is 1 if the threat scenario is considered and zero 
otherwise.  By convention, 0=
iS
A  if the denominator of Eq. 3-23 is zero.  Alternatively, 
one could assume the scenario attractiveness to be equal to the expected value of all 
associated attack profiles, the minimum values among associated attack profiles, etc., the 
choice being at the reasonable discretion of the analyst.   
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The relative attractiveness of the i-th asset, 
iA
A , can be defined as the ratio of the 
perceived expected utility for attacking the asset with a given threat type to the sum of all 























U ′  is taken as the maximum perceived expected utility among all threat scenarios 








δ  is a binary variable whose value is 1 if the asset is considered and zero otherwise.  
By convention, 0=
iA
A if the denominator of Eq. 3-25 is zero.  As with scenario 
attractiveness, Eq. 3-26 can assume alternative forms (e.g., expected value among all 
attack profiles, minimum value among all attack profiles, etc.) depending on the needs of 
the analyst. 
Assuming that all assets, scenarios, and attack profiles are equally visible, the 
results from Eqs. 3-21, 3-23, and 3-25 can be integrated into Eq. 3-14 to estimate the 
annual rate of occurrence for each attack profile. However, treating asset, scenario, and 
profile visibility in a probabilistic manner insists that Eq. 3-15 be revised to account for 
all combinations of visibility situations.  That is: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )∑=
k
kkii ee νν Pr|PrPr  (3-27) 
 
where Pr(νk) is the probability corresponding to the state where only a given subset of 
assets, scenarios and attack profiles are visible and thus considered by the adversary, 
Pr(ei|νk) is the probability apportioned to ei determined from the approach in Eqs. 3-21 
through 3-26 considering only visible assets, scenarios, and attack profiles, and the 
summation is taken over all visibility combinations.  More explicitly, Eq. 3-27 can be 
written in expanded form as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑∑=
j k l
PSAjkljkji jkljkj
AAAe αβγαβααβγαβα ,,|,||,|Pr|PrPrPr  (3-28) 
 
where αj defines a state where a subset of assets are visible (e.g., 
iA
δ  = 1 for i = 1, 2, and 
5; 
iA
δ  = 0 otherwise), βk defines a state where a subset of threat scenarios associated with 
visible assets are themselves visible (e.g., 
iS
δ  = 1 for i = 1, 2, and 4; 
iS
δ  = 0 otherwise), 
and γl defines a state where a subset of visible attack profiles associated with visible 
assets and threat scenarios (e.g., 
iP
δ  = 1 for i = 1, 2, and 3; 
iP
δ  = 0 otherwise).  The 
probabilities of these events are determined according to the assessed probabilities PVA, 
PVE, and PVP that the assets, key elements, and intrusion paths are visible to the adversary, 
respectively, where for example the situation α6 where assets 2 and 3 among a set of 4 
assets are visible has a probability: 
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  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
43214321
110,1,2,0PrPr 6 VAVAVAVAAAAA PPPP −−====== δδδδα  
 
Moreover, the attractiveness terms 
jA
A α| , jkSA αβ ,| , and jklPA αβγ ,,|  in Eq. 3-28 are 
reassessed for all situations defined by αj, βk, and γl using appropriate values for Aδ , Sδ , 
and Pδ , in Eqs. 3-21, 3-23, and 3-25, respectively. 
It should be noted, as was noted by Pate-Cornell and Guikema (2002), that there 
is currently no empirical justification for the use of the utility ratios as surrogates for 
probability, but is rather justified solely on the basis of the assumption that the 
probability of attack is proportional to the expected utility of alternative plausible attack 
profiles.  However, Woo (2002) does make a good case for the use of such an exponential  
model based on order-of-magnitude comparisons of the utilities of alternative threat 
profiles and scenarios.  Moreover, the appropriateness of using the maximum operator in 
lieu of, say, an averaging operator, minimum operator, etc., in Eqs. 3-22, 3-24, and 3-26 
warrants further attention.  For example, it may be sensible to specify lower-threshold 
values on expected utility for which only those scenarios that exceed this threshold will 
be considered in the analysis, just as it may be sensible to specify minimum values for 
one or more model parameters (e.g., PS* ≥ 0.75, as described by Nerud 2008, or a 
minimum utility threshold as suggested by Bier 2007). 
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3.5.3. Aggregate Vulnerability 
Given a set of initiating events ei belonging to a class of threat types E (ei ∈ E) 
(such as explosive attacks, malicious attacks, or natural hazards), the aggregate 
vulnerability, VA, of the system to a degree of loss cj can be obtained as:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∑=
i
iijTjA EeecVEcV |Pr,|  (3-29) 
 
where Pr(ei | E) is the conditional probability of ei given the occurrence of E, and the 
summation is taken overall all initiating events i belonging to E.  In the case of malicious 
attacks, the probability of an initiating event depends on the attractiveness of the scenario 
relative to other options considered by the adversary.  In general, malicious threats are 
intelligent and adaptive, and to assess the probability of a malicious initiating event thus 
requires consideration of intents, motivations, capabilities, and overall awareness of 
potential targets, threat types, and attack profiles. 
According to the form of Eqs. 3-19, 3-21, 3-23, and 3-25, the conditional 
probability of an initiating event depends on an adversary’s awareness of potential targets 
and perceptions of gain, loss, probability of success, and cost.  In light of the expression 
for aggregate vulnerability in Eq. 3-29, the aggregate vulnerability for malicious attacks 
depends on adversary awareness and perceptions, which can be influenced by 
interventions that limit visibility and enhance deterrence.  These considerations in the 




As can be seen from the development of expressions in section 3.5.2, the visibility 
of an asset or system’s elements and intrusion paths has a significant effect on aggregate 
vulnerability.  If an element or intrusion path is not visible to an adversary, then the 
associated initiating events would not be considered.  Visibility depends on the amount of 
information available to the adversary to assist in attack planning, such as through 
information gained through surveillance and reconnaissance or from open sources (Baker 
et al. 2004; Pluchinsky 2002).  Strategies to minimize visibility serve to decrease 
aggregate vulnerability; however, difficulties in assessing what is truly visible to a 
potential adversary make this contributor hard to measure.  A conservative approach to 
vulnerability assessment is to assume all assets, elements, and intrusion paths are visible 
to the adversary (i.e., probability of adversary awareness is one); any additional measures 
to limit visibility provide a bonus, though largely unassessed, improvement to aggregate 
vulnerability. 
 
3.5.3.2. Perceived Attractiveness 
As noted by Fuqua and Wilson (1977), deterrence affects the psyche of the 
adversary, and thus has influence over the choice of whether to attack and which attack 
profile to choose.  In general, all visible and stated interventions and countermeasures 
have some deterrence value.  The addition of deterrence measures designed solely for 
influencing adversary perceptions has the positive effect of moving adversary attention 
away from less protected elements and intrusion paths, and thus decreases aggregate 
vulnerability.  While having no bearing on the actual performance of an asset under the 
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stress imposed by an adversary, measures such as fake cameras, decoy guards, signage, 
and mock targets serve to decrease vulnerability by creating the appearance of tight 
security or by creating irrelevant attack options.  As with visibility, however, the 
assessing the perceptions of potential adversaries is difficult at best, and thus aggregate 
vulnerability should be conservatively assessed under the assumption of perfect adversary 
knowledge of all key elements, their loss potential, and the existence and effectiveness of 
interventions (i.e., the “mirror-imaging” assumption per McGill et al. (2007)). 
 
3.5.3.3 Observations on Aggregate Vulnerability 
According to the proportional attractiveness model for assessing the probability of 
a deliberate human-caused initiating event, the total mass of probability is biased toward 
those initiating events and attack profiles that are more attractive to the adversary from 
the standpoint of perceived expected utility.  Under the conservative “mirror-imaging” 
assumption that assumes the adversary has perfect knowledge of system vulnerabilities, 
there exists a direct relationship between overall vulnerability and relative probability of 
occurrence for a given initiating event.  That is, the more vulnerable a system is to a 
given initiating threat, the more likely the initiating event is to occur.  Though in most 
circumstances this assumption is conservative, the fact that knowledge of adversary 
perceptions, motivations, capabilities, etc. is inherently limited justifies its use from a risk 
practitioner’s point of view.  Unfortunately, the implications of this assumption is that a 
high overall vulnerability to loss from just one initiating event among a class of events 
dominates the aggregate vulnerability, whereas for naturally occurring events this would 
not necessarily be the case. 
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3.6. Actionable Risk Assessment 
3.6.1. Expressing Risk 
An expression for total risk conditioned on the occurrence of an event among 
class E of initiating events ei in terms of a probability distribution on loss can be 
determined from Eqs. 2-3 and 3-5 as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∑=
i
iijTj EeecVEc |Pr,|Pr  (3-30) 
 
where the summation is taken over the set of all initiating events ei ∈ E.  In expanded 
form for human-cause hazards, Eq. 3-33 can be expressed as: 
 
 ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )



















|Pr  (3-31) 
 
Note that cj can be defined as the probability that the loss C exceeds some value c, which 
in turn causes Eqs. 3-30 and 3-31 to produce exceedance probabilities. 
 
3.6.2. Loss Accumulation 
Accepting the possibility that one or more events may occur within a given period 
of time, the total accumulated loss over a given time period t must consider the possibility 
of n event occurrences.  In general, the loss given the occurrence of an event is dependent 
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on the loss from previous events, the elapsed time since the previous event, and how a 
decision maker decided to reconstitute his lost assets.   For example, if an attack led to 
total loss, the asset owner may decide to not rebuild at all, thus making it pointless for the 











L lFtnltF  (3-32) 
 
where )()( lF nL  is the general n-fold convolution as follows: 
 







In general, Eq. 3-33 must consider the fact that the probability of a given level of loss l  
occurring in the (n+1)th event is dependent on the level of loss realized in the nth event.  If 
it can be assumed that the distribution of loss given an event is independent of the 
spacing and number of events that have already occurred and that the rate of attack 
occurrence afflicting an asset or portfolio of assets is practically constant, the cumulative 
distribution on total accumulated loss in a time period t can be obtained assuming a 
















teltF E λλ  (3-34) 
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It must be noted that the assumption of a constant rate of occurrence for attacks is highly 
contentious, particularly if the attack is of sufficient magnitude to prompt a significant 
defender response on the attacker’s resources.  Manunta (1999a) argues that probabilities 
cannot be justifiably assigned to intelligent adversaries that possess the power to decide 
where and when to attack, yet some empirical research has shown that, in some contexts, 
the overall frequency of attacks may remain constant in a given context despite a shift in 
tactics toward the less logistically complex (Enders and Sandler 2005).  However, it may 
be reasonable to treat a recurrence rate not a statistically derived parameter, but as a 
subjective judgment that facilitates comparison with other rates for which statistics are 
available.  For example, if one judges that the probability of occurrence of a terrorist 
attack within a given time span is less than that of earthquakes by some subjective order 
of magnitude, one could then apply this same order of magnitude reduction in the 
estimated annual recurrence rate for earthquakes to obtain a representative value for the 
terrorism hazard. 
Often, of interest are the consequences following a single rare, catastrophic event.  
In this case, it may be sufficient to focus strictly on the losses of this single event.  
Accordingly, the analyst would leverage only the probability that an event will occur 
within a specified time frame in order to discount the conditional loss-exceedance curve 
given attack occurrence as the probability of a second event will often be much smaller 
than that of the first attack, if a second event is possible at all. 
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3.6.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
A simple expression for determining the sensitivity, S, of some representative 
measure of risk, R, (e.g., mean, medium, 99th percentile) with respect to a favorable 









1  (3-35) 
 
where ΔpRi is the change in the representative value of risk due to a favorable percentage 
change p in the value of the i-th risk contributor (in units of percentage change in risk per 
unit percentage change in the risk contributor) (Ayyub et al. 2007).  If the upper limit of a 
parameter is fixed, p describes the degree of improvement of the variable as the fraction 
of distance between the current state and the ideal state.  For example, assuming two 
parameters x and y bounded by the range [0 (bad),10 (good)], if p is set to 10%, a 
fractional favorable change for x = 2 evaluates risk at x = 2+10%(10 – 2) = 2.8, whereas a 
fractional favorable change for y = 9.5 evaluated risk at y = 9.5+10%(10 – 9.5) = 9.55.  
Alternatively, if the favorable direction of a variable is theoretically unbounded but is 
bounded in the unfavorable direction (e.g., adversary delay time), the fractional change p 
is applied to the inverse of the variable.  For example, if the delay time t  is 20 seconds, 
the fractional favorable change for p = 10% would reassess risk at t = 1/((100% – 
10%)/(20 seconds)) = 22.2 seconds.  Equation 3-35 yields the ratio of fractional reduction 
in risk due to a fixed percentage change in the value of each risk contributor, which is a 
generalization of the risk reduction worth importance measure described by Modarres et 
al. (1999) (which can be achieved by setting p = 100% or 1.0). 
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3.7. Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Benefit-cost analysis provides information that is useful to support strategic 
resource allocation decision making among alternative countermeasures and consequence 
mitigation strategies.  In the context of malicious anthropic initiating events, 
countermeasures aim to reduce the probability of attack or probability of adversary 
success and consequence mitigation strategies aim to reduce the potential consequences 
following an attack, both of which serve to mitigate overall vulnerability to different 
degrees of loss.  The benefit of a risk mitigation action is the difference between the 
values of loss, conditional risk, percentiles of risk, or total annual risk (collectively 
referred to as “state”) before and after its implementation (Ayyub 2003).  The benefit-to-




 State Mitigated- StatedUnmitigate
Cost
Benefit
=  (3-36) 
 
where higher-valued ratios indicate better risk mitigation actions from a cost-
effectiveness standpoint.  The probability that a favorable benefit-to-cost ratio will be 









⎛ ≥ αα  (3-37) 
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where α is an acceptability criterion specified according to the dimensions of benefit and 
cost.  In addition to the results of Eqs. 3-36 and 3-37, selection of a suitable risk 
mitigation action must also consider the affordability of each alternative and whether it 
achieves risk reduction objectives (McGill et al. 2007). 
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Chapter 4. Case Study – Asset Analysis 
 
4.1. Problem Description 
This chapter applies the CAPRA framework developed in Chapter 3 to the 
problem of allocating financial resources to protect a single infrastructure facility or asset 
(e.g., a chemical facility) against the threat posed by malicious attacks.  The point of view 
of this analysis is the facility security manager, and by extension the asset owner, 
responsible for ensuring continuity of business and the safety of his employees and 
visitors.  The decision variables in this study include all aspects of facility security, to 
include detection, delay, response, and defeat measures.  The effects or outcomes of 
concern to the decision maker following an attack include service disruption, property 
damage, environmental damage, and loss of life.  The sources of risk in this case study 
are limited to the phenomenologies associated with an improvised explosive device (IED) 
attack via a variety of different attack modes, including hand-emplaced, ground vehicle 
delivered, and aerial delivered explosives.  The set of targets of the risk is defined by 
seven operational elements shown in Figure 4-1, namely tank 1 (“small tank”), tank 2 
(“large tank”), underground pipeline, loading dock, 80-ton rail cars, railroad track, and a 
main building.  (Note that collectively tank 1 and tank 2 comprise the “tank farm”).  
Supporting elements whose compromise would increase the probability of success for 
attacks (e.g., guard posts, fences, trees) and elements external to the facility whose 
compromise would negatively impact operations (e.g., the rail system, highway 
infrastructure, electric power, end-users) are outside the scope of this analysis.  Note that 
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all aspects of this analysis, to include the facility, its elements, and its characterization, 









80-Ton Tank CarsRailroad Tracks
Mom and Pop Chemical Shop
 
Figure 4-1. Site plan for the notional chemical facility 
 
4.2. Scenario Identification 
The scope of this analysis centers on the risk resulting from an explosive attack 
against elements of the notional chemical facility shown in Figure 4-1.  A set of five 
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attack modes relevant to IED events were considered as described in Table 4-1.  The 
explosive intensity associated with these attack modes is characterized by a simple 
discrete probability distribution constructed over a finite set of charge weight bins (i.e., 
“small,” “medium,” and “large”) where each bin represents a stratification of an 
otherwise continuous probability distribution (Figure 4-2).  The probabilities in Table 4-1 
were informally elicited from an explosives expert (Neale 2008).  Each attack mode 
accesses a target in a specific way.  In particular: 
 
• Hand emplaced (HE) explosive attacks are characterized by explosives delivered 
by a human directly to the target, and includes satchel charges, backpack bombs, 
and suicide attacks.  Hand emplaced explosive attacks are compatible with any 
target accessible to humans on foot and susceptible to the effects of explosives. 
• Ground vehicle (GV) explosive attacks are characterized by explosives delivered 
by ground-transiting vehicles, ranging from small compact cars to large trucks.  
Ground vehicle explosive attacks are compatible with any target accessible via 
roads and susceptible to the effects of explosives.  
• Manned aerial vehicle (AVM) explosive attacks are characterized by explosives 
delivered by any type of human-operated air vehicle capable of carrying 
explosives, including motorized gliders and small airplanes.  Manned aerial 
vehicle explosive attacks are compatible with any target accessible by air and 
susceptible to the effects of explosives. 
• Unmanned aerial vehicle (AVU) explosive attacks are characterized by explosives 
delivered by any type of unmanned or autonomous aerial vehicle capable of 
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carrying explosives, including radio-controlled aircraft and motorized balloons.  
Unmanned aerial vehicle explosive attacks are compatible with any target 
accessible by air and susceptible to the effects of explosives. 
• Waterborne (WB) vehicle explosive attacks are characterized by explosives 
delivered by any type of water-transiting vehicle, including small boats such as 
canoes and kayaks to large vessels such as sailboats, yachts, and barges.  
Waterborne vehicle explosive attacks are compatible with any target directly 




Figure 4-2. Threat intensity distribution for a given attack mode 
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Table 4-1. Explosive attack modes and expected loss given success. 
Delivery System 
Probability of Intensity, p 
Low Med High 
Hand Emplaced 0.9 0.1 0.0 
Ground Vehicle 0.0 0.1 0.9 
Manned Aerial Vehicle 0.8 0.2 0.0 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Waterborne Vehicle 0.0 0.5 0.5 
 
To identify and screen initiating events on the basis of their relevance and first 
order assessment of risk, the hybrid FMECA/CARVER technique briefly mentioned in 
section 3.2 was employed to identify and screen in initiating events for more detailed 
analysis.  In particular, this qualitative risk analysis method examines the inherent 
susceptibilities of all identified elements to a wide array of plausible malicious attack 
types, describes the manner in which the elements fail in response to an attack, and 
speculates on a worst reasonable case outcome given attack.  In light of these narratives, 
this technique scores each of the seven attributes of the CARVER + Shock methodology 
(US Food and Drug Administration 2007) described in Table 4-2. Accepting the logic 
described in the simple possibility tree in Figure 4-3, an expression for the risk score, RS, 
for each initiating event can be obtained as: 
 
 RS = log10RAV + log10[w (10 ) + w$(10$) + wET(10E)+ wS(10S)] (4-1) 
 
where R is the recognizability of the target element, A is the accessibility of the target, V 
is the vulnerability as the likeliness of damage given attempt (i.e., protection vulnerability 
per section 3.4), the criticality is the sum of human harm ( ) and property damage ($), E 
is the economic effect of disruption per unit duration and T is the duration for complete 
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recoverability, and S is the impacts resulting from the shock of the attack to include 
psychological damage and other game changers.  The expression for RS in Eq. 4-1 gives 
an order of magnitude expression of risk, and in linear space corresponds to a simple 
probabilistic risk analysis model (Cox 2005).  Base-10 logarithms are used in Eq. 4-1 to 
accommodate estimates of loss as orders of magnitude, where the scoring schemes for the 
bracketed loss parameters are described in Tables 4-3 (probability terms), 4-4 
(consequence terms), and 4-5 (recoverability).  Given a minimum risk score threshold 
value M, a relative risk priority number, RRPN, can be determined as: 
 
 RRPN = 10(RS – M) (4-2) 
 
For convenience and to enhance communication with senior leadership without loss of 
usefulness of the process, values for RS and RRPN are rounded to the nearest 1/10th for 
display in the hybrid FMECA/CARVER table. 
A complete set of relevant initiating events was obtained using the hybrid 
CARVER/FMECA method as shown in Table 4-6, where an event was deemed relevant 
if its RRPN was 6 or more (i.e., M = 6).  According to Table 4-6, the following initiating 
events are screened-in for full analysis: 
 
• Explosive attack against chemical tank 1 (small) 
• Explosive attack against chemical tank 2 (large) 
• Explosive attack against main building 
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For the purposes of illustration, the remainder of this chapter example focuses only on the 
disjunctive event “explosive attack against tank farm,” which corresponds to an attack 
occurring at tank 1, tank 2, or both.  It is reasonable to consolidate these two scenarios 
into one since it is assumed to be a relatively trivial to attack both simultaneously given 
their close proximity to one another, or at the very least an attack on one has a significant 
potential to incite common cause failures in the other. 
 
 




Table 4-2. Hybrid FMECA/CARVER model parameters and interpretation 











s Recognizability (R) Ease of identifying target Likeliness that a determined adversary would 
recognize the value of the target in question, 
measured as a probability 
Accessibility (A) Ability to physically 
access and egress from 
target 
Likeliness that the adversary could access the 
target in the absence of security measures, 
measured as a probability 
Vulnerability (V) Ease of accomplishing 
attack 
Likeliness of adversary success at damaging 
the target considering security measures and 












Human Harm ( ) 
Measure of public health 
and economic impacts of 
an attack 
Order of magnitude of the seriousness of 
human health effects considering injuries and 
fatalities, measured on a bounded 
constructed scale 
Criticality:  
Property Damage ($) 
Order of magnitude of the seriousness of 
property damages and asset loss, measured 
on a bounded constructed scale 
Effect (E) Amount of direct loss 
from an attack as 
measured by loss in 
production 
Order of magnitude of the value of lost 
production through dissolution of the facility 
Shock (S) Shock value of an attack 
in terms of psychological 
and other impacts 
Order of magnitude of the game changing 
consequences, or seriousness of the shock to 
the system 
Recoverability (T) Ability of the system to 
recover from an attack 
Time to reconstitute production as a fraction 
of time to dissolution 
 
Table 4-3. Scoring scheme for each probability parameters of the hybrid approach 
Score 
Interpretation of Parameter at Each Score Level 
Recognizability (R) Accessibility (A) Vulnerability (V) 
0 It is near impossible that the 
adversary will recognize the 
element 
The target is completely 
inaccessible to an adversary 
in light of plausible adversary 
capabilities 
The security measures make 
it nearly impossible for an 
adversary to achieve success 
in light of plausible adversary 
capabilities 
5 There is an even chance that 
the adversary will recognize 
the element 
There is an even chance that 
a determined adversary can 
access the target in light of 
plausible adversary 
capabilities 
There is an even chance that 
a determined adversary will 
successfully defeat security 
measures in light of plausible 
adversary capabilities 
10 It is near certain that the 
adversary will recognize the 
element 
It is near certain that a 
determined adversary can 
access the target in light of 
plausible adversary 
capabilities 
It is near certain that a 
determined adversary will 
successfully defeat security 
measures in light of plausible 
adversary capabilities  
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Table 4-4. Scoring scheme for each consequence parameter of the hybrid approach 
Score 
Interpretation of Parameter at Each Score Level 
Criticality: Human 
Harm ( ) 
Criticality: Property 
Damage ($) Effect (E) Shock (S) 




Not Used 2 $100-$1,000 $100-$1,000 
3 $1,000-$10,000 $1,000-$10,000 
4 Minor Injuries Only $10,000-$100,000 $10,000-$100,000 Minor Psychological 
Response 5 Major Injuries Only $100,000-$1M $100,000-$1M 
6 1-10 Lives $1M-$10M $1M-$10M Major Psychological 
Response 7 10-100 Lives $10M-$100M $10M-$100M 
8 100-1,000 Lives $100M-$1B $100M-$1B Severe Psychological 
Response 9 1,000-10,000 Lives $1B-$10B $1B-$10B 
10 >10,000 Lives >$10B >$10B Shutdown 
w 5 1 1 1 
 
Table 4-5. Scoring scheme for the recoverability parameter 
Score 0 2 4 6 8 10 
Percentage Time 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
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Table 4-6. Hybrid FMECA/CARVER assessment for the notional chemical facility 






































































Tank 1 (Small) Failure to contain hazardous materials 
Release of hazardous materials 
followed by exposure of employees 
to lethal chemicals; damage to 
storage tank; disruption of mission 
7 6 7 2 6 
Tank is very visible but with few indications 
of current volume; Additional guard fence 
protection beyond baseline security 
8 8 7 7.4 24 
Tank 2 (Large) Failure to contain hazardous materials 
Release of hazardous materials 
followed by exposure of employees 
to lethal chemicals; damage to 
storage tank; disruption of mission 
7 6 7 3 6 
Tank is very visible but with few indications 
of current volume; Additional guard fence 
protection beyond baseline security; tank 
structure is vulnerable to damage from  
8 8 7 7.4 24 
Pipeline 
Failure to transit products 
from storage tanks to rail 
cars 
Minor release of hazardous 
materials followed by quick 
containment to minimize employee 
exposure; damage to pipeline; 
minor business disruption 
5 5 7 1 4 
No subsurface access without digging; main 
access control point and distance are the only 
barriers; highly ambiguous where the 
pipeline runs 
2 3 6 4.8 (15) 
Loading Dock Failure of structure Loss of use of loading dock; requires ad hoc substitute 5 3 0 2 4 
Highly recognizable asset; only baseline 
security measures apply with main access 
control point and distance being the only 
barriers; structure highly vulnerability to 
damage from explosion 
9 9 8 5.5 (3) 
Rail Cars 
Failure to provide means 
for shipping chemicals to 
customers 
Loss of rail cars for shipping; 
replacement available within days 5 4 2 0 5 
Rail cars are very visible to a facility insider; 
only baseline security measures apply 9 10 7 5.6 (3) 
Railroad Track Failure to allow passage of transiting rail cars 
Loss of ability to transit rail cars 
for shipping product; fix can be 
achieved very quickly 
0 3 2 0 4 
Difficult to damage in any significant way 
using explosives; only baseline security 
measures apply; track is very visible 
10 10 5 3.7 (182) 
Main Building 
Failure to house 
personnel and 
administrative functions 
Exposure of personnel to effects of 
blast to include; with the exception 
of lost people, no major disruption 
to operations due to quick 
reconstitution of administrative 
support functions at a remote 
facility 
6 5 2 3 6 
Main building is less visible than all other 
elements except for the pipeline, but 
recognizable once on the facility; baseline 
security measures apply 
10 10 8 6.7 5 
Criticality: Measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack Accessibility: Ability to physically access and egress from target Effect: Amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production 
Recognizability: Ease of identifying target Vulnerability: Ease of accomplishing attack Recoverability: Ability to recover from an attack Shock: Shock value of the attack 
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4.3. Consequence and Severity Assessment 
As stated in the problem description in Section 4.1, this analysis considers four 
consequence dimensions assessed from the point of view of the facility owner as follows: 
 
• Repair and replacement costs (measured in dollars) 
• Fatalities and injuries (measured in equivalent fatalities) 
• Recuperation time at full disruption (measured in days) 
• Environmental damage (measured in units for land area) 
 
Table 4-7 describes the maximum potential loss for each consequence dimension.   
Constant consequence conversion factors are used to convert all non-monetary 
consequences into an equivalent economic value.  The consequence conversion factors 
used in this analysis are shown in the third column of Table 4-7.  Since this analysis is 
looking at the risk situation exclusively from the point of view of a facility owner, 
external consequences such as downstream cascading effects and decreased public 
confidence are not considered.  Moreover, while it can be expected that an attack of any 
type will result in “shock” effects (e.g., vicarious liability (Douglas 1929)) directly felt by 
the asset owner, such impacts are outside the scope of this analysis. 
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Fatalities 50 persons $6.0-M 
Repair Costs $20.0M N/A 
Recuperation Time 90 days $100K/day 
Environmental Damage: 
Chemical Release 10 acres $300K/acre 
 
4.4. Overall Vulnerability Assessment 
As described in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, overall vulnerability assessment examines 
both protection and response vulnerabilities.  This study employs probabilistic event tree 
modeling and systems reliability engineering concepts to assess security system 
effectiveness, target accessibility, and fragility of key elements to arrive at a discrete 
probabilistic representation of protection vulnerability.   However, because this particular 
facility lacks indigenous emergency response capabilities, the assessment of response 
vulnerability is simplified to focus exclusively on basis loss. 
 
4.4.1. Security System Effectiveness 
In order for a security system at any level to defeat an adversary, the adversary 
must be detected, engaged by response forces, and neutralized; failure to succeed at any 
one of these steps results in an overall failure to defeat a determined adversary (Hicks et 
al. 1999).  Figure 4-4 illustrates an example event tree for an intrusion path at a facility 
consisting of three security zones, where the overall facility security system consists of 
hardware, human, and software elements (Smidts et al. 1997; Modarres et al. 1999; 
Mosleh and Chang 2004; Li et al. 2005; Li et al. 2006).  Defining interruption as the 
combined event that the adversary has been detected and engaged by response forces, a 
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simple equation giving the probability of interruption, PI, for an intrusion path consisting 
of n security zones considering only passive security measures can be expressed as 
(Dessent 1987): 
 


















P  is the probability that the adversary is detected with the passive detection 
measures present in security zone j and 
jDE
P |  is the probability that the defender force 




Figure 4-4. Event tree for assessing security system effectiveness 
  
In general, the probabilities in Eq. 4-3 are a function of both time and adversary 
capability, and their assessment can be obtained with knowledge of the mean time to 
detect for active (i.e., time-dependent) detection measures and probability of detection for 
static (i.e., demand-based) detection measures (Doyon 1981; Kobza and Jacobson 1997), 
the adversary delay time associated with each barrier along an intrusion path, and 
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response times of the defender forces.  The probability of engaging the adversary given 
detection, PE|D can be expressed as: 
 
 ( )DRDE ttP ≤= Pr|  (4-4) 
 
where tD is a random variable describing the total adversary transiting delay time between 
the point of detection and the target (plus time for egress if egress is part of the scenario) 
and tR is a random variable describing the time for the defender to respond to and engage 
the adversary.  Using the stress-strength reliability model (Ayyub and McCuen 2002; 
Kotz 2003), the probability of engagement can be computed as: 
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where the capital F and lower-case f denote the cumulative distribution and probability 
density functions, respectively, for the event in the subscript. 
More significant is the probability of detection for active-detection measures, 
where the probability of detection is a function of duration of an adversary exposure in a 
security zone.  This probability can be characterized by the exponential cumulative 
distribution function, FDA, as follows: 
 







ttFDA exp1  (4-6) 
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where MTTD is the mean time to detect which is a function the defender capabilities to 
sense, recognize, and annunciate the presence of an adversary.  Equation 4-6 assumes a 
constant rate of detection given the presence of an adversary in a security zone.  The 
probability density function, fDA, for this model can be expressed as: 
 










1  (4-7) 
 
For active detection measures, detection can occur at any time while an adversary is 
present in a security zone.  Accordingly, Eq. 4-3 must be revised to accommodate active 
measures by incorporating the following expression for probability of intervention given 
detection in a security zone: 
 












Pr|Pr ττττ dfttttP DADDDRI  (4-9) 
 
For security zones containing both active and passive detection measures, the probability 
of intervention is: 
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Pr|Pr1Pr ττττ dfttttPPttP DADDDRDPDPDRI  (4-10) 
 
For a security system composed of a sequence of n security zones with arbitrary 
composition of passive and active detection measures, Eq. 4-3 can be generalized as: 
 


















where the probability of intervention is determined from Eq. 4-10.  Using the model for 
security effectiveness assessment described in Hicks et al. (1999), the probability that the 
defender interrupts and defeats the adversary (i.e., the security system effectiveness), IS, 
can be expressed as: 
 
 INIS PPI |=  (4-12) 
 
where INP |  is the probability that the defender neutralizes and defeats the adversary given 
interruption by the defender.  The results from Eq. 4-12 can be interpreted as the 
reliability of the security system with respect to a given challenge defined by the attack 
profile (McGill et al. 2007).   
As shown in Figure 4-5, four representative intrusion paths that define relevant 
plausible security events afflicting the tank farm.  Figure 4-6 illustrates these intrusion 
paths in relation to tank farm attacks, each divided into a sequence of one or two security 
zones.  For the event “explosive attack against the tank farm,” the attack profile 
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compatibility matrix shown in Table 4-8 defines all relevant combinations of delivery 
system and intrusion path, where an “X” denotes a relative pairing between intrusion path 
and attack mode.  Table 4-9 summarizes notional values for security system performance 
variables in relation to security zones and applicable attack profiles.  Since delay and 
response are non-negative values with an unbounded upper limit, maximum entropy 
arguments insist that these parameters be characterized by lognormal distributions when 
only a mean and coefficient of variation was provided (Kapur 1990).  The summary 
results for probability of intervention, probability of neutralization (as an input) and 
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Ground (via Water)
Ground (via Main Access)
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INTRUSION PATH CROSS-SECTION COUNTERMEASURES
 
Figure 4-6. Intrusion paths to a chemical tank 
 
Table 4-8. Attack profile compatibility matrix for explosive attack against the tank farm 





























On Person X X X - 
Ground Vehicle X - - - 
Waterborne Vehicle - - - - 
Aerial Vehicle - - - X 
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1 150 0.15 
60 0.20 
0.0 300 
2 30 0.20 0.5 60 
3 150 0.20 0.5 1,200 
4 180 0.25 0.0 450 
Ground 
Vehicle 
2 10 0.20 0.7 30 





5 60 0.20 120 0.10 0.0 300 
*Note: Delay time and response time distributions are assumed to be lognormally distributed 
 
Table 4-10. Summary of results for the explosive attack against tank farm event 





Hand emplaced via forest 0.3292 0.70 0.2305 
Hand emplaced via main access road 0.5490 0.70 0.3843 
Hand emplaced via water 0.2820 0.70 0.1974 
Ground vehicle via main access road 0.0486 0.20 0.0097 
Manned aerial vehicle via air 0.0000 0.20 0.0000 
Unmanned aerial vehicle via air 0.0000 0.10 0.0000 
 
4.4.2. Target Accessibility 
If the security system fails to defeat the adversary, the adversary must then 
successfully impart a load to the target in order to cause damage.  For each of the five 
attack modes considered, Table 4-11 gives a notional probability of successful attack 
execution that applies equally to all target elements.  This value accounts for both 
uncertainty in weapon performance and the accessibility of the target.  Note that because 
the probability of successful execution is zero for both the tank farm and main building 




Table 4-11. Probability of successful execution for each of the five delivery systems 
Attack Mode Probability of Successful Execution 
Hand Emplaced 0.98 
Ground Vehicle 0.95 
Manned Aerial Vehicle 0.90 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 0.75 
Waterborne Vehicle 0.00 
 
4.4.3. Target Hardness and System Response 
Given that the adversary successfully imparts a load onto its target, the target 
must be unable to resist the load if damage, and consequently, loss or harm is to be 
achieved.  In this study, the “fragility” of system response is expressed in terms of a 
series probability distributions constructed over each consequence dimension as a 
function of threat intensity.  Table 4-12 describes system response fragility with respect 
to an explosive attack against the tank farm for a variety of explosive intensities.  This 
approach is in contrast to a more detailed analysis that would first assess the probability 
of alternative damage states followed by an assessment of probability for different 
degrees of basis loss (i.e., system response) for each damage state (see, for example, the 
second case study in Chapter 5).  However, since this study is designed to inform 
decisions to invest in improved security, the added resolution for accommodating both 
target fragility and system response as separate variables is unnecessary.  The fragilities 
are given in Table 4-12. 
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Table 4-12. Fragility of system response to different attack intensities 
Consequence 
Dimension 
Conditional Loss Distribution* 
Low Med High 





Fatalities 0.20 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.35 0.10 
Repair Costs 0.60 0.10 0.70 0.15 0.80 0.10 
Recuperation Time 0.25 0.05 0.50 0.10 0.75 0.15 
Environmental 
Damage 0.10 0.02 0.30 0.10 0.50 0.10 
*Note: Conditional loss distributions are assumed to follow a beta distribution 
 
Assuming non-negative dependence (i.e., positive quadrant dependence) among 
the loss distributions for each consequence dimension, the probability density and 
cumulative distribution functions on loss for each relevant attack profile for the tank farm 
events is shown in Figure 4-7 for the bounding cases of independence and perfect 
positive dependence.  According to Figure 4-7, loss is expressed as a fraction of the 
maximum potential loss for each consequence dimension, and as such is expressed over 
the unit interval.  Given fixed upper and lower bounds on loss in conjunction with a mean 
and coefficient of variation, maximum entropy arguments insists on expressing the 
uncertainty in loss in terms of beta distributions (Kapur 1990).  Together, the cumulative 
distribution functions assuming independence and perfectly dependent random variables 
represents the lower and upper bounds, respectively, on the cumulative distribution of the 
actual loss distribution (Ferson et al. 2004).  Table 4-13 summarizes the moments of the 
resulting distribution on aggregate loss (or aggregate fragility) expressed as a fraction of 
the maximum potential aggregate loss valued in dollars.  In this example, the aggregate 
maximum potential loss is $332-million, which is obtained by summing the product of 
maximum potential loss and consequence conversion factor for each consequence 
dimension.  From Figure 4-7 and Table 4-13, it is observed that there is no practical 
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difference between the aggregate loss distributions assuming independence and assuming 
perfect dependence, where at its worst the deviation between the mean of the expected 
conditional loss distribution for the “low” case is less than one percent.  According to this 
observation, it is justifiable to assume one or the other dependency case, this choice being 
what is most computationally efficient.  The remainder of the example, however, 
considers both dependency cases. 
 
Table 4-13. Aggregate fragility of system response to different attack intensities 
Dependence 
Assumption 
Conditional Loss Distribution* 
Low Med High 





Independent 0.2260 0.0596 0.3291 0.0462 0.3891 0.0915 
Perfectly 
Dependent 0.2246 0.0528 0.3295 0.0578 0.3893 0.1009 





Figure 4-7. Probability density and cumulative distribution functions for loss 
 
4.4.4. Response and Recovery 
In this example, it is assumed that the facility does not possess indigenous 
response and recovery capabilities, and thus relies on external support to mitigate loss in 
the event of a successful attack.  However, because the facility owner is unable to directly 
influence response and recovery capabilities controlled by external agencies, the worst 
case of no response and recovery capabilities is assumed.  Expressed mathematically, the 




 ( ) ( ) 1,1|Pr ,, =−= mPRmP ccIcc   
 
This gives the expected loss given a successful attack (i.e., the so-called conditional risk) 
for each attack profile as described in Table 4-14. 
 
Table 4-14. Expected aggregate loss give successful attack against the tank farm for both 
the independent and dependent case 
Attack Profile Conditional Risk ($Million) Independent Dependent 
Hand emplaced via forest 59.2 58.9 
Hand emplaced via main access road 47.3 47.1 
Hand emplaced via water 61.7 61.4 
Ground vehicle via main access road 119.7 119.7 
Manned aerial vehicle via air 73.7 73.4 
Unmanned aerial vehicle via air 56.3 55.9 
 
4.5. Threat Probability Assessment 
It is assumed in this study that neither the facility owner nor security manager has 
any information that is useful for establishing actual adversary intent on the basis of 
actual motivations and capabilities, nor for identifying who the actual adversaries are that 
threaten the facility.  To compensate for this missing threat information and to fulfill the 
requirements for analysis, this study assumes that, for each visible element, the adversary 
has perfect knowledge of facility loss potential and the effectiveness of protective 
security countermeasures.  As described in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, these assumptions 
permit the use of the proportional attractiveness model under the mirror imaging case, 
where the adversary’s perceived probability of success is equal to the probability of the 
complement to security system effectiveness and the perceived gain from success is 
directly proportional to the defender’s assessed loss from failure.  Under these 
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assumptions and further assuming perfect visibility of key elements and attack profiles 
and a perceived probability of capability acquisition for each attack mode as described in 
Table 4-15, a series of probability distributions describing the relative likeliness of 
alternative tank farm attack profiles can be constructed according to Eqs. 3-21 and 3-22 
as shown in Figure 4-8 for bounding values of the bias parameter b (i.e., b = 0 and b = ∞) 
and one intermediate value (e.g., b = 2). 
 Despite missing information on actual adversary motivations and capability, this 
analysis assumes there is sufficient information to assess a probability of attack profile 
visibility (shown in Table 4-16) that accounts for adversary awareness or familiarity of 
alternative attack modes and facility intrusion paths.  A comparison of the assessed 
probabilities of attack for each tank farm attack profile with and without considering 
visibility is shown in Figure 4-9 assuming a bias parameter of 2. 
 
Table 4-15. Notional perceived probability of successful capability acquisition 
Mode of Attack Probability of Successful 
Capability Acquisition, PC 
Hand Emplaced 0.95 
Ground Vehicle 0.85 
Manned Aerial Vehicle 0.70 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 0.50 
Waterborne Vehicle 0.85 
 
Table 4-16. Assessed visibility of tank farm attack profiles 
Attack Profile Profile Visibility 
Hand emplaced via forest 1.0 
Hand emplaced via main access road 0.8 
Hand emplaced via water 0.7 
Ground vehicle via main access road 1.0 
Manned aerial vehicle via air 0.4 







































Figure 4-8. Threat probabilities without visibility for different values of b (for the 




Figure 4-9. Probability distribution over attack profiles with and without considering 
visibility (b=2) (for the independent and perfectly dependent cases) 
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Accepting a bias parameter of 2 and the assessed visibilities of attack profiles, the 
aggregate conditional loss distribution given an attack against the tank farm considering 
all tank farm attack profiles, their overall vulnerability, and relative probabilities assessed 
according to the proportional attractiveness model is shown in Figure 4-10.  The expected 
aggregate loss (fraction of aggregate maximum potential loss) given the occurrence of an 
attack against the tank farm is $92.4-million (0.2783) and $92.5-million (0.2787) for the 
independent and dependent case, respectively, which amounts to a discrepancy of less 
















Figure 4-10. Individual and aggregate loss distributions for tank farm attack profiles 
(shown only for the independent case) 
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To obtain an estimate of overall facility risk with respect to explosive attacks, 
attack profiles centered on the main building must also be considered.  Assuming perfect 
visibility of the tank farm and a visibility of 0.6 for the main building, the relative 
conditional probability of attack at an element and the probability density and cumulative 
distribution on aggregate loss given an attack at the facility can be obtained as shown in 
Figure 4-11 for both the independent and perfectly dependent cases.  The resulting 
expected loss given attack is $87.9-million and $88.0-million per event for the 

















































Figure 4-11. Individual and aggregate probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions considering tank farm and main building attack profiles 
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4.6. Actionable Risk Assessment 
Assuming a subjectively assessed return period on attacks at the facility under 
study of once every twenty-five years with a coefficient of variation of 0.5 and that the 
loss between events is independent, a family of loss exceedance curves spanning a ten 
year planning horizon can be constructed as shown in Figure 4-12 using the techniques 
for loss accumulation described in Eqs. 3-32 and 3-33.  In this figure, the 1st, 50th, and 
99th percentiles are shown for only the independent case.  Also shown in Figure 4-12 is 
the expected loss and coefficient of variation as a function of percentile distribution.   
For the purposes of sensitivity analysis, the expected 10-year accumulated loss of 
the 99th percentile distribution will be considered ($65.5-million).  Since this analysis was 
designed to inform investment decisions to improve facility security, a sensitivity 
analysis was conducted on all controllable security variables (e.g., mean time to detect, 
probability of static detection, delay and response times, etc.) to produce actionable risk 
information that suggests where the decision maker should focus attention for decreasing 
risk.  The scope of this sensitivity analysis considers only the impacts on risk internal to 
the facility due to changes in the performance variables, and does not account for 
corresponding redistribution of attack probabilities across a portfolio of assets.  Table 4-
17 summarizes the results of this sensitivity analysis using the fractional favorable 
change approach described in Eq. 3-34 with a fixed p value of 10%.  According to this 
table, the initial focus for risk reduction should be on measures that improve security with 








Figure 4-12. Percentile loss-exceedance curves for explosive attacks afflicting the 
chemical facility (shown only for the independent case) 
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Table 4-17. Summary of results from the sensitivity analysis 
Parameter Sensitivity (%) 
Mean Time to Detect Zone 1 – HE – 0.75 
Mean Time to Detect Zone 2 – HE + 0.00 
Mean Time to Detect Zone 3 – HE – 0.22 
Mean Time to Detect Zone 4 – HE – 0.16 
Mean Time to Detect Zone 5 – AV + 0.00 
Mean Time to Detect Zone 1 – GV + 0.16 
Mean Time to Detect Zone 2 – GV + 0.01 
Probability of Neutralization – Hand Emplaced – 1.51 
Probability of Neutralization – Ground Vehicle + 3.78 
Probability of Neutralization – Aerial Vehicle + 0.00 
Response Time – Mean + 8.51 
Response Time – COV – 1.11 
Delay Time in Zone 1 – HE, Mean  – 0.96 
Delay Time in Zone 2 – HE, Mean – 0.12 
Delay Time in Zone 3 – HE, Mean – 0.16 
Delay Time in Zone 4 – HE, Mean – 0.12 
Delay Time in Zone 1 – GV, Mean + 6.57 
Delay Time in Zone 2 – GV, Mean + 1.53 
Delay Time in Zone 5 – AV, Mean + 0.13 
Delay Time in Zone 1 – HE, COV + 0.14 
Delay Time in Zone 2 – HE, COV + 0.10 
Delay Time in Zone 3 – HE, COV + 0.14 
Delay Time in Zone 4 – HE, COV + 0.14 
Delay Time in Zone 1 – GV, COV + 0.30 
Delay Time in Zone 2 – GV, COV + 0.17 
Delay Time in Zone 5 – AV, COV + 0.13 
Probability of Passive Detection in Zone 1 – HE –  2.12 
Probability of Passive Detection in Zone 2 – HE + 0.12 
Probability of Passive Detection in Zone 3 – HE – 2.06 
Probability of Passive Detection in Zone 4 – HE – 0.68 
Probability of Passive Detection in Zone 1 – GV + 3.25 
Probability of Passive Detection in Zone 2 – GV + 0.13 
Probability of Passive Detection in Zone 5 – AV + 0.13 
 
 
4.7. Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Assuming that the total risk exposure for this facility exceeds the risk tolerance of 
the facility owner or security manager, several options may be considered for risk 
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reduction such as those described in Table 4-18, where the cost is characterized by a 
lognormal distribution with the actual mean and coefficient of variation shown.  
Leveraging the CAPRA approach used for baseline assessment as implemented in the 
previous sections, a cumulative probability distribution on benefit for each option can be 
constructed such as is shown in Figure 4-13.  As a conservative assumption, the annual 
rate of occurrence is assumed to be constant before and after implementation of the risk 
mitigation measures, though in practice the risk reduction may be augmented by a 
decrease in the annual recurrence rate.  According to the table in Figure 4-13, strategy S2 
has the largest expected benefit-cost ratio at 1.24, followed by strategy S1 with an 
expected ratio of 1.07 and strategy S3 with an expected ratio of 1.01.  However, 
according to Figure 4-14 which plots probability of exceeding a given benefit cost ratio 
as a function of this ratio, the probability of exceeding a benefit cost ratio between one 
and three is greatest for strategy S1 despite having a lower expected benefit cost ratio. 
Additional information on whether the needed resources are available to 
implement strategy S1, whether this option meets risk reduction objectives, and the 
nature of impacts this option will have on future options is required prior to making a 
final decision.  For example, though strategy S1 has the highest probability of exceeding 
a benefit-cost ratio of 1, an average price tag of $4-million with significant uncertainty to 
implement this option may exceed the decision maker’s budget for security 
improvements, which might force the decision maker to consider the next best option due 
to its lower cost.  Moreover, a more complete risk picture considering a full-suite of 
anthropic and naturally occurring events is necessary to fully evaluate the benefits of 
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proposed security investments, though it can be reasoned that accounting for these other 
initiating events will only serve to improve the business case for any alternative. 
 
Table 4-18. Alternative risk mitigation options 
Risk Mitigation Option Estimated Effect 10-Year Cost (COV) 
S1: Improve passive detection 
capabilities of ground vehicle 
explosives in security zone 3 
with increased ability to 
neutralize ground vehicle 
attacks 
Increase passive probability of 
detection from 0.2 to 0.75 in 
security zone 3; probability of 
neutralization increased from 
0.2 to 0.5 
$4-million (0.25) 
S2: Decrease response time 
by hiring new guards and 
positioning them at strategic 
locations 
Decrease response time from 
60-seconds to 30-seconds, 
keeping COV constant 
$2-million (0.10) 
S3: Increase delay time in 
security zone 2 for hand 
emplaced and ground vehicle 
attacks 
Increase delay time by 100% in 
security zone 2 for hand 
emplaced (to 60-seconds) and 
by 200% for ground vehicle  


















Figure 4-13. Cumulative probability distributions for accumulated benefit associated with 



















This case study focused on applying the CAPRA methodology developed in 
Chapter 3 to produce actionable asset-level risk information for a notional chemical 
facility exposed to the threat of an explosive attack and to evaluate the cost-effectiveness 
of alternative options for mitigating risk through improved countermeasures.  The inputs 
to the CAPRA methodology in this example were strictly probabilistic in nature, and 
consequently the outputs assumed the form of a standard family of loss-exceedance 
curves. 
The scenario identification phase leveraged a new technique for scenario 
identification and screening based on the CARVER targeting (and vulnerability 
assessment) methodology and the FMECA approach.  This approach identified initiating 
events based on the inherent susceptibility of key elements, and scored each initiating 
event according to the six CARVER criteria.  These scores were then aggregated using a 
revised CARVER formula that expresses the aggregate score in terms of an order of 
magnitude estimate of risk.  Given these order of magnitude estimates, only those 
initiating events for which the estimate exceeds some minimum threshold were screened-
in for further analysis, i.e., those initiating events for which the relative risk priority 
number was one or greater. 
The overall vulnerability assessment phase leveraged established techniques from 
systems reliability analysis to study the performance of security systems under the stress 
imposed on it by an adversary.  While some of the tools used to make sense of security 
system effectiveness were leveraged from previous studies, this research extended these 
models to include consideration of active detection measures whose performance was 
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measured in terms of a mean time to detect.  However, this analysis implicitly assumes 
that there is no capability beyond what the facility possesses to defeat the adversary once 
an attack is commenced.  That is, this analysis does not consider the contribution to 
overall security from external countermeasures, to include local police and other security 
resources.  The inclusion of these factors in terms of a probability of interdiction prior to 
an adversary’s arrival at the facility fence line insists on analytic collaboration between 
the asset owner, local response forces, and so on.  Absent this level of collaboration and 
information sharing insists that conservative assumptions be made, which though not 
necessarily bad, may result in an overstatement of the actual risk reduction achieved from 
different risk mitigation proposals. 
In the absence of statistical information to construct empirical distributions for the 
loss parameters or infer a probability of adversary success, this case study leveraged 
knowledge of distribution parameters (e.g., mean, coefficient of variation, bounds) 
obtained, for instance, from expert elicitation (though no source was specified in this 
example) to support expression of uncertainty by maximum entropy distributions.  In 
other cases for which no information was available to render a judgment of likeliness, 
such as for the effectiveness of external response and recovery measures, conservative 
values (i.e., a value of one for vulnerability parameters or zero for effectiveness 
parameters) were employed to arrive at conservative estimates of risk.  Again, to arrive at 
such estimates of response and recovery capabilities insists on dialogue between the asset 
owner and local response and recovery forces.  Moreover, this analysis demonstrated that 
no significant assumptions on the dependency are necessary for different consequence 
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dimensions save for omitting negative dependencies; it was shown that the results varied 
little depending on whether independence or perfect dependence was assumed.   
Overall, while this analysis focused on informing decisions to improve security to 
reduce risk, the study acknowledged all contributors to vulnerability.  However, this 
analysis was rightfully tailored to meet the specific decision requirements of the decision 
maker, which in this study centered on evaluating security system performance and 
assessing the cost-effectiveness of alternative strategies for decreasing probability of 
success.  Accordingly, while it was acknowledged that the fragility of target elements and 
the intrinsic susceptibility of the asset to different levels of target damage are separate 
parameters that contribute to overall vulnerability, it was appropriate to combine the two 
to arrive at an expression of “system fragility,” or the probability of different degrees of 
loss given that the adversary successfully imparts its load on the target.  Though not 
explicitly described in the discussion of overall vulnerability in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, 
system fragility is an element of overall vulnerability that crosses the largely artificial 
boundary between protection and response vulnerabilities. 
The threat probability assessment phase demonstrated that meaningful attack 
probabilities can be obtained by assuming rational adversaries with perceptions of 
opportunity that mirror defender assessments of risk.  As demonstrated in the analysis of 
mitigation strategies, the CAPRA methodology is sensitive to changes in adversary 
perceptions of risk and reward due to changes in the facility security posture.  However, 
since this analysis focused on a single asset in isolation, it could not account for a shift in 
perceived attractiveness away from the facility itself and toward other facilities.  Had 
some of the probability of attack at the asset been allowed to move away toward other 
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assets, the assessed reduction in risk would be greater was assessed without considering 
this behavior.  Consequently, all else being equal, the assessed benefit of a consequence 
mitigation action might, in actuality, be less than would actually be realized when 
implemented.  Again, with improved collaboration with other assets and higher-level 
decision makers, this model could easily accommodate this level of analysis.   
The threat probability assessment also demonstrated how the visibility of key 
elements and intrusion paths can be integrated to analysis to arrive at threat probabilities 
that are considerate of the fact that not all assets are necessarily visible.  It is a fairly 
straightforward task to extend this model to consider uncertainties in other adversary 
dimensions; for example, variations in adversary behavior and attractiveness attitudes can 
be accommodated through a probability distribution constructed over a finite (or perhaps 
infinite) set of representative attractiveness attitudes and preferences.  Similarly, for a 
given adversary with defined attitude, a probability distribution can be constructed over 
the bias parameter b.  In the end, the resulting probability of attack for each asset, 
initiating event type, and attack profile obtained in this manner could more effectively 
leverage intelligence resources to estimate threat probabilities for operational and 
strategic resource allocation decisions not in terms of actual adversary activities, but in 
terms of assessed adversary preferences, knowledge, and attitudes. 
In terms of providing actionable risk information for decision makers, this case 
study also demonstrated how to produce actionable risk information via sensitivity 
analysis using a new approach to sensitivity analysis based that examines how a 
fractional favorable change in model parameters reduces risk, which as a special case 
reduces to the risk reduction worth importance factor described by Modarres et al. 1999.  
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The results from a sensitivity analysis combined with a baseline expression of risk 
communicates not only the magnitude of the risks afflicting decision makers, but also 
offers insight on where to focus attention to achieve cost-effective risk reduction. Given a 
set of risk mitigation options, this case study also demonstrated that while the expected 
benefit-cost ratio for a given risk mitigation strategy may appear superior, the probability 
of exceeding a given benefit-cost ratio may not be superior relative to other strategies 
with lower expected benefit-cost ratios.  It is thus important to take into account the 
variability in benefit and cost when selecting one or more investments options from 
among a set of alternatives. 
Future lines of research that would augment the analysis described in this Chapter 
include leverage human-reliability based models of guard performance in relation to 
detection, response, and neutralization (e.g., force on force models) capabilities.  For 
example, the recent work in the area of human reliability analysis described by Chang 
and Mosleh (2007) can be explored, in addition to work in the area of agent based 
simulation of adversary behavior.  Moreover, this analysis could readily consider 
multiple simultaneous attacks against different elements, but the assessment would then 
have to consider the synergies and inefficiencies of multiple coordinated attacks.  Also, 
since this analysis was asset centric, it does not consider the contribution to overall risk 
stemming from incidents afflicting external assets for which the current asset is 
dependent.  Finally, more analysis is needed to select an appropriate value for the bias 
parameter to capture the true preferences of adversaries, which combined with the need to 
understand adversary attitudes (and utility functions) embodies the need to better 
understand attacker behaviors. 
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Chapter 5. Case study – Regional Risk Analysis 
 
5.1. Problem Description 
This chapter applies the CAPRA framework developed in Chapter 3 to the 
problem of allocating financial resources to improve one or more capabilities possessed 
by a region to prevent, respond to, and recover from adverse initiating events.  The point 
of view of this analysis is regional leadership responsible for maintaining critical services 
and protecting the health and safety of its citizens.  The decision variables in this study 
are the 37 target capabilities defined by DHS and as shown in Table 5-1 (DHS 2006c; 
DHS 2007) plus additional variables that characterize regional security capabilities.  The 
effects or outcomes of concern to the decision makers include service disruption and loss 
of life.  The sources of risk in this case study are limited to the phenomenologies 
associated with an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against selected 
infrastructure targets; the IED scenario is number 12 (i.e., NPS-12) among the 15 
National Planning Scenarios shown in Figure 2-2 (US Department of Homeland Security 
2006b).  The targets of the risk in this case study are five infrastructure assets situated in 
the region as illustrated in Figure 5-1.  The relevance of each target capability to one or 
more variables of the CAPRA risk model are denoted by an “X” in Table 5-2.  Note that 
some of the capabilities, while important in the general case, are not applicable to the 
given problem due to its focus being limited to IED attacks (e.g., epidemiological 
surveillance and investigation). 
The specific region under study is a large city with a population of 500,000 
people and a gross regional product of $100-billion.  Of particular concern to regional 
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decision makers are the five infrastructure assets shown in Figure 5-1, all of which are 
owned by private (e.g., non-governmental) enterprises.  As part of their annual grant 
application for federal resources to improve security and resilience, the task of the 
regional decision makers is to identify and evaluate alternative investment strategies for 
mitigating the risk associated with an adverse IED attack against one or more of these 
five infrastructure assets.  The scope of this study focuses on two dimensions of loss: 
fatalities resulting from the aggregate effects of the attack and ensuing damage (measured 
in fatality equivalents) and disruption of essential services (measured in units of time-%).  
Note that since the scope of the analysis is on regional decision makers, property damage 










Figure 5-1. Five infrastructure assets in the study region 
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The goal of this case study is to produce actionable risk information that informs 
regional decision makers on where to focus their attention for cost-effective risk 
reduction.  The main challenges in this case study are threefold: (1) mapping the 
performance of a subset of the 37 capabilities to one or more elements of the CAPRA risk 
equation developed in Section 3, where it is generally assumed that the relationship 
between these capabilities and risk is highly nonlinear and lacks explicit functional 
representation; (2) consideration of physical, geographical, cyber, and logical 
interdependencies among assets within the portfolio; and (3) producing risk results that 
are faithful to the limited available information and data collection resources.   
The proposed implementation of the CAPRA framework for regional risk analysis 
in light of regional capabilities is illustrated in Figure 5-2.  Section 5.2 describes the 
nature and the characteristics of the security hazards considered in this analysis.  Section 
5.3 describes the means with which each of the five infrastructures are characterized to 
support regional analysis, to include an assessment of maximum loss potential, basis loss 
for each damage state, fragility of the asset to different hazard intensities, and security 
system performance.  Section 5.4 describes the means of characterizing regional 
capabilities, to include approximate reasoning models that link regional capability 
variables to ability to reduce basis loss and regional security performance.  In addition, 
Section 5.4 describes a simple first-order interdependency analysis technique used for 
estimating the total impact due to service disruption in light of portfolio 
interdependencies.  The remaining sections synthesize regional and asset information to 
produce risk profiles expressed as a family of pignistic probability distributions and 
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Figure 5-2. Implementation of CAPRA for regional risk analysis
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Table 5-1. Target Capabilities List (DHS 2006c; DHS 2007) 




Y1 Communications A continuous flow of communication is maintained as needed among multi-jurisdictional and 
multi-disciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, and government officials 
for the duration of the emergency response operation in compliance with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).  In order to accomplish that, the jurisdiction has a continuity of 
operations plan for public safety communications including the consideration of critical 
components, networks, support systems, personnel, and an appropriate level of redundant 
communications systems in the event of any emergency. 
 Y2 Community Preparedness 
and Participation 
There is a structure and a process for ongoing collaboration between government and 
nongovernmental organizations at all levels; volunteers and nongovernmental resources are 
incorporated in plans and exercises; the public is educated, trained, and aware; citizens 
participate in volunteer programs and provide surge capacity support; nongovernmental 
resources are managed effectively in disasters; and there is a process to evaluate progress. 
 Y3 Planning Plans incorporate an accurate threat analysis and risk assessment and ensure that capabilities 
required to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all-hazards events are available 
when and where they are needed.  Plans are vertically and horizontally integrated with 
appropriate departments, agencies, and jurisdictions.  Where appropriate, emergency plans 
incorporate a mechanism for requesting State and Federal assistance and include an clearly 
delineated process for seeking and requesting assistance from appropriate agencies. 
 Y4 Risk Management Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector entities identify and assess risks, 
prioritize and select appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation solutions based on 
reduction of risk, monitor the outcomes of allocation decisions, and undertake corrective actions.  
Additionally, Risk Management is integrated as a planning construct for effective prioritization 
and oversight of all homeland security investments. 
 Y5 Intelligence/ Information 
Sharing and Dissemination 
Effective and timely sharing of information and intelligence occurs across Federal, State, local, 
tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector entities to achieve a coordinated awareness of, 
prevention of, protection against, and response to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attack, 




Y6 CBRNE Detection Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or explosive (CBRNE) materials are rapidly 
detected and characterized at borders and ports of entry, critical locations, events, and incidents. 
 Y7 Information Gathering and 
Recognition of Indications 
and Warning 
Locally generated threat and other criminal and/or terrorism-related information is identified, 
gathered, entered into appropriate data/retrieval system, and provided to appropriate analysis 
centers. 
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Table 5-1. (continued) 





Y8 Intelligence Analysis and 
Production 
Timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence/information products are produced in support of 
prevention, awareness, deterrence, response, and continuity planning operations. 
Y9 Counter-Terror 
Investigations and Law 
Enforcement 
Suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security are successfully deterred, 





Y10 Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
The risk of, vulnerability of, and consequence of an attack on critical infrastructure are reduced 
through the identification of critical infrastructure; conduct, documentation, and standardization 
of risk assessments; prioritization of assets; decisions regarding protective and preventative 
programs; and implementation of protective and preventative response plans. 
 Y11 Epidemiological 
Surveillance and 
Investigation 
Potential exposure to disease is identified rapidly by determining exposure and mode of 
transmission and agent; interrupting transmission to contain the spread of the event; and 
reducing number of cases.  Confirmed cases are reported immediately to all relevant public 
health, food, regulatory, and law enforcement agencies.  Suspected cases are investigated 
promptly, reported to relevant public health authorities, food regulatory, environmental 
regulatory, and law enforcement agencies.  Suspected cases are investigated promptly, reported 
to relevant public health authorities, and accurately confirmed to ensure appropriate preventive 
or curative countermeasures are implemented.  An outbreak is defined and characterized; new 
suspect cases are identified and characterized based on case definitions on an ongoing basis; 
relevant clinical specimens are obtained and transported for confirmatory lab testing; the source 
of exposure is tracked; methods of transmission identified; and effective mitigation measures are 
communicated to the public, providers, and relevant agencies, as appropriate. 
 Y12 Food and Agriculture 
Safety and Defense 
Threats to food and agriculture safety are prevented, mitigated, and eradicated; affected products 
are disposed of; affected facilities are decontaminated; public and plant health are protected; 
notification of the event and instructions of appropriate actions are effectively communicated 
with all stakeholders; trade in agricultural products is restored safely; and confidence in the U.S. 
food supply is maintained. 
 Y13 Public Health Laboratory 
Testing 
Chemical, radiological, and biological agents causing, or having the potential to cause, 
widespread illness or death are rapidly detected and accurately identified by the public health 
laboratory within the jurisdiction or through network collaboration with other appropriate 
Federal, State, and local laboratories.  The public health laboratory, working in close partnership 
with public health epidemiology, environmental health, law enforcement, agriculture, and 
veterinary officials, hospitals, and other appropriate agencies, produces timely and accurate data 
to support ongoing public health investigations and the implementation of appropriate preventive 
or curative countermeasures. 
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Table 5-1. (continued) 




Y14 Animal Disease 
Emergency Support 
Foreign animal disease is prevented from entering the United States by protecting the related 
critical infrastructure and key assets.  In the event of an incident, animal disease is detected as 
early as possible, exposure of livestock to foreign diseases is reduced, immediate and humane 
actions to eradicate the outbreak are implemented, public and animal health and the environment 
are protected, continuity of agriculture and related business is safely maintained and/or restored, 
and economic damage is minimized.  Trade in agricultural products and domestic and 
international confidence in the U.S. food supply are safely maintained or restored. 
 Y15 Citizen Evacuation and 
Shelter-In-Place 
Affected and at-risk populations (and companion animals to the extent necessary to save human 
lives) are safely sheltered-in-place or evacuated to safe refuge areas. 
 Y16 Critical Resource 
Logistics and Distribution 
Critical resources are available to incident managers and emergency responders upon request for 
proper distribution and to aid disaster victims in a cost-effective and timely manner. 
 Y17 Emergency Operations 
Center Management 
The event is effectively managed through multi-agency coordination for a pre-planned or no-
notice event. 
 Y18 Emergency Public 
Information and Warning 
Government agencies and public and private sector entities receive and transmit coordinated, 
prompt, useful, and reliable information regarding threats to their health, safety, and property 
through clear, consistent information delivery systems.  This information is updated regularly 
and outlines protective measures that can be taken by individuals and their communities. 
 Y19 Environmental Health After the primary event, disease and injury are prevented through the quick identification of 
associated environmental hazards, including exposure to infectious diseases that are secondary to 
the primary event as well as secondary transmission modes.  The at-risk population (i.e., exposed 
or potentially exposed) receives the appropriate countermeasures, including treatment or 
protection, in a timely manner.  The rebuilding of the public health infrastructure, removal of 
environmental hazards, and appropriate decontamination of the environment enable the safe re-
entry and re-occupancy of the impacted area.  Continued monitoring occurs throughout the 
recovery process in order to identify hazards and reduce exposure. 
  Y20 Explosive Device 
Response Operations 
Threat assessments are conducted, the explosive and/or hazardous devices are rendered safe, and 
the area is cleared of hazards.  Measures are implemented in the following priority order: ensure 
public safety; safeguard the officers on the scene (including the bomb technician); collect and 
preserve evidence; protect and preserve public and private property; and restore public services. 
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Table 5-1. (continued) 





Y21 Fatality Management Complete documentation and recovery of human remains and items of evidence (except in cases 
where the health risks posed to personnel outweigh the benefits of recovery of remains).  
Remains receive surface decontamination (if indicated) and, unless catastrophic circumstances 
dictate otherwise, are examined, identified, and released to the next-of-kin’s funeral home with a 
complete certified death certificate.  Reports of missing persons and ante mortem data are 
efficiently collected.  Victims’ family members receive updated information prior to the media 
release.  All hazardous material regulations are reviewed and any restrictions on the 
transportation and disposition of remains are made clear by those with the authority and 
responsibility to establish the standards.  Law enforcement agencies are given all information 
needed to investigate and prosecute the case successfully.  Families are provided incident-
specific support services. 
 Y22 Fire Incident Response 
Support 
Dispatch and safe arrival of the initial fire suppression resources occur within jurisdictional 
response time objectives.  The first unit to arrive initiated the Incident Command System (ICS), 
assesses the incident scene, communicates the situation, and requests appropriate resources 
including any necessary mutual aid or cross-discipline support.  Firefighting activities are 
conducted safely and fire hazards are contained, controlled, extinguished, and investigated, and 
the incident is managed in accordance with emergency response plans and procedures. 
 Y23 Isolation and Quarantine Individuals who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed are separated, movement is restricted, 
basic necessities of life are available, and their health is monitored in order to limit the spread of 
a newly introduced contagious disease (e.g., pandemic influenza).  Legal authority for those 
measures is clearly defined and communicated to all responding agencies and the public.  
Logistical support is provided to maintain measures until danger of contagion has elapsed. 
 Y24 Mass Care (Sheltering, 
Feeding, and Related 
Services) 
Mass care services, including sheltering, feeding, and bulk distribution, are rapidly provided for 
the population and companion animals within the affected area. 
 Y25 Mass Prophylaxis Appropriate drug prophylaxis and vaccination strategies are implemented in a timely manner 
upon the onset of an event to prevent the development of disease in exposed individuals.  Public 
information strategies include recommendations on specific actions individuals can take to 
protect their family, friends, and themselves. 
 Y26 Medical Supplies 
Management and 
Distribution 
Critical medical supplies and equipment are appropriately secured, managed, distributed, and 
restocked in a timeframe appropriate to the incident. 
 Y27 Medical Surge Injured or ill from the event are rapidly and appropriately cared for.  Continuity of care is 
maintained for non-incident related illness or injury. 
 136
Table 5-1. (continued) 





Y28 Onsite Incident 
Management 
The event is managed safely, effectively, and efficiently through the common framework of the 
ICS. 
Y29 Emergency Public Safety 
and Security Response 
The incident scene is assessed and secured; access is controlled; security support is provided to 
other response operations (and related critical locations, facilities, and resources); emergency 
public information is provided while protecting first responders and mitigating any further public 
risks; and any crime/ incident scene preservation issues are addressed. 
 Y30 Responder Safety and 
Health 
No illness or injury to any first responder, first receiver, medical facility staff member, or other 
skilled support personnel as a result of preventable exposure to secondary trauma, 
chemical/radiological release, infectious disease, or physical and emotional stress after the initial 
incident or during decontamination and incident follow-up. 
 Y31 Emergency Triage and 
Pre-Hospital Treatment 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) resources are effectively and appropriately dispatched and 
provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and documentation of care 
appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the capabilities of the EMS system for continued 
operations. 
 Y32 Search and Rescue (Land-
Rescue) 
The greatest number of victims (humans and, to the extent that no humans remained endangered, 
animals) are rescued and transferred to medical or mass care capabilities, in the shortest amount 
of time, while maintaining rescuer safety. 
 Y33 Volunteer Management 
and Donations 
The positive effect of using unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations is maximized and 
does not hinder response and recovery activities. 
 Y34 WMD/Hazardous 
Materials Response and 
Decontamination 
Any hazardous materials release is rapidly identified and mitigated; victims exposed to the 
hazards are rescued, decontaminated, and treated; the impact of the release is limited; and 




Y35 Economic and Community 
Recovery 
Economic impact is estimated; priorities are set for recovery activities; business disruption is 
minimized; and individual families are provided with appropriate levels and types of relief with 
minimal delay. 
 Y36 Restoration of Lifelines Lifelines to undertake sustainable emergency response and recovery activities are established. 
 Y37 Structural Damage 
Assessment 
Accurate situation needs and damage assessments occur.  The full range of engineering, building 
inspection, and enforcement services are implemented, managed, and coordinated in a way that 
maximizes the use of resources, aids emergency response, and implements recovery operations.  
Mitigation projects to lessen the impact of similar future events are identified and prioritized. 
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Table 5-2. Relevant of capabilities to CAPRA model variables 


















Y1 Communications X - 
Y2 Community Preparedness and Participation X X 
Y3 Planning X - 
Y4 Risk Management - - 
Y5 Intelligence/ Information Sharing and Dissemination - X 
Planning 
Mission Area 
Y6 CBRNE Detection - X 
Y7 Information Gathering and Recognition of Indications and Warning - X 
Y8 Intelligence Analysis and Production - X 
Y9 Counter-Terror Investigations and Law Enforcement - X 
Protect 
Mission Area 
Y10 Critical Infrastructure Protection - - 
Y11 Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation - - 
Y12 Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense - - 
Y13 Public Health Laboratory Testing - - 
Respond 
Mission Area 
Y14 Animal Disease Emergency Support - - 
Y15 Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place X - 
 Y16 Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution X - 
 Y17 Emergency Operations Center Management X - 
 Y18 Emergency Public Information and Warning X - 
 Y19 Environmental Health - - 
 Y20 Explosive Device Response Operations - - 
 Y21 Fatality Management X - 
 Y22 Fire Incident Response Support X - 
 Y23 Isolation and Quarantine - - 
 Y24 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) X - 
 Y25 Mass Prophylaxis - - 
 Y26 Medical Supplies Management and Distribution X - 
 Y27 Medical Surge X - 
 Y28 Onsite Incident Management X - 
 Y29 Emergency Public Safety and Security Response X - 
 Y30 Responder Safety and Health X - 
 Y31 Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment X - 
 Y32 Search and Rescue (Land-Rescue) X - 
 Y33 Volunteer Management and Donations - - 
 Y34 WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination - - 
Recover 
Mission Area 
Y35 Economic and Community Recovery X - 
Y36 Restoration of Lifelines - - 
 Y37 Structural Damage Assessment - - 
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5.2. Threat Characterization 
The scope of this analysis centers on the risk resulting from an IED attack against 
one or more of the five infrastructure assets identified in Figure 5-1.  A set of five modes 
of attack for the IED events were considered as described in Table 5-3, where a simple 
probability distribution constructed over a discrete space of possible explosive weights 
(i.e., “small,” “medium,” and “large”) was constructed leveraging informal opinions from 
an explosives expert (Neale 2008).  Each mode of attack accesses the target in a specific 
way.  In particular: 
 
• Hand emplaced (HE) explosive attacks are characterized by explosives delivered 
by a human directly to the target, and includes satchel charges, backpack bombs, 
and suicide attacks.  Hand emplaced explosive attacks are compatible with any 
target accessible to humans on foot and susceptible to the effects of explosives. 
• Ground vehicle (GV) explosive attacks are characterized by explosives delivered 
by ground-transiting vehicles, ranging from small compact cars to large trucks.  
Ground vehicle explosive attacks are compatible with any target accessible via 
roads and susceptible to the effects of explosives.  
• Manned aerial vehicle (AVM) explosive attacks are characterized by explosives 
delivered by any type of human-operated air vehicle capable of carrying 
explosives, including motorized gliders and small airplanes.  Manned aerial 
vehicle explosive attacks are compatible with any target accessible by air and 
susceptible to the effects of explosives. 
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• Unmanned aerial vehicle (AVU) explosive attacks are characterized by explosives 
delivered by any type of unmanned or autonomous aerial vehicle capable of 
carrying explosives, including radio-controlled aircraft and motorized balloons.  
Unmanned aerial vehicle explosive attacks are compatible with any target 
accessible by air and susceptible to the effects of explosives. 
• Waterborne (WB) vehicle explosive attacks are characterized by explosives 
delivered by any type of water-transiting vehicle, including small boats such as 
canoes and kayaks to large vessels such as sailboats, yachts, and barges.  
Waterborne vehicle explosive attacks are compatible with any target directly 
adjacent to a body of water (e.g., river, lake) and susceptible to the effects of 
explosives. 
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The relative attractiveness of alternative modes of attack is a function of the 
perceived probability of success, PS, gain from success, G, loss from failure, L, and cost 
to attack, C or probability of successful capability acquisition, PC.  A set of notional 
probabilities for this latter factor is given in Table 5-4.  Assuming perfect adversary 
knowledge of regional and target defenses and loss potential for each target asset (per 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5), values for the remaining factors can be obtained directly from the 
assessment of the risk variables.  For the gain parameter, the preferences of the adversary 
determine which risk variables to map to, whether to maximize fatalities, maximize 
disruption, maximize aggregate loss, satisfy a minimum requirement on probability of 
success (e.g., 0.75), etc. (Yager 2006; Nerud 2008).  This analysis assumes an 
“optimistic, rational” adversary that seeks to maximize worst case aggregate loss, which 
for practical purposes can be taken as the 99% value on the 99% confidence level 
distribution for aggregate loss. 
 
Table 5-4. Notional perceived probability of acquisition and capability 
Mode of Attack Probability of Successful 
Capability Acquisition, PC 
Hand Emplaced 0.95 
Ground Vehicle 0.85 
Manned Aerial Vehicle 0.70 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 0.50 





For the purposes of this example, the probability of an attack in the region within 
a given time span is specified as single point working value.  Assuming a planning 
horizon of 5 years between risk assessments, the assessed probability of one or more 
attacks in the region affecting one or more of the five assets is assessed to be “remote”  
with a representative probability of 0.05. 
 
5.3. Asset Characterization 
This section characterizes each of the five assets in the region under study in 
terms of relevant attack modes (section 5.3.1) maximum potential loss for the dimensions 
of disruption (units of time-%) and public health (units of fatality equivalents) (section 
5.3.2), asset security system effectiveness in terms of probability of adversary success at 
the asset (section 5.3.3), target accessibility and attack mode success in terms of 
probability of kill (section 5.3.4), hardness of the target in terms of asset fragility 
matrices (section 5.3.5) and resistance to loss in terms of basis loss potential (section 
5.3.6). 
 
5.3.1. Relevant Attack Modes 
All five infrastructure assets in this case study are susceptible to the effects of an 
explosive attack.  However, due to the geographic constraints, not all attack modes are 
necessarily compatible with each asset.  In particular for this example, the office building 
is the only asset adjacent to water, and as such is the only asset susceptible to a 
waterborne attack.  Table 5-5 provides the attack profile compatibility matrix for the five 
regional assets, where an “X” denotes an attack mode that is compatible with an asset. 
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Table 5-5. Attack profile compatibility matrix for the five regional assets. 
Asset 













Office Building X X X X X 
Hospital X X X X  
Train Station X X X X  
Stadium X X X X  
Power Substation X X X X  
 
 
5.3.2. Maximum Potential Loss and Value of Disruption 
The maximum potential loss associated with each asset in terms of functional 
disruption and potential fatalities is given in Table 5-6.  In practice, this data can be 
elicited as the maximum disruption time (e.g., time to completely reconstitute 
functionality in light of total loss) and maximum number of individuals that can possibly 
be exposed to the effects of an explosive attack against the asset.  Since this analysis is 
examining each asset from the perspective of a regional decision maker, individuals 
within and adjacent to the asset are considered in addition to those within the scope of the 
asset owner’s concern.  The economic value to the region per day of disruption for each 





Table 5-6. Maximum potential loss for each asset 
Asset Maximum Potential Loss Disruption Fatalities 
Office Building 550 days (1.5 years) 500 
Hospital 730 days (2 years) 2,000 
Train Station 180 days (6 months) 3,500 
Stadium 730 days (2 years) 75,000 
Power Substation 90 days (3 months) 50 
 
Table 5-7. Daily value of total disruption for each asset 
Asset Value of Disruption ($/100%/day)* 
Office Building About $50,000 
Hospital About $100,000 
Train Station About $25,000 
Stadium About $75,000 
Power Substation About $10,000 
*Note: The word “about” implies ±5%
 
5.3.3. Security System Effectiveness (Asset) 
The following implements an approximate reasoning approach to assessing the 
effectiveness of each asset’s security system in terms of probability of adversary success 
in light of asset defenses using principles of fuzzy systems and fuzzy logic (McGill and 
Ayyub 2008b).  Based on a discussion with a team of security experts and a review of 
current approaches to asset vulnerability assessment within the US Department of 
Defense, Morgenson et al. (2006) identified a set of six defensive criteria that are thought 
to characterize the effectiveness of a target’s (e.g., facility or asset) defenses as described 
in Table 5-8.  
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Table 5-8. Asset Defensive criteria for probability of adversary success assessment (Morgenson et al. 2006) 





This attribute includes an access control system designed to preclude un-authorized entry. Effective access control 
systems prevent the introduction of harmful devices, materials and components. Access control systems include guarded 
entry and exit points, access control rosters, personal recognition, ID cards, badge exchange procedures and personnel 
escorts for visitors. Cyber access systems include firewall, passwords protection, antivirus software and are Tempest 





Fencing is the primary personnel barrier. Standard fences are six foot tall, chain link fence topped with three strands of 
barbed wire with twisted and barbed selvages at the bottom. They are fastened to rigid metal or re-enforced concrete 
posts. In addition, these fences are typically inspected and maintained at least on a weekly basis. It should also be noted 
that the fence gates are designed to prevent personnel from crawling underneath. Sewer air and water intakes and 






These barriers reinforce the fence and prevent vehicles from penetrating the perimeter. They keep VBIEDs at a safe 
standoff distance from the asset. Two types of barriers are used to protect the asset from vehicle bombs: perimeter and 
active barriers. Barriers differ for stationary and moving vehicle bombs. Barriers capable of stopping a moving vehicle 
include chain link fence reinforced with cable, reinforced concrete (jersey barriers), pipe bollards, planters, ditches, and 
berms. All these systems are anchored and spaces between barriers are no greater than four feet.  Active barriers are 
required at entry and exit points; these barriers are substantial and must be strong enough to resist a 15000 pound vehicle 
moving at fifty miles per hour. Reinforced sliding gates, retractable bollards, and delta barriers are acceptable barriers. 
Other measures used to control the speed of vehicles moving up to the entrances or exits are anchored serpentines or 





These systems are used to provide early warning of an intruder. Systems consist of hardware and software elements 
operated by trained security personnel. They are configured to provide two or more layers of detection around an asset. 
Each of these layers is made up of a series of interlocking detection zones. They isolate the asset and further control entry 
and exit of authorized personnel and equipment. Redundant power systems are utilized. These provide a separate 
emergency power source for surveillance and perimeter lights in case of a power failure or sabotage of the power main 
power systems.  The term that is used to describe overall site surveillance is Electronic Security System (or ESS). An 
ESS consists of sensors interfaced with electronic entry controls, closed circuit television, alarm reporting displays, both 
visual and audible, and security lighting. Typically, a given security situation is assessed by re-positioning guards to the 
alarm site or using closed circuit television. The incident can be monitored from the security center, where the terminal 
for these devices is located. Depending on the severity of the incident, the guard force can be augmented.  Other types of 
sensors are sometimes employed including boundary sensors that detect penetration (structural vibration sensors or 
passive ultrasonic sensors). The advantage to these sensors is the extra time they give the security force to react. 
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Table 5-8.  (continued) 
Variable Defensive Criterion Definition 
X5 Guard Force 
 
 
The guard force or security force for a facility provides the enforcement element in the physical security program. The 
force consists of personnel specifically organized, trained, and equipped to protect the asset’s physical security. It is 
considered the asset’s most effective tool in a comprehensive, integrated, physical security program. This tool, however, 
requires vulnerability tests and advanced training to maintain effectiveness. For our purposes, the guard force will be 
considered adequately armed and trained. For example, there must be regular weapons qualification as well as practical 
drills to test reaction times and to correct weaknesses. Another consideration is that the guards are required to have prior 
military or law enforcement experience and be in relatively good physical condition. Training includes: 
 
• Care and use of weapons 
• Areas of responsibility and authority of security personnel, including apprehension, search and seizure and the use of 
force 
• Location of first aid and fire control equipment as well as important electrical switches and circuit breaker boxes 
• Duties during emergencies, alerts, fires, explosions, and civil disturbances 
• Recognition of the common forms of sabotage and espionage activity 
• Knowing the location of vulnerable equipment and systems 
 
New security force personnel are given instruction and are capable of assuming various different roles in the overall 
defense team. Rotating retraining schedules is a common practice, in order to cover adequately the entire security force. 




This is the asset’s own reaction force and it should not to be confused with the reaction force provided by the local 
defense layer. It is normally a reserve from within the guard force on-site. They are uncommitted to security posts or 
check-points in order to be available for commitment at a decisive moment. Armament for the reaction force is heavier 
than the regular guard force and the level of training of the reaction force is equivalent to or better than the regular guard 
force. It includes an on-site HAZMAT response force based on the nature of work done at the site. For example, the 
chemical production facilities normally have some level of internal HAZMAT response capability within their workforce 
to respond to local emergencies. There are also memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with local law enforcement, fire 
departments, and other first responders that delineate the specific instances when they will respond to emergency 
situations at the asset. 
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Applying the mathematics of fuzzy systems described Appendix A, a fuzzy 
system can be constructed (Figure 5-3) that approximates the functional relationship 
between the subjective assessment of each defensive criterion to an output probability of 
adversary success via an exhaustive set of linguistic rules of the form: 
 
 If X1 and X2 and X3 and X4 and X5 and X6, then Pr(SA |A,SR) (5-1) 
 
where Xi are linguistic variables for the defensive criteria (i.e., premises) from Table 5-8 
specified as membership functions spanning a constructed scale (Keeney 1981) on the 
bounded domain [0, 10] (where 0 corresponds to no capability and 10 corresponds to full 
performance for the criteria in light of the mode of attack considered), and the consequent 
Pr(SA|A,SR) is the probability of adversary success at the asset given attack and adversary 
success against regional defenses specified over the domain [0,1] as required by the 
axioms of probability theory (Ayyub and McCuen 2002).  Within the context of this case 
study, the premises Xi may take on the fuzzy values “Low,” “Medium,” or “High” 
defined with membership functions shown in Figure 5-4, and the consequent Pr(SA|A,SR) 
may take on linguistic values such as “Likely,” “Certain,” or “Even Chance” with 

























































































Figure 5-4. Membership functions for the fuzzy numbers representing degree of 
effectiveness on a constructed scale 




















Very  Unlikely : TrFN(0,0.05,0.15,0.3)
Unlikely : TrFN(0.15,0.3,0.4,0.45)
Ev en Chance: TrFN(0.4,0.45,0.55,0.6)
Likely : TrFN(0.55,0.6,0.7,0.85)
Very  Likely : TrFN(0.7,0.85,0.95,1)
Certain: TFN(0.95,1,1)
 




Given a set of antecedents containing all possible linguistic state combinations of 
Xi , a corresponding consequent linguistic state Pr(SA|A,SR) can be specified for each by a 
panel of security experts.  The set of all possible antecedents represents an exhaustive set 
of fuzzy rules, which would contain 729 rules according to Eq. A-9 using the three fuzzy 
numbers in Figure 5-4.  For example, a panel of experts might decide that the following 
set of premises on the effectiveness of security measures corresponds to a probability of 
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When combined, the complete set of fuzzy inference rules of this form approximate the 
true functional relationship between inputs and outputs, and thus provide a means for 
specifying the function: 
 
 ( ) ( )654321 ,,,,,
~,|Pr XXXXXXPSAS ARA =  (5-3) 
 
where the tilde “~” over the functional PA denotes that it is a fuzzy system.  An 
exhaustive set of notional, yet realistic fuzzy rules for assessing security system 
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effectiveness given the fuzzy sets for the defensive criteria and probability of adversary 
success is shown in Figure 5-6 for hand emplaced attacks, Figure 5-7 for ground vehicle 
and waterborne vehicle attacks, and Figure 5-8 for aerial vehicle (manned and unmanned) 
attacks.  Given that each defensive criterion can assume one of three linguistic input 
states (i.e., 0 for “low,” 1 for “medium,” and 2 for “high”), a rule base is comprised of 
729 rules, each represented as a cell in Figures 5-6 through 5-9 with unique number, Z, 
according to Eq. A-11 in Appendix A and background pattern denoting the corresponding 
probability of adversary success.  For example, the rule described in Eq. 5-2 in the 
context of hand emplaced attacks according to Figure 5-6 is: 
 
  Z = (30)(1)+(31)(0)+(32)(0)+(33)(2)+(34)(0)+(35)(0) = 55 
 
and is patterned with vertical dark grey and light grey stripes.  
Once the fuzzy inference rules are defined, a user such as a security expert can 
subjectively assign a value to each premise or criterion on a scale of, say, 0 to 10 for a 
given facility or asset and threat type.  According to the proposed model, the 
corresponding membership values for each relevant fuzzy set associated with the 
premises would be obtained, processed according to the set of fuzzy inference rules, and 
then the result would be translated back into a value for probability of adversary success 
represented as a random set which can be displayed in terms of the corresponding 
probability-boxes or p-boxes (Ferson et al. 2004).  An equivalent probability distribution 
can be obtained from this random set via a suitable transformation, such as the pignistic 
transformation described by Smets (1994).  Tables 5-9 through 5-13 describe the 
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subjective assessment of the six defensive criteria for each of the five infrastructure 
assets, and provide the corresponding probability of adversary success (at the asset) 
expressed as a p-box determined via the fuzzy system in Eq. 5-3 and mathematics 

























Figure 5-7. Exhaustive set of fuzzy inference rules for a ground vehicle and waterborne 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5-9. Security system effectiveness assessment for the office building 
Defensive Criterion 












X1: Perimeter Access 
Control 3 2 0 0 7 
X2: Personnel 
Perimeter Barriers 1 NA NA NA NA 
X3: Vehicle Perimeter 
Barriers NA 5 0 0 2 
X4: Surveillance 
Systems 6 4 3 2 5 
X5: Guard Force 6 4 0 0 6 
X6: Reaction Force 














 0 0.5 10
0.5
1
*Note: Each plot shows the p-box corresponding to the random set derived from the approximate reasoning 
model.  The left and right bounds are the cumulative plausibility and cumulative belief functions, 
respectively. The x-axis is the probability Pr(SA|A,SR) and the y-axis is the epistemic CDF on this probability. 
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Table 5-10. Security system effectiveness assessment for the hospital 
Defensive Criterion 
Assessed Value for Each Attack Mode 
(Hospital) 
Hand Emplaced Ground Vehicle Manned Aerial Vehicle 
Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle 
X1: Perimeter Access 
Control 2 0 0 0 
X2: Personnel 
Perimeter Barriers 0 NA NA NA 
X3: Vehicle Perimeter 
Barriers NA 0 0 0 
X4: Surveillance 
Systems 8 5 1 1 
X5: Guard Force 3 1 2 2 
X6: Reaction Force 












 0 0.5 10
0.5
1
*Note: Each plot shows the p-box corresponding to the random set derived from the approximate 
reasoning model.  The left and right bounds are the cumulative plausibility and cumulative belief 




Table 5-11. Security system effectiveness assessment for the train station 
Defensive Criterion 
Assessed Value for Each Attack Mode 
(Train Station) 
Hand Emplaced Ground Vehicle Manned Aerial Vehicle 
Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle 
X1: Perimeter Access 
Control 4 4 0 0 
X2: Personnel 
Perimeter Barriers 0 NA NA NA 
X3: Vehicle Perimeter 
Barriers NA 6 0 0 
X4: Surveillance 
Systems 8 8 3 3 
X5: Guard Force 5 4 2 2 
X6: Reaction Force 












 0 0.5 10
0.5
1
*Note: Each plot shows the p-box corresponding to the random set derived from the approximate 
reasoning model.  The left and right bounds are the cumulative plausibility and cumulative belief 





Table 5-12. Security system effectiveness assessment for the stadium 
Defensive Criterion 
Assessed Value for Each Attack Mode 
(Stadium) 
Hand Emplaced Ground Vehicle Manned Aerial Vehicle 
Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle 
X1: Perimeter Access 
Control 6 8 0 0 
X2: Personnel 
Perimeter Barriers 4 NA NA NA 
X3: Vehicle Perimeter 
Barriers NA 6 0 0 
X4: Surveillance 
Systems 8 8 5 5 
X5: Guard Force 6 6 4 2 
X6: Reaction Force 












 0 0.5 10
0.5
1
*Note: Each plot shows the p-box corresponding to the random set derived from the approximate 
reasoning model.  The left and right bounds are the cumulative plausibility and cumulative belief 





Table 5-13. Security system effectiveness assessment for the electric power substation 
Defensive Criterion 
Assessed Value for Each Attack Mode 
(Electric Power Substation) 
Hand Emplaced Ground Vehicle Manned Aerial Vehicle 
Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle 
X1: Perimeter Access 
Control 0 0 0 0 
X2: Personnel 
Perimeter Barriers 2 NA NA NA 
X3: Vehicle Perimeter 
Barriers NA 0 0 0 
X4: Surveillance 
Systems 1 1 0 0 
X5: Guard Force 0 0 0 0 
X6: Reaction Force 












 0 0.5 10
0.5
1
*Note: Each plot shows the p-box corresponding to the random set derived from the approximate 
reasoning model.  The left and right bounds are the cumulative plausibility and cumulative belief 
functions, respectively. The x-axis is the probability Pr(SA|A,SR) and the y-axis is the epistemic CDF 
on this probability.
 
5.3.4. Probability of Successful Attack Execution 
Given adversary success at penetrating regional and target defenses, the 
probability that the attack will go off as intended and successfully impart the explosive 
energy to the target, ( )iASK ,|Pr  (as in probability of kill per Washburn 2002) takes into 
account a variety of factors, including the construction of the device, the accessibility of 
the target to the delivery system, maneuverability of the delivery system, etc. A notional 
set of such probabilities is given in Table 5-14 for each of the five attack modes paired 





Table 5-14. Probability of successful execution for each of the five delivery systems 
Asset 













Office Building 0.98 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.95 
Hospital 0.98 0.95 0.90 0.75 NA 
Train Station 0.98 0.95 0.90 0.75 NA 
Stadium 0.98 0.95 0.90 0.75 NA 
Electric Power Substation 0.98 0.95 0.70 0.40 NA 
 
5.3.5. Asset Fragility Matrices 
The probability Pr(Dk | A) that an asset will suffer a given damage state Dk subject 
to a given attack mode defined by the initiating event A can be obtained as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )∑=
j
jjkk AIIDAD |Pr|Pr|Pr  (5-4) 
 
where the probability of intensity given an attack of specified type, Pr(Ij | A) is given by 
the information in Table 5-3 and the probability of damage with respect to different size 
explosive attacks, Pr(Dk| Ij) is specified according to fragility matrices constructed over a 
finite space of four discrete damage states (i.e., “no damage,” “minor damage,” 
“moderate damage,” and “major damage”) shown in Tables 5-15 through 5-19 for the 
five regional assets.  The resulting probability of damage over the finite space of damage 
states for each asset in light of the five attack modes is given in Table 5-20. 
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Table 5-15. Probability of damage subject to different size IED attacks for the office 
building. 










































*Note: This column describes how many times more likely is the comparative damage state relative to 
the most likely damage state. 
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Table 5-16. Probability of damage subject to different size IED attacks for the hospital. 









































*Note: This column describes how many times more likely is the comparative damage state relative to 
the most likely damage state. 
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Table 5-17. Probability of damage subject to different size IED attacks for the train 
station. 










































*Note: This column describes how many times more likely is the comparative damage state relative to 




Table 5-18. Probability of damage subject to different size IED attacks for the stadium. 










































*Note: This column describes how many times more likely is the comparative damage state relative to 
the most likely damage state. 
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Table 5-19. Probability of damage subject to different size IED attacks for the electric 
power substation. 









































*Note: This column describes how many times more likely is the comparative damage state relative to 
the most likely damage state. 
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Table 5-20. Probability of damage states for each asset and attack mode combination 
Asset 
Attack Mode 




















































































































































































5.3.6. Basis Loss 
The basis loss for an asset describes the loss potential in the absence of regional 
response and recovery capabilities for a given state of damage following a successful 
attack.  The basis loss considers the ability of the asset to resist, respond to, and recover 
from loss, which depends on such things as intrinsic system structure, the existence of 
redundant elements, and safety systems.  To simplify the elicitation of the basis loss, the 
uncertainty in this loss is characterized by a triangular possibility distribution over the 
space of outcomes for each consequence dimension (see Appendix A.1).  To simplify 
matters further, this possibility distribution can be constructed over the domain of 
percentage of maximum potential loss with three points as follows: 
 
• Reasonable Best Case 
• Most Likely Loss 
• Reasonable Worst Case 
 
The reasonable best case and reasonable worst case bound the scope of imagined 
outcomes in the absence of regional response and recovery capabilities; values of 
experienced loss beyond these limits are thus deemed to be practically impossible and 
carry maximum value of potential surprise (Shackle 1969).  Tables 5-21 and 5-22 specify 
the basis loss corresponding to each damage state with respect to the five regional assets.
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Table 5-21. Basis loss for each damage state (disruption) 




































































Table 5-22. Basis loss for each damage state (fatalities) 











































0 0.5 1  
TFN(0.001, 0.002, 0.003) 
0
1
0 0.5 1  
TFN(0.002, 0.005, 0.007) 
0
1













0 0.5 1  
TFN(0.15, 0.2, 0.25)
*Note: In the figures, the x-axis is percent maximum potential loss, and the y-axis is the corresponding 
membership value 
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5.3.7. Asset Visibility 
In the context of this case study, it is assumed that the adversary has perfect 
knowledge of all five assets.  Visibility of all attack profiles and asset is assured under 
this assumption, and thus the probability that the asset is visible to the adversary is set 
equal to one (Pr(V) = 1) for all five regional assets. 
 
5.4. Regional Characterization 
This section characterizes the region under study in terms of performance of each 
of its capabilities to protect, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate (section 
5.4.1), first-order interdependencies among the identified assets in the region (section 
5.4.2), and the effectiveness of regional security in terms of probability of adversary 
success in the region (section 5.4.3). 
 
5.4.1. Response and Recovery Effectiveness - Fatalities 
It is standard practice within most US regions and locales to mobilize publicly-
funded resources to assist in responding to and recovering from the effects of adverse 
initiating events affecting its citizens.  In the extreme situation where no such resources 
exist, the loss following an adverse initiating event affecting an asset can be characterized 
by uncertainty distributions, such as the possibility distributions constructed in section 
5.3.5 (i.e., the basis loss), that only account for the inherent resistance of the asset to loss 
in light of its system characteristics and its indigenous response and recovery capabilities.   
It can be assumed that any additional capability brought to bear by the region to assist in 
response and recovery serves to reduce this basis loss potential.  Stated another way, it 
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can be assumed that regional capabilities do not increase ensuing loss, but rather serve to 
discount it as a function of its unmitigated magnitude.  This assumption further assumes a 
saturation point at which regional capabilities can no longer reduce loss in an efficient 
manner.  That is, there exists some value or saturation point of loss L* at which further 
loss cannot be mitigated by regional capabilities. 
Given the basis loss potential information collected for the five regional assets in 
Section 5.3.6, an approximate model that relates a subset of the 37 capabilities to public 
health and safety loss can be constructed leveraging the approximate reasoning 
techniques already applied to the asset security system effectiveness problem in Section 
5.3.3 and elaborated on in detail in Appendix A.  Table 5-2 summarizes a mapping of 
capabilities to the loss variable “fatalities.”  The approximate relationship, FC
~ , between 
relevant capabilities yF, basis public health and safety loss, lF,B, and percentage reduction 
in loss, ρF can be expressed as: 
 
 ( )FBFFF ylC ,~ ,=ρ  (5-5) 
 
In the context of this case study, the loss inputs to Eq. 5-5 are conditioned on a specific 
damage state.  The epistemic uncertainty associated with the output of the fuzzy system 
FC
~  can be expressed as a probability box (Ferson et al. 2004) with lower and upper 
bounds characterized by the cumulative belief function CbelL(l) (Eq. A-26) and 
cumulative plausibility function CplL(l) (Eq. A-27), respectively.  That is, a crisp input 
for basis loss produces a less certain output that can be characterized by a family of loss-
exceedance curves contained in the probability box bounded by the functions 1 – CbelL 
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and 1 – CplL.  Moreover, given that the input lF,B to Eq. 5-5 is characterized by a 
possibility distribution as described in Section 5.3.6, the corresponding outputs take the 
form of a nested set of conditional loss-exceedance curves (or probability boxes/hybrid 
numbers) with increasing degrees of membership such as is shown in Figure 5-9.  This 
form of loss distribution can be referred to as possibilistic loss exceedance curves, which 










The total rule base to implement the fuzzy systems of Eq. 5-6 consists of a set of 
M conditional rule bases for each possible state of loss, LB,F.  The fuzzy system for 
percentage reduction in fatality loss in Eq. 5-5 is comprised of a set of linguistic rules of 
the form: 
 
 If LF,B and Y1 and Y2 and … and Y35, then ρF (5-6) 
 
According to Table 5-2, 18 regional capabilities are assumed to contribute and interact 
toward reducing the number of fatalities following an adverse initiating event.  To 
simplify calculations in this model in light of the large number of capabilities relevant to 
public health and safety loss, each capability Yj (see Table 5-2 for the list of Yj relevant to 
fatalities loss) is allowed to assume one of two states – “effective” or “ineffective” – with 
membership functions shown in Figure 5-10 constructed over the bounded domain [0, 
10].  This results in 218 = 262,144 rules according to Eq. A-9.  Greater sensitivity is 
afforded to the loss variable, which is allowed to take on one of five states as described in 
Figure 5-11 constructed over the bounded domain [0, L*], where L* is the saturation 
point of the response capabilities in the region.  Any amount of basis loss that exceeds L* 
is assumed to be unmitigable.  The percentage reduction in loss, ρF, can assume one of 
ten output sets as shown in Figure 5-12 (without labels) constructed over the bounded 
domain [0, 100%]. 
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Figure 5-10. Membership functions for states of the input capability variables 
 
























Figure 5-11. Membership functions for states of the input loss variable 
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Figure 5-12. Membership functions for states of the output reduction variable 
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Figure 5-13. Conditional rules bases for fatality loss reduction.  Each circle maps a rule 
number to an output state Ri. 
 
A notional assessment of relevant regional capabilities is provided in Table 5-23, where a 
“- -“ means that the assessed value for the corresponding capability is not relevant to this 
analysis.  According to the model in Eq. 5-5 and the basis public health and safety loss in 
Table 5-21, these capabilities produce a conditional cumulative distribution function on 
public health and safety loss such as that shown in Figure 5-14 for ground vehicle attack 
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against the office building.   A summary of results for all five assets and corresponding 
attack profiles is provided in Appendix B, Section B.1. 
 
Table 5-23. Notional regional Capability Assessment 
Category Label Capability Value* 
Common 
Mission Area 
Y1 Communications 5 
Y2 Community Preparedness and Participation 7 
Y3 Planning 8 
Y4 Risk Management -- 
Y5 Intelligence/ Information Sharing and Dissemination 6 
Planning 
Mission Area 
Y6 CBRNE Detection 4 
Y7 Information Gathering and Recognition of Indications and Warning 5 
Y8 Intelligence Analysis and Production 6 
Y9 Counter-Terror Investigations and Law Enforcement 8 
Protect 
Mission Area 
Y10 Critical Infrastructure Protection -- 
Y11 Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation -- 
Y12 Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense -- 
Y13 Public Health Laboratory Testing -- 
Respond 
Mission Area 
Y14 Animal Disease Emergency Support -- 
Y15 Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place 8 
 Y16 Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 7 
 Y17 Emergency Operations Center Management 8 
 Y18 Emergency Public Information and Warning 5 
 Y19 Environmental Health -- 
 Y20 Explosive Device Response Operations -- 
 Y21 Fatality Management 4 
 Y22 Fire Incident Response Support 6 
 Y23 Isolation and Quarantine -- 
 Y24 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) 7 
 Y25 Mass Prophylaxis -- 
 Y26 Medical Supplies Management and Distribution 8 
 Y27 Medical Surge 4 
 Y28 Onsite Incident Management 5 
 Y29 Emergency Public Safety and Security Response 6 
 Y30 Responder Safety and Health 5 
 Y31 Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment 8 
 Y32 Search and Rescue (Land-Rescue) 9 
 Y33 Volunteer Management and Donations -- 
 Y34 WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination -- 
Recover 
Mission Area 
Y35 Economic and Community Recovery 5 
Y36 Restoration of Lifelines -- 
 Y37 Structural Damage Assessment -- 




Figure 5-14. Conditional cumulative distribution on public health and safety loss for the 
office building subject to a ground vehicle attack 
 
5.4.2. Interdependency Analysis 
For disruption of service, a consequence conversion factor is developed uniquely 
for each asset according to the economic loss corresponding to service outage.  Such 
values were assessed in Table 5-5 for each asset.  The effects of dependencies among the 
portfolio of assets in the region (i.e., internal interdependencies) are captured in a first-
order basis via a simple proportionality relationship between disruption and economic 




 ( ) bTbATAI LL ,⋅= uKc  (5-7) 
 
where TAc  is a vector that assigns a cost per unit time of disruption for each asset in the 
portfolio, KA is the portfolio interdependency matrix where elements kij give the 
percentage degree of disruption to asset ai due to complete loss of asset aj (ai, aj ∈ A), ub 
is a disruption vector with elements ui that take on the value of the percentage service 
disruption for i corresponding to asset b (zero otherwise), and LT,b is the time to recover 
lost functionality of asset b (i.e., disruption time determined for the asset).  The following 
assumptions were made to justify the form of Eq. 5-7: 
 
• Only first-order internal interdependencies are considered.  Second-order and 
higher interdependencies are not considered, nor are interdependencies arising 
from interactions with assets and services external to the portfolio. 
• Substitution of services is not considered.  The model makes the conservative 
assumption that the interdependent assets will not make any non-immediate 
substitutions beyond what is nominally available in the market relating to the 
asset. 
• The degree of degradation of the function of an asset is linearly proportional to 
the degree of degradation in its dependencies.  This assumption justifies the use of 
the interdependency matrix KA with elements kij that linearly map disruption of 
the initiating asset to percentage disruption of interdependent assets. 
• The loss attributed to disruption of an asset is proportional to the degree of 
disruption and the time to reconstitute its function.  This assumption justifies the 
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use of a cost vector TAc  to map percent damage to economic loss, and use of the 
recuperation time LT0 of the initiating asset to scale it according to time.  This 
assumption is conservative in the sense that with increasing time, portfolios such 
as a region or infrastructure sector will tend to compensate for the loss via 
substitution. 
 
Referring to the list of 37 target capabilities shown in Table 5-2, any improvements in 
lessening the interdependency values KA, lessening the cost per unit disruption TAc , or 
decreasing the amount of time for disruption following an adverse incident (such through 
a purchase of spare transformers for an electric power substation) addresses capability 
Y36, “Restoration of Lifelines.” 
Table 5-24 presents a notional interdependency matrix KA for a system comprised 
of the five regional assets, where each cell gives the percentage reduction in function of a 
column asset due to total disruption of a row asset.   According to the model in Eq. 5-7 
and the basis disruption loss in Table 5-22, the cumulative distribution function on 
disruption loss can be obtained such as that shown in Figure 5-15 for ground vehicle 
attack against the office building.  A summary of results for all five assets and 
corresponding attack profiles is provided in Appendix B, Section B.2. 
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Building  0 15 0 80 
Hospital 0  0 0 100 
Train Station 0 0  0 100 
Stadium 0 0 50  100 
Power 




Figure 5-15. Conditional cumulative distribution on disruption loss for the office building 
subject to a ground vehicle attack 
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5.4.3. Probability of Adversary Success in Region 
It is broadly accepted that the effectiveness of a security system depends on the 
ability of defender forces to detect, respond to, and defeat determined adversaries 
(McGill et al. 2007).  As was done for the case of asset security, the functional 
relationship between adversary success probability in light of regional defenses, Pr(SR | 
A) and defensive variables can be expressed in approximate form as: 
 
 ( ) ( )321 ,,
~|Pr WWWPAS RR =  (5-8) 
 
where the defensive criteria W1, W2, and W3 described in Table 5-25 are linguistic 
variables whose values assume membership functions spanning a constructed scale on the 
bounded domain [0, 10] (where 0 corresponds to no capability and 10 corresponds to full 
performance for the criteria in light of the mode of attack considered), and the consequent 
Pr(SR|A) is the probability of adversary success at defeating regional defenses given 
attack specified over the domain [0,1].  The fuzzy system RP
~  in Eq. 5-8 is defined by an 
exhaustive set of linguistic rules of the form: 
 
 If W1 and W2 and W3, then Pr(SR |A) (5-9) 
 
Within the context of this case study, the premises Wi may take on one of five fuzzy 
values as shown in Figure 5-16, and the consequent Pr(SR|A) may take on one of seven 
linguistic values shown in Figure 5-17.  According to Eq. A-9, this results in 125 rules.  
A notional set of rules are provided in Table 5-26 that are broadly applicable to all attack 
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modes.  The benchmarks for the assessment of the underlying variables, however, are 
different depending on attack mode. 
 According to the fuzzy system for regional security performance assessment 
described in Eq. 5.8, a set of notional probabilities for adversary success in the region 
(illustrated in the form of p-boxes) can be obtained such a is shown in Table 5-27. 
 
Table 5-25. Regional Defensive criteria for probability of adversary success assessment 
Variable Defensive Criterion Definition 
W1 
 
Detection Ability to detect that the attack is occurring 
W2 
 
Response Ability to engage the adversary once detected 
W3 Defeat Ability to defeat or neutralize the adversary once 
engaged 
 





























Figure 5-17. Output fuzzy sets for the regional security model. 
 
Table 5-26. Notional rules for security system effectiveness assessment in the region 
Output Set Rule Number, Z 
P01 0-30, 35, 40, 45, 50-55, 60, 65, 70, 75-80, 
85, 90, 95, 100-105, 110, 115, 120 
P02 31 
P03 32, 36, 56 
P04 33, 41, 81 
P05 34, 37, 46, 57, 61, 106 
P06 38, 42, 58, 66, 82, 86 
P07 39, 47, 59, 62, 71, 107, 111 
P08 43, 83, 91 
P09 44, 48, 63, 67, 84, 87, 96, 108, 116 
P10 49, 64, 72, 109, 112, 121 
P11 68, 88, 92 
P12 69, 73, 89, 97, 113, 117 
P13 93 
P14 74, 114, 122 
P15 94, 98, 118 





Table 5-27. Assessed values for the regional defensive criteria for each attack mode  
Asset 











Detection (W1) 1 3 1 1 2 
Response (W2) 3 3 0 0 7 














 0 0.5 10
0.5
1
*Note: Each plot shows the p-box corresponding to the random set derived from the approximate reasoning 
model.  The left and right bounds are the cumulative plausibility and cumulative belief functions, 




5.5. CAPRA Risk Assessment 
Elaboration on the specific initiating events under the IED class of scenarios is 
described in section 5.3.1.  For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the effects of 
an attack are independent at the asset level; that is, simultaneous attacks against multiple 
assets does not affect each asset’s security and response and recovery system.  However, 
when considered at the regional level, the baseline asset-level effects can be combined in 
a linear manner, which then can be discounted in aggregate form according to the target 
capabilities.  This study focuses only on scenarios involving an attack against a single 
asset using a single delivery mode, though with additional computational resources, this 
model can be extended to look at multiple simultaneous attacks at regional assets. 
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5.5.1. Consequence and Severity Assessment 
Loss conversion factors are used to bring all dimensions of loss into consistent 
units such as dollars to enable aggregation of loss (Ayyub 2003).  For the public health 
and safety consequence dimension, a simple fuzzy number under the label “fuzzy value 
of life” (FVOL) can be constructed using the data compiled by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) 
on the statistical value of life used by various US regulatory agencies between 1985 and 
2000 (Table 5-27).  The reason for expressing value of life as a fuzzy number is due in 
part to the inherent inter-individual and inter-organizational ambiguity of the appropriate 
value of life for use in different contexts.  The membership function for the FVOL used 
in this analysis is shown in Figure 5-18, where each α-cut corresponds to the inner α-
percentile and the median is corresponds to the single-valued support at α = 1.  Treating 
the FVOL as a consequence conversion factor (Ayyub 2003), the total equivalent 
fatalities valued in dollars can be obtained by multiplying the number of fatalities by the 
FVOL using fuzzy interval arithmetic described in Appendix A (Ayyub and Klir 2007). 
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Figure 5-18. Fuzzy value of life (FVOL) derived from data of Viscusi and Aldy (2003) 
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Table 5-28. Date on value of statistical life (Viscusi and Aldy 2003) 
Agency, Source (Rule) [Year] Value 
(2000 $US) 
Federal Aviation Administration, Protective Breathing Equipment (50 FR 41452) 
[1985] 
1.0 
Environmental Protection Agency, Regulation on Fuels and Fuel Additives; 
Gasoline Lead Content (50 FR 9400) [1985] 
1.7 
Federal Aviation Administration, Improved Survival Equipment for Inadvertent 
Water Landings (53 FR 24890) [1988] 
1.5 
Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone (53 FR 
30566) [1988] 
4.8 
Federal Aviation Administration, Proposed Establishment of the Harlingen Airport 
Radar Service Area, TX (55 FR 32064) [1990] 
2.0 
Food and Nutrition Service (USDA), National School Lunch Program and School 
Breakfast Program (59 FR 30218) [1994] 
1.7, 3.5 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Multiple Tube Mine and Shell Fireworks 
Devices (60 FR 34922) [1995] 
5.6 
Food Safety Inspection Service (USDA), Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point Systems (61 FR 38806) [1996] 
1.9 
Food and Drug Administration, Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of 
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents (61 FR 
44396) [1996] 
2.7 
Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot Training, 
Testing, and Checking and at Training Centers (61 FR 34508) [1996] 
3.0 
Environmental Protection Agency, Requirements for Lead-Based Paint Activities in 
Target Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities (61 FR 45778) [1996] 
6.3 
Food and Drug Administration, Medical Devices; Current Good Manufacturing 
Practice Final Rule; Quality System Regulation (61 FR 52602) [1996] 
5.5 
Environmental Protection Agency, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
Ozone (62 FR 38856) [1997] 
6.3 
Environmental Protection Agency, Radon in Drinking Water Health Risk 
Reduction and Cost Analysis (64 FR 9560) [1999] 
6.3 
Environmental Protection Agency, Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles: 
Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements 
(65 FR 6698) [1999] 
3.9, 6.3 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Portable Bed Rails; Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (65 FR 58968) [2000] 
5.0 
 
The consequence conversion factor for disruption depends on the nature of the 
specific services disrupted, and is taken as the equivalent dollar value of lost income that 
would otherwise be generated from services per day per percentage disruption (i.e., 
converts disruption time/degree into dollars).  This model assumes a continuous 
proportionality relationship between the economic value of a service and degree and 
duration of disruption.  Accordingly, the factor depends on the specific assets affected by 
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an event.  The consequence conversion factors for disruption in this case study is 
expressed as a possibility distribution (see Table 5-7) with core centered at a nominal 
value and the support spanning ±5% to accommodate the ambiguity imposed by the 
qualifying adverb “about.” 
The aggregate loss considering all relevant loss dimensions (public health and 
safety loss and disruption loss, in this case) can be obtained for each attack profile by first 
multiplying the conditional loss valued in the natural units of each dimension by the loss 
conversion factor to bring each dimension to consistent units, then summing together the 
losses for each dimension under the assumption of unknown, but non-negative 
dependence (see Appendix A, Section A-7).  The only assumption made here is that, for 
example, there is at least a non-negative correlation between losses from each natural 
dimension (e.g., the probability that an increase in public health and safety loss will 
consistently correlate to a decrease in disruption loss is assumed to be zero).  Typical 
results for aggregate loss from this assumption are shown in Figure 5-19, which gives the 
conditional cumulative distribution function on aggregate loss given a successful attack 
against the office building with a ground vehicle explosive.  A summary of aggregate loss 





Figure 5-19. Conditional cumulative distribution on aggregate loss valued in dollars for 
the office building subject to a ground vehicle attack 
 
5.5.2. Overall Vulnerability Assessment: Security Vulnerability Assessment 
Given two layers of defenses, namely regional defenses and target (i.e., asset) 
defenses, adversary success requires the adversary to first defeat regional defenses, and if 
successful, defeat target defenses.  The probability of adversary success, Pr(S | A), can 
thus be expressed as the joint probability of the adversary defeating both regional 
defenses (denoted by the event SR) and target defenses (denoted by the event SA), Pr(SA,SR 
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~  and RP
~  are obtained from Eqs. 5-3 and 5-8, respectively. 
 
5.5.3. Conditional Loss Given Attack 
According to the theorem of total probability (Ayyub and McCuen 2002), the 
conditional cumulative distribution function on loss L, whether public health and safety, 
disruption, or aggregate, given attack with attack profile P can be obtained according the 
following Equation: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )ASASlLPlL |Pr,|Pr11|Pr <−−=<  (5-11) 
 
where Pr(S | A) is obtained from Eq. 5-10.  Since the fuzzy systems AP
~  and RP
~  
comprising Pr(S | A) produce random sets as outputs, the conditional cumulative 
distribution on loss in Eq. 5-11 is characterized by a random set at each level of loss l.  
To the author’s knowledge, there is no convenient mechanism for displaying this level of 
uncertainty in compact form on a single plot; however, a set of pignistic percentiles can 
be constructed for each level of loss (see Appendix A), from which a series of pignistic 
percentile distributions can be constructed at different percentile levels. 
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5.5.4. Threat Probability Assessment 
According to the assumptions underlying the proportional attractiveness model 
described in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1 combined with an assumed visibility of one (Pr(V) 
= 1) for all assets and attack profiles and a bias parameter b = 1, the probability of attack 
for each attack profile given an attack at the asset is shown in Figure 5-20.  These 
probabilities were determined according to the 99th-percentile value of the 99th pignistic 
percentile conditional aggregate loss (i.e., worst-case, optimistic rational adversary) 
distributions described in Appendix B, Section B.4.  The results in Figure 5-20 can be 
combined with the results for the conditional loss distributions given attack determined 
from Eq. 5-11 to obtain the conditional loss distribution given attack at an asset, all 
relevant attack profiles considered.  To obtain the conditional loss distribution given 
attack for the region, all assets and attack profiles considered, the probability of attack at 
each asset is necessary.  The resulting probability of attack at each asset was determined 













































































Figure 5-21. Relative probability of attack for each asset in the region 
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Given a baseline estimate on the rate of occurrence or probability of an attack 
affecting one or more of the five regional assets, an approximate model that relates a 
subset of the 37 capabilities to actual attack probability can be constructed leveraging 
approximate reasoning techniques.  Table 5-2 summarizes a mapping of capabilities to 
the loss variable “threat occurrence.”  The approximate relationship, λ~ , between relevant 
capabilities yλ and percentage reduction in attack recurrence rate, λ can be expressed as: 
 
 ( )λλ λρ y
~
=  (5-12) 
 
Note that according to the arguments of the function in Eq. 5-12, this model assumes 
independence between the ability of the region to decrease the probability of attack and 
the baseline estimate for this probability.  The reason for this assumption is that any 
dependence between capabilities and the baseline estimate, given the inherent 
subjectivity associated with estimating an annual recurrence rate or probability of attack, 
creates a situation where the output risk profiles may be overly sensitive to the initial 
subjective estimates of baseline probability of attack. 
According to Table 5-2, 6 regional capabilities are assumed to contribute and 
interact toward reducing the number of fatalities following an adverse initiating event.  
As was done in Section 5.4 for loss, each capability Yj is allowed to assume one of two 
states – “effective” or “ineffective” – with membership functions shown in Figure 5-11 
constructed over the bounded domain [0,10].  This results in 26 = 64 rules according to 
Eq. A-9.  The percentage loss, ρλ, can assume one of five output sets as shown in Figure 
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5-22 constructed over the bounded domain [0,100%].  The rules for this case are given in 
Table 5-29. 
























Figure 5-22. Output sets for % reduction in threat probability or recurrence rate 
 
 
Table 5-29. Rules for threat probability / recurrence reduction 
Output Set Rule Number, Z 
R1 0-6, 8-10, 12, 16-18, 20, 24, 32-34, 36, 
40, 48 
R2 7, 11, 13-14, 19, 21-22, 25-26, 28, 35, 37-
38, 41-42, 44, 49-50, 52, 56 
R3 15, 23, 27, 29-30, 39, 43, 45-46, 51, 53-
54, 57-58, 60 




 Given the output from the approximate reasoning model in Eq. 5-12, the total 
cumulative distribution on loss L can be determined according to the theorem of total 
probability as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) λρAAlLlL Pr|Pr11Pr <−−=<  (5-13) 
 
where Pr(L < l | A) is the conditional cumulative distribution function for loss given an 
attack in the region, all assets and associated attack profiles considered.  A summary of 
the conditional aggregate loss distributions and membership functions for the mean loss 
over a wide set of pignistic percentile distributions for each asset is provided in Appendix 
B, Section B.5. 
 
5.5.5. Regional Risk Profiles and Actionable Risk Information 
According to the input information and procedures described in the previous 
sections of this chapter and the results obtained as shown in Appendix B, the conditional 
aggregate loss and membership functions for different percentiles of aggregate loss given 
attack in the region are obtained as shown in Figures 5-24 and 5-25, respectively.  
Considering a fixed assumed probability of attack of 0.05 for a time period spanning 5 
years (as defined in Section 5.2), the regional risk profile for an attack occurring against a 
single asset among the five in the region within the next 5 years is shown in Figure 5-25.  
Table 5-30 presents the results of Figure 5-25 in numerical matrix form in order to 

































Figure 5-25. Possibilistic loss-exceedance curve in light of explosive attacks occurring in 
the region against one of the five assets in the next 5 years 
 199
 
Table 5-30. Matrix of levels of less for different pignistic percentile distributions and 





Aggregate Loss Values ($Millions) for Different Probabilities of Exceedance 
0.99 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.70 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.01 
0.00 1                   497 
0.01 1                 22 601 
0.05 3                 86 738 
0.10 5               27 182 942 
0.25 13               184 415 1,392 
0.50 43             130 453 809 1,912 
0.75 124             328 937 1,264 2,609 
0.90 310           184 947 1,599 1,849 3,090 
0.95 493           388 1,322 1,912 2,129 3,746 
0.99 908       172 298 1096 1,829 2,339 2,458 5,039 
Note: Empty cells indicate a value of zero 
  
 To better advise decision makers on strategies for cost-effective risk reduction in 
the event that the decision maker’s risk exposure was determined to be unacceptable, 
each relevant regional capability was adjusted to its maximum favorable value (p = 100% 
using the sensitivity analysis method described in Eq. 3-34) to determine the impact it 
had on various pignistic percentile distributions at different percentile levels.  Table 5-31 
summarizes the results from this inquiry, where from this table it is suggested that 
improving CBRNE detection capabilities (Y6) and enhancing information collection and 
recognition of indications capabilities (Y7) present the greatest opportunity for reducing 
risk.  In contrast, this analysis also suggests that any improvement in planning (Y3), 
counter-terror investigations (Y9), citizen evacuation (Y15), and several other capabilities 
(Y17, Y26, Y31, and Y32) offers no benefit risk reduction. 
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Table 5-31. Sensitivity of the risk results to favorable changes in each regional capability 
Strategy CDF Value Mean 
Pignistic Percentiles 




Mean 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.60 0.98             
0.50 0.26 0.16 0.46   0.00       
0.75 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.34       
0.95 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.20 0.61 




Mean 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.53 0.82             
0.50 0.27 0.19 0.49   0.00       
0.75 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.27       
0.95 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.19 
0.99 0.02   0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Improve Universal 
Defeat Capabilities 
Mean 0.02   0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.12 0.13             
0.50 0.09 0.06 0.18   0.00       
0.75 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.06       
0.95 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 




Mean 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.10 0.14             
0.50 0.04 0.03 0.06   0.00       
0.75 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08       
0.95 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 
0.99 0.06   0.04 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.10 
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Table 5-31. (continued) 
Strategy CDF Value Mean 
Pignistic Percentiles 






Mean 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.21 0.31             
0.50 0.12 0.08 0.19   0.00       
0.75 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.12       
0.95 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.33 
0.99 0.04     0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.09 
Improve Planning 
Capabilities (Y3) 
Mean 0.00               
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25                 
0.50         0.00       
0.75                 
0.95                 







Mean 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.65 1.00             
0.50 0.34 0.26 0.58   0.00       
0.75 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.61       
0.95 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.31 1.00 




Mean 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.15 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.83 1.00             
0.50 0.53 0.48 0.72   0.00       
0.75 0.25 0.05 0.18 0.54 1.00       
0.95 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.19 0.41 1.00 1.00 
0.99 0.08   0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.11 
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Table 5-31. (continued) 
Strategy CDF Value Mean 
Pignistic Percentiles 








Mean 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.73 1.00             
0.50 0.47 0.39 0.68   0.00       
0.75 0.18 0.03 0.13 0.43 0.98       
0.95 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.65 1.00 






Mean 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.65 1.00             
0.50 0.34 0.26 0.58   0.00       
0.75 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.61       
0.95 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.31 1.00 






Mean 0.00               
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25                 
0.50         0.00       
0.75                 
0.95                 





Mean 0.00               
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25                 
0.50         0.00       
0.75                 
0.95                 
0.99               0.00 
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Table 5-31. (continued) 
Strategy CDF Value Mean 
Pignistic Percentiles 





Mean 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.06 0.10             
0.50 0.01 0.00 0.01   0.00       
0.75 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07       
0.95 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 






Mean 0.00               
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25                 
0.50         0.00       
0.75                 
0.95                 






Mean 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.10 0.14             
0.50 0.04 0.03 0.06   0.00       
0.75 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08       
0.95 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 




Mean 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.12 0.16             
0.50 0.06 0.06 0.08   0.00       
0.75 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.09       
0.95 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 
0.99 0.06   0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.10 
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Table 5-31. (continued) 
Strategy CDF Value Mean 
Pignistic Percentiles 





Mean 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.09 0.13             
0.50 0.02 0.02 0.02   0.00       
0.75 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08       
0.95 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 






Mean 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.06 0.10             
0.50 0.01 0.00 0.01   0.00       
0.75 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07       
0.95 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 






Mean 0.00               
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25                 
0.50         0.00       
0.75                 
0.95                 




Mean 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.12 0.16             
0.50 0.06 0.06 0.08           
0.75 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.09       
0.95 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 
0.99 0.06   0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.10 
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Table 5-31. (continued) 
Strategy CDF Value Mean 
Pignistic Percentiles 





Mean 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.10 0.14             
0.50 0.04 0.03 0.06           
0.75 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08       
0.95 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 






Mean 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.09 0.13             
0.50 0.02 0.02 0.02   0.00       
0.75 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08       
0.95 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 





Mean 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.10 0.14             
0.50 0.04 0.03 0.06   0.00       
0.75 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08       
0.95 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 






Mean 0.00               
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25                 
0.50         0.00       
0.75                 
0.95                 
0.99               0.00 
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Table 5-31. (continued) 
Strategy CDF Value Mean 
Pignistic Percentiles 
0.01 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.99 
Improve Search 
and Rescue (Land 
Rescue) 
Capabilities (Y32)  
Mean 0.00               
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25                 
0.50         0.00       
0.75                 
0.95                 





Mean 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
0.01                 
0.05                 
0.25 0.10 0.14             
0.50 0.04 0.03 0.06   0.00       
0.75 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08       
0.95 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 
0.99 0.06   0.04 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.10 
 
5.6. Discussion 
This case study focused on applying the CAPRA methodology developed in 
Chapter 3 to assess the risks associated with a portfolio of assets in a region due to 
malicious explosive events.  The information used to support this analysis was highly 
uncertain, and consequently the outputs assumed the form of a nested set of probability 
boxes defined according to their percentiles values or membership values.  However, as 
this case study demonstrates, even highly uncertain expressions of model parameters can 
be synthesized to produce meaningful statements of risk that avoid the fallacy of 
irresponsible precisiation, or rather the tendency to communicate a high degree of 
precision that cannot be justified on the basis of less precise inputs. 
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To assist in obtaining rapid assessments of probability of adversary success in 
light of target and regional capabilities, this case study leveraged techniques from 
approximate reasoning to approximate the true functional relationship between several 
input variable and resulting security system effectiveness.  Unlike the previous case study 
in Chapter 4, this case study took for granted cooperation with asset owners to obtain 
asset-level security information.  However, in practice this level of cooperation is not 
ensured, but rather may come at a cost in terms of reciprocal support or in terms of 
decrease tolerance for future interactions.  In lieu of this approximate reasoning approach, 
the regional analyst could leverage any available information on adversary probability 
success at the asset so long as the approach taken to make this asset-level assessment is 
compatible with the CAPRA methodology.  For example, the approach used in the case 
study in Chapter 4 could be used in place of the Chapter 5 approach provided it was 
employed at the asset level and the asset owner is willing to share it with regional 
decision makers. 
Approximate reasoning techniques were also essential for mapping the 37 
capabilities to risk for the purposes of demonstrating to funding agencies how an 
improvement in one capability will lead to decreased risk overall in order to make a 
business case for investment.  In the interest of tailoring the specifics of the CAPRA 
methodology to meet the needs of a regional decision maker, approximate models were 
constructed to relate the degree of effectiveness of each capability to its ability to reduce 
consequence for any degree of basis loss and to reduce the probability of an attack 
occurring.  However, since basis loss was expressed in terms of a simple triangular 
possibility distribution whose characteristic points were directly elicited from regional 
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decision makers, the result of this model was a series of probability boxes at different 
degrees of membership.  While this representation of information is highly uncertain, the 
result from this analysis remains true to the nature of the uncertainties in the underlying 
model inputs and the understanding of how capabilities relate to risk.  That is, this case 
study demonstrated that the CAPRA model can still produce useful risk information even 
in the face high uncertainty. 
While it was not described explicitly in the case study itself, this analysis applied 
techniques for fuzzy systems in a way not previously done in the literature, that is, as a 
tool for approximating a function that would otherwise be developed using statistical or 
actuarial techniques.  To the author’s knowledge, the use of random sets in conjunction 
with fuzzy inference (described in detail in Appendix A) not to produce a defuzzified 
crisp output, but to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, all the uncertainties in 
inputs and model has not been discussed in the literature. 
This study also demonstrated a simple first-order approach to capturing losses due 
to interdependencies which, in some sense, amounts to deriving a consequence 
conversion factor on loss that considers broader impacts than just lost service of the 
afflicted system.  Though more rigorous methods are available for capturing the 
aggravating effects of secondary asset disruption due to disruption of a dependent asset 
(e.g., Lee at al. 2007), the approach used in this case study has the benefit of being quick, 
and for the most part, conservative in that it does not account for substitution effects that 
tend to emerge over time.  However, similar to its more rigorous counterparts, the 
approach for considering interdependencies is limited in scope to dependencies among 
assets within the portfolio under study, and do not consider contributions to risk 
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stemming from the disruption of assets external to the portfolio.  This important line of 
study, that is consideration of both internal and external dependencies to a portfolio, is a 
subject in need of future research attention.  For example, the Department of Homeland 
Security is presently considering this problem in terms of US dependence on foreign 
infrastructure, or more generally, US dependence on infrastructure that is outside the 
national infrastructure portfolio (Poptanich 2008). 
Another key innovation demonstrated in this case study was the use of a fuzzy 
value of life to accommodate the inherent vagueness in the appropriate value of life for 
different individuals and contexts.  This fuzzy value of life was overlaid atop expressions 
for equivalent fatalities to obtain a monetarily equivalent expression for public health and 
safety loss.  By leveraging fuzzy sets for the purposes of converting consequence 
expressed in one loss dimension to another, the hope was that any concern on what the 
actual value of life should be would be alleviated by accommodating a family of 
reasonable values for this factor. 
Future work will explore ways in which to mine unstructured data sets to extract 
inference rules from previous incidents, reports, narratives, and simulation results, for the 
purposes of examining the role of the capabilities in reducing the consequences 
associated with different naturally occurring and anthropic events and for different 
dimensions of consequence.  Data mining or machine learning techniques offer a 
potentially significant improvement over the current brute force approach employed in 
the present study for obtaining inference rules.  Also, this approach would enable finer 
resolution models that would ultimately reduce the uncertainties associated function 
approximation. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
6.1. General Discussion 
The research described in the previous chapters developed an overarching 
methodology for critical asset and portfolio risk analysis for security events, with a 
demonstration for explosive attacks in particular.  Homeland security risk analysis 
problems are large in scope, and accordingly any methodology used to make sense of the 
risks afflicting homeland security decision makers at any level of leadership and system 
abstraction necessarily must accommodate many factors, some of which whose values 
extend beyond the ability of a given decision maker to assess or control.  This was 
demonstrated in the case study in Chapter 4, where the asset owner had to make 
conservative assumptions for model parameters to compensate for missing information 
on other assets and regional emergency response capabilities.  However, even without 
values for some of the model parameters, decision makers must still make decisions.  As 
was shown, the CAPRA methodology provides a framework for decision support despite 
missing information by defaulting to conservative assumptions when necessary. 
The CAPRA methodology meets all of the requirements outlined in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2 of this research.  In particular: 
 
• The structure of the CAPRA methodology allows for a sensitivity analysis to be 
performed on the baseline estimate of risk so as to provide actionable risk 
information to homeland security decision makers.  This sensitivity analysis can 
be used to target specific risk variables for risk reduction, or to bolster a case for 
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enhanced cooperation with other stakeholders to alleviate any conservative 
assumptions made to compensate for missing information. 
• The CAPRA methodology builds upon accepted thinking and understanding of 
security risk analysis (i.e., the Risk = Threat times Vulnerability time 
Consequence model).  This methodology considers all aspects of the security risk 
analysis problem – to include consequence, vulnerability, and threat – and in fact, 
establishes a new operational definition for overall vulnerability that highlights 
those contributors to vulnerability beyond security countermeasures.  Moreover, 
the CAPRA methodology redefines the role of consequence and severity 
assessment, in particular by using this phase to clearly articulate those 
consequence dimensions of concern to a decision maker and the spectrum of 
severity up to an event-neutral maximum potential loss.  Threat probability 
assessment is also accommodated, even in the absence of specific information on 
current adversary plans and activities, to produce meaningful probabilities of 
attack based on adversary behavior, knowledge, and perceptions. 
• The mathematical structure of the CAPRA methodology, as a purely probabilistic 
model at its core, expresses risk in terms of a probability distribution over suitable 
dimensions of loss.  The high-level sequence of events between cause and 
consequence follow a logical progression beginning with an initiating event and 
then through a series of barriers or interventions to arrive at a particular degree of 
loss.  Moreover, the CAPRA methodology allows for expression of model 
parameters in a variety of quantitative forms, and consequently produces risk 
information that remains faithful to the imprecision of the underlying inputs. 
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• As was demonstrated in the two case studies, the CAPRA methodology is 
scalable to accommodate the needs of decision makers at all levels of abstraction 
and leadership, including operational and strategic asset, sectoral, and regional 
analysis.  While the CAPRA methodology accepts that each decision maker has 
his or her own interests, such as a focus on different dimensions and scope of loss, 
the general philosophy underpinning the methodology is consistent across all 
stakeholders.  This feature promotes statements of compatibility between the 
results of the CAPRA methodology, and avoids any need for discussion on how 
the results were obtained.  Moreover, under the CAPRA framework, a business 
case can be made for sharing of information across stakeholders for the purpose 
of obtaining the most accurate representations of risk possible that consider 
factors that are both internal and external to the decision maker’s decision space. 
• A key innovation described in this research is the ability of the CAPRA 
methodology to make judgments of threat probability without intelligence 
information on specific adversary activities.  Rather, the proportional 
attractiveness model discussed in this research assumes only that the adversaries 
behave as rational decision makers that choose from among a variety of visible 
options in proportion to the perceived value added from their compromise with 
respect to the adversary’s goals and motivations.  Consequently, the CAPRA 
methodology accommodates the dynamic nature of human adversaries, 
particularly their tendencies to shift preferences in response to security 
investments.   
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In general, there is no single approach to obtaining values for the parameters of 
the CAPRA methodology.  As the two case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate, 
different techniques can be used to obtain values for, say, the security system 
effectiveness (i.e., systems reliability modeling in Chapter 4, and approximate reasoning 
in Chapter 5).  As an example, some of the parameters, such as response and recovery 
and security system effectiveness may benefit in some context from the use of discrete 
event simulation or agent-based simulation.  However, the CAPRA methodology 
provides a consistent mechanism for integrating information from various models.  And 
more importantly, this research and the two case studies demonstrated that useful and 
actionable risk information can be produced even with limited information supporting 
precise estimates of model parameters. 
 
6.2. Avenues for Future Research 
Avenues for future research to further enhance the implementation of the CAPRA 
methodology in different contexts include, but are not limited to, the following: 
 
• Considering strategies to validate the results produced by the CAPRA 
methodology.  For example, depending on the level of abstraction at which the 
model is applied, such as at the regional level where the stakeholders 
represent public interests rather than at the asset level where the asset owner 
has little resources to support analysis, peer review of the parameter values 
and assumptions underlying their aggregation may be useful for assessing 
their reasonableness, and when appropriate, their accuracy.  However, it must 
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be noted that since the CAPRA model focuses largely on security incidents, 
little data is available to make meaningful statistical comparisons with model 
predictions.  More importantly, such data is typically undesirable to pursue 
since its availability implies humans have suffered from the effects of 
hazardous events.  Another strategy might be to look at event precursors as a 
basis for assessing the probability of subsequent events that could have, but 
did not happen.  For example, if an attack was attempted but was unsuccessful 
at defeating target defenses, precursor analysis would examine what would 
have happened had the adversary been successful for the purposes of 
comparison with initial predictions. 
• In lieu of model validation, a promising line of research might be to bypass 
the validation question altogether, and instead explore the usefulness of the 
CAPRA methodology as a decision support tool in terms of the information 
and insights learned through its application.  That is, to what extent does 
knowledge generated in the process of implementing CAPRA empower 
decision makers to make better decisions? 
• Extending the CAPRA model to consider several or more operational states of 
an asset or portfolio.  In general, all dimensions of vulnerability have a time 
element: changes in the situational environment (e.g., night versus day, rainy 
versus sunny, weekend versus weekday) may have an effect on one or more 
aspects of vulnerability.  In many circumstances, an asset or system may be 
more or less vulnerable at different times depending on the situation at hand.  
It is thus important to identify an exhaustive set of operational states, and 
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independently conduct a vulnerability assessment of each.  Along these lines, 
the CAPRA methodology can also be extended to support tactical decisions 
by integrating real time expressions of consequence, vulnerability, and threat 
likeliness and using this as a basis to allocate tactical resources so as to keep 
risk below a threshold level of acceptability (McGill and Ayyub 2006). 
• Leverage the latest developments in human reliability analysis to assess the 
performance of humans (e.g., guard, first responders) in relation to the various 
types of situations characterized by the CAPRA methodology.  For example, 
future work should examine the performance of guards at the individual and 
group level to determine probability of detection, response capabilities, and 
their ability to defeat specified types of adversaries.  Such an implementation 
of human reliability analysis to security would enable more comprehensive 
and meaningful expressions of security system effectiveness that take into 
account guard training, response capabilities, cognitive and psychological 
factors. 
• Explore the extent to which cooperation among homeland security 
stakeholders will yield positive (and perhaps negative) benefits to the 
individual and to society.  As was demonstrated in the case studies in Chapters 
4 and 5, different stakeholders have different needs, but in the absence of 
information from lower and higher levels, all decisions will be based on 
conservative estimates, and consequently may be suboptimal.  To what extent 
does cooperation promote optimal decision making at both the individual and 
societal level?  It is envisioned that the answer to such a question could 
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enhance arguments for or against cooperation among homeland security 
decision makers. 
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Appendix A. Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Logic, and Evidence Theory 
 
A.1. Fuzzy Numbers and their Membership Functions 
The basic building blocks of fuzzy logic are linguistic variables that can take on 
states described by fuzzy intervals.  A linguistic variable is one that takes on linguistic 
values such as “strong” for a variable describing impact resistance of a crash barrier and 
“secure” for a variable defining the state of protection (Zadeh 1975).  That is, a linguistic 
variable takes on values that have clear intension (“the barrier is strong”), but with a 
vague extension (we cannot be explicit about the resistance).  In contrast to a crisp 
number whose value is precisely defined, a fuzzy number is a fuzzy set defined on the set 
of real numbers whose numeric meaning is ambiguous (Ayyub and Klir 2007).  For 
example, the phrase “not unlikely” as a statement about likeliness and the phrase 
“catastrophic” as a statement about potential consequences are both fuzzy numbers in the 
sense that they express magnitude without precise quantification.  Fuzzy numbers have 
been linked to possibility distributions by Zadeh (1999), which are a specific case of 
random sets (Alvarez 2006). 
The degree of belonging or membership of a certain numeric value x to a fuzzy 
number X is characterized by a membership function μ(x) on the range [0,1], where a 
membership of 1 indicates that x fully belongs to X, a membership value of 0 indicates 
that x does not belong to X, and values in between indicate that x partially belongs to X.  
Figure A-1, for example, shows a series of fuzzy numbers representing various degree of 
probability as derived from the data of Lichenstein and Newman (1967) assuming a 
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single-valued core positioned at the published median value and the support spanning the 
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Figure A-1. Fuzzy numbers for selected probability words 
 


























μ  (A-1) 
 
where μL(x) and μR(x) are, respectively, non-decreasing and non-increasing functions of x 
on the range [0,1].  The fuzzy number described by the membership function in Eq. A-1 
is known as a generalized left-right fuzzy number, or GLRFN (Dubois and Prade 1980).  
Note that a GLRFN is bell-shaped, and is defined by four characteristic points <a, b, c, 
d>.  The core of a fuzzy number X is defined as the interval where α = 1 (i.e., [b, c] in 
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Eq. A-1), and consists of all values of x that definitely belong to X. The support of a 
fuzzy number is defined as the interval where α > 0 (i.e., (a, d) in Eq. A-1), and consists 
of all values of x that have at least a partial belonging to X.  An alpha-level or alpha-cut 
of a fuzzy number, αX, defines the interval associated with a degree of membership α.  In 
terms of the formulation for a GLRFN, the alpha-cut can be obtained from Eq. (A-1) as: 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ]αμαμα 11 , −−= RLX  (A-2) 
 
where ( )αμ 1−L  and ( )αμ 1−R  are the inverses of the functions used in Eq. A-1. 
In practice, fuzzy numbers are commonly represented in a simplified or 
approximate form known as a trapezoidal fuzzy number, or TrFN.  The membership 
function of a TrFN is linearly increasing on the interval [a,b], constant on the interval 
[b,c], and linearly decreasing on the interval [c,d]. That is, the shape of the membership 
function is piecewise linear with functions μL and μR of the form (from Eq. A-1): 
 










axxLμ  (A-3) 
 










xdxRμ  (A-4) 
 
It is common practice to denote a trapezoidal fuzzy number as TrFN(a,b,c,d).  The alpha-
cuts of a TrFN can be obtained from Eqs. A-2, A-3, and A-4 as: 
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 ( ) ( )[ ]cddabaX −−−+= ααα ,  (A-5) 
 
In the special case where b = c, the core collapses into a single value and the resulting 
TrFN is known as a triangular fuzzy number, or TFN.  To facilitate ease of computation 
when dealing fuzzy numbers specified in general form, trapezoidal approximations of 
GLRFNs can be obtained using the methods described by Grzegorzewski and Mrowka 
(2005; 2007). 
Given a set of linguistic variables established for a specific problem, the set of 
possible fuzzy values each can take must be sensitive to individual interpretation and 
dimensional precision.  As noted by Wallsten and Budescu (1994), the location, spread, 
and shape of membership functions vary over individuals and depend upon context and 
the intent of the communicated message.  Moreover, inter-individual vagueness in 
meaning must also be considered due to individual differences in understanding and 
operational lexicons, which has led researchers to suggest that words cannot be legislated 
(Wallsten and Budescu 1994).  It is therefore important to formally elicit membership 
functions that are specific to each problem or variable, and if resources permit, for each 
user using established techniques for expert opinion elicitation (Ayyub 2001).  One 
effective technique is the Multistimuli Membership Function Technique (MMFT) 
described by Budescu et al. (2003). 
 
A.2. The Extension Principle 
The membership function of a variable Y, μY(y), that is a function of one or more 
input variables X1, X2, …, XM characterized by fuzzy numbers with membership functions 
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( ) ( ) ( )MXXX xxx Mμμμ ,...,, 11 21 , respectively can be obtained via the extension principle as 














=  (A-6) 
 
where R(x1, x2, …, xM) defines a constraining relation among the input variables (e.g., 
x1+x2 ≤ x3) that is appropriate given the nature of the problem (Klir 1997).  Alternatively, 
an alpha-cut approach can be used as follows (Ayyub and Klir 2006): 
 
 ( ) ( ){ }RXXXxxxxxxfY MMM ααααα ∩×××∈= ...,...,,|,...,, 212121  (A-7) 
 
where the intersection of the relation R with the space of possible values of Xj constrains 
the corresponding set of admissible values for Y at a given α-level.  Equation A-7 
provides the basis for standard arithmetic operations on fuzzy numbers via interval 
arithmetic at each α-level (Ayyub and Klir 2006). 
 
A.3. Constructing a Fuzzy System 
A fuzzy system is a collection of “if-then” rules that link a string input of 
linguistic variables (i.e., the antecedent or the “if-part”) to an output value (i.e., the 
consequent or the “then part”) (Kosko 1997; Passino and Yurkovich 1998).  More 
specifically, a fuzzy system F~ approximates the true function Y = f (X1, X2, …, XM) via a 
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set of N fuzzy inference rules defined on the input-output state space X1 × X2 × … × XM × 
Y of the form (shown for two input variables): 
 
 IF (X1 is Ak) AND (X2 is Bk) THEN (Y is Ck) (A-8) 
 
where Ak, Bk, and Ck are linguistic or fuzzy values assigned to X1, X2, and Y, respectively 
for the kth rule (1 < k ≤ N).  The approximation of a true function f by a fuzzy system F~  
is achieved via a set of overlapping fuzzy rule patches such as is shown in Figure A-2 
that cover part of the graph of an unknown or unascertained function.  If each Xj (1 < j ≤ 
M) can assume one of nj linguistic or fuzzy values, the total number of rules N that 











Accordingly, a higher resolution approximation with a more precise coverage of the 
unknown or unascertained function follows from a larger set of finely-tuned inference 
rules.  For illustration, a fuzzy system consisting of 6 input variables each with three 
possible states is characterized by 36 = 729 rules.  If each variable could take on one of 
four possible states, the fuzzy system would then be characterized by 46 = 4,096 rules.  
Thus, as the number of possible states for each linguistic variable increases, so too does 
the required number of inference rules; this is known as the “curse of dimensionality” 
(Kosko 1997).  The challenge is to balance the need for analytical resolution with 
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simplicity and available computational resources, which thus requires a trade-off between 
the number of input states permitted for each linguistic variable in a fuzzy inference rule 







































Figure A-2. Approximation of a function Y = f(x) with a set of fuzzy rule patches 
 
Constructing a fuzzy system requires systematically evaluating the consequent or 
output value for each of N antecedents to generate a complete set of fuzzy inference rules.  
This can be done manually by an expert or a panel of experts using techniques for expert 
opinion elicitation (Ayyub 2001), or if empirical data is available, can be done using 
numerical techniques (see, for example, Chiu 1999).  While the simplest and most 
primitive approach to establishing a complete set of fuzzy inference rules is to use brute-
force to evaluate the consequent for each individual antecedent in turn, this method can 
be time consuming if the number of rules is large or cognitively prohibitive if the number 
of input variables exceeds the mental abilities of a group of experts to process them into 
an opinion (Miller 1956).  Fortunately, the fuzzy control literature is replete with 
suggestions on efficiently obtaining and updating a complete set of fuzzy inference rules, 




A.4. Fuzzification and Rule Matching 
Given a fuzzy system F~  consisting of a set of N inference rules that map input 
variables Xj (1 < j ≤ M) to an output Y, a series of crisp input values xj can be processed 
through the rule base (e.g., collection of rules) to obtain an approximation of y with 
associated uncertainty.  In particular, given a set of crisp input values xj, the membership 
values μ(xj) for all linguistic values or fuzzy numbers that can be assigned to Xj are 
determined.  This is known as fuzzification, or the process of encoding a crisp number for 
use with a fuzzy rule base.  For example, given a probability value p = 0.5, the 
corresponding degree of membership for each fuzzy number in Figure A-1 is μEven 
Chance(0.5) = 1, μLikely(0.5) = 0.5, μVery Likely(0.5) ≅ 0.1, and μ (0.5) = 0 for all others.  Thus, 
if the linguistic variable X represents a probability, the fact that the p = 0.5 means that X 
is “Tossup” to the degree 1.0, X is “Likely” to the degree 0.5, and so forth. 
Once the membership values for the fuzzy numbers evaluated at xj are obtained, 
the next step is to determine which of the N rules are relevant (i.e., which rules are “on” 
or are “firing”) with respect to the given the input state.  That is, the rule matching step 
assigns a degree of membership to each inference rule according to the degree of 
membership of its premises associated with xj.  Considering the example in the preceding 
paragraph, the rule “If X is ‘Likely’ then Y is ‘Bad’” would have a membership of 0.5 
since μLikely(0.5) ≅ 0.5, whereas the rule “If X is ‘Unlikely’ then Y is ‘Good’” would have 
membership of zero in the set of relevant rules since μUnlikely(0.5) ≅ 0.0.  For a set of rules 
with M premises, the membership, μRule,k, for the kth rule can be determined according to 
the inputs xj from the product rule (a popular type of T-norm) as follows (Kosko 1997): 
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21Rule, ,...,, μμ  (A-10) 
 
where kX jμ  is the membership function of the fuzzy number assigned to Xj according to 
rule k.  If the collection of fuzzy numbers for each xj collectively span its entire domain 
and if the sum of the memberships among all possible fuzzy sets is exactly one for all xj 
contained in Xj, the sum of the memberships assigned to all rules from Eq. A-10 for an 
arbitrary input state x is exactly equal to one, and is otherwise known as a fuzzy partition 
(Klir and Yuan 1995).  Accordingly, the membership determined for rule k from Eq. A-
10 can be interpreted as a mass assigned to the random set associated with the consequent 
of rule k, and the total mass distributed among all consequents would sum to one as 
required by the theory of evidence (Shafer 1976).  Alternative T-norms can be used (e.g., 
maximum, minimum), but these have less discriminatory power and may not meet the 
requirement that the memberships sum to one (Kosko 1997). 
 Given a fuzzy system with M input parameters where each can take on nj 
linguistic states (j = 1, 2, … M), an unique integer rule number Z can be assigned to each 






















ˆˆ  (A-11) 
 
where { }1,...,1,0ˆ −∈ jj nX  is an integer value for the state of each input variable, where 
the value 0 corresponds to the first rule, 1 the second rule, and so forth up until the last 
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rule nj – 1.  For example, if Xj could take on linguistic values “Low”, “Medium”, and 
“High”, the corresponding integer states could be 0, 1, and 2, respectively. 
 
A.5. Fuzzy Inference: Evidence Theory Approach 
In this final step, an aggregate output basic belief density (bbd) function, mY([u, 
v]), defined on a bounded continuous frame of discernment 2ℜ∈Ω  is constructed from 
the consequents of each inference rule discounted by the memberships obtained from Eq. 
A-10.  In light of a complete partition of the input space by fuzzy numbers, the total mass 
distributed among all consequent fuzzy sets must sum to one as required by the theory of 
evidence, that is: 
 





mdvduvum  (A-11) 
 
where ∅ indicates the null or empty set (Smets 2005).   
 Assuming each fuzzy consequent takes the form of a bell-shaped GLRFN with 
characteristic points <a, b, c, d> (see section 5.2.1), the corresponding contribution, kYm , 
to the aggregate output bbd from each rule with membership μRule,k can be obtained as: 
 














μγμγ  (A-12) 
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where ( )vγ  satisfies ( )( ) ( )vv μγμ = .  Closed-form expressions for ( )bγ  associated with 
different bell-shaped distributions are given in Table A-5.  The aggregate output bbd can 
be obtained from the results of Eq. A-12 as: 
 








,,  (A-13) 
 
To account for the less than perfect quality associated with a given item of 
evidence, its corresponding bbd can be discounted by a quality factor c as follows: 
 




 ( ) ( ) ccmm YcY −+Ω=Ω 1,  (A-15) 
 
where ( ).,cYm  denotes the bbd after discounting.  Note from Eqs. A-14 and A-15 that 
mass removed from intervals [u,v] is transferred to Ω, which reflects transfer of mass 
from a state of full or partial knowledge to a state of ignorance.  This manner of 
discounting can be referred to as vacuous discounting.  Values for the quality factor c in 
consider the credibility and competence of the expert as well as the reliability of the 
underlying inference model; a value of one indicates perfect information, whereas values 
less than one indicate lesser quality information. 
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Alternatively and for practical reasons, the mass removed from [u,v] can be 
transferred to the most conservative state A as follows: 
 




 ( ) ( ) cAcmAm YcY −+= 1,  (A-17) 
 
The manner of discounting described in Eqs. A-16 and A-17 can be referred to as 
conservative discounting.  For example, if the belief function is constructed over a space 
representing the probability of adversary success for a given attack type, discounting the 
belief function by a factor c according to conservative discounting would transfer the 
uncommitted mass 1 – c to the focal element corresponding to a probability of one, that is 
A = [1,1] and [ ]( ) [ ]( ) ccmm YcY −+= 11,11,1, .  While the conservative discounting approach 
is arguably unjustified on epistemological grounds, it does err on the side of caution in 
light of expert opinions that are less than perfectly credible and pushes the value toward 
the worst case (e.g., 1.0) rather than the least informative (e.g., 0.5); this feature is more 






Table A-1. ( )bγ  for selected continuous bell-shaped functions (McGill and Ayyub 2008) 
Distribution Expression for ( )bγ  Illustration 
Uniform For ubv ≤≤ : 
 








Triangular For ubv ≤≤ : 
 
















Trapezoidal For umbv ≤≤ : 
 
( ) bvb −= 2γ  
 
For ubmu ≤< : 
























Normal For μ≥b : 
 
( ) bb −= μγ 2  



















































In the academic literature, the term mY(∅) has been referred to the strength of 
conflict (Rakar et al. 1999; Rakar and Juricic 2002).  A non-zero value cannot be 
assigned to mY(∅) directly, but rather emerges through the conjunctive combination of 
two or more partially contradictory or conflicting belief functions via the unnormalized 
Dempster’s rule of combination (Smets and Kennes 1994).  Given two distinct bbds 
(Smets 1992) ( )],[1 bam  and ( )],[2 bam  defined on continuous frames of real numbers, 
such as would be the case if two distinct expert provided inputs to the inference model or 
if a single expert provided inputs into two distinct, yet competing models, the 
unnormalized Dempster’s rule of combination yields a combined bbd as follows (Smets 
2005): 
 





dydxyxmbayxmbam ],[],[],[],[ 1212  (A-18) 
 
where the expression [ ]( )],[],[ bayxmΩ  can be determined from: 
 















































The notation [ ]( )],[],[ badcmΩ  can be interpreted as the mass density a belief holder 
would assign to the focal element [a,b] given that [c,d] was accepted as true.  According 
to Smets (2005), Eq. A-18 is both associative and commutative, that is, the bbd obtained 
for the combination of n items of evidence is the same regardless of the order of 
aggregation. 
In the event of non-zero strength of conflict, the mass assigned to ∅ must be 
redistributed among non-empty focal elements to obtain a “normalized” bbd Ym̂  either by 
normalization as in the standard Dempster’s rule of combination (Shafer 1976):  
 





,,ˆ  (A-20) 
 
or by transferring mY(∅) entirely to the vacuous state mY((–∞,∞)) according to Yager’s 
rule of combination (Yager 1987): 
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 Sentz and Ferson (2002) describe other approaches to dealing with the strength of 
conflict after conjunctive combination of two or more conflicting belief functions. 
There exist dual measures under the theory of evidence framework that can be 
derived from a bbd: belief and plausibility.  The degree of belief associated with a closed 
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interval [a,b], belY([a,b]), quantifies the total amount of justified specific support that can 
be given to [a,b], and can be determined as: 
 





mdvduvumbabel ,],[  (A-22) 
 
Τhe degree of plausibility associated with a closed interval [a,b], plY([a,b]), quantifies the 
maximum amount of potential specific support that could be given to [a,b], and can be 
determined as: 
 








,],[  (A-23) 
 
Belief and plausibility measures are dual in the sense that the following relationship 
holds: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) [ ]( )babelbelbapl YYY ,,],[ −∞∞−=  (A-24) 
 
where by definition ( )( ) ( )∅−=∞∞− YY mbel 1, .  The belief and plausibility functions 
bound the set of probability functions, PrY([a,b]), that can be derived via a probabilistic 
transformation, that is: 
 
 [ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( ) babaplbababel YYY ≤∀≤≤ ,,,Pr,  (A-25) 
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The cumulative belief function CbelY(b) and cumulative plausibility function CplY(b) can 
be obtained as: 
 
 ( ) ( ]( )bbelbCbel YY ,∞−=  (A-26) 
 
 ( ) ( ]( )bplbCpl YY ,∞−=  (A-27) 
 
Together, the cumulative belief and plausibility function form the bounds on the true 
CDF of the underlying probability distribution (Ferson et al. 2004).  The plausibility 
(belief) associated with a single point value can be obtained by collapsing the interval 
[a,b] in Eq. A-23 (A-22) to a single point [a,a].  The resulting plausibility (belief) 
distribution can be obtained by calculating ( )],[ aaplY  (or the belief alternative) for all 
permissible values of a.  If the bbd is consonant in that it is constructed over a nested set 
of intervals, the plausibility (belief) distribution is called a possibility (necessity) 
distribution.  As noted by Zadeh (1999), possibility distributions are linked to fuzzy sets 
in that the possibility associated with a given value a is equivalent to the membership of 
a. 
In the event that a single probability distribution or point estimate of Y is needed, 
beliefs are transferred from the credal state where uncertainty is characterized by belief 
functions over a Borel sigma algebra to a pignistic state where uncertainty is 
characterized by a probability distribution over the space of real numbers via a pignistic 
transformation (Smets and Kennes 1994; Smets 2005b).  Given a normalized bbd 
( )],[ bamY , a pignistic probability density function can be determined as (Smets 2005): 
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From Eq. A-28, a pignistic cumulative distribution function can be determined as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )yYduuBetfyBetF y YY ≤== ∫ ∞− Pr  (A-29) 
 
where Pr(Y ≤ y) gives the pignistic probability that the true value lies within the interval 
(–∞,y].  The pignistic transformation is grounded in the principle of insufficient reason – 
in the absence of information available to discriminate between two or more alternatives, 
the available mass is divided equally among the alternatives (Smets 2005b).  A pignistic 
percentile describes the y value in Eq. A-29 that yields a specified value on the pignistic 
cumulative distribution function. 
Following standard procedures of determining moments of a probability 






= dyyyBetfy Y  (A-30) 
 




22σ  (A-31) 
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The mean and variance obtained in Eqs. A-30 and A-31 provide a basis for 
defuzzification to obtain crisp outputs from the fuzzy system.  The next section describes 
an alternative defuzzification approach based on the standard additive model, or SAM. 
 
A.6. Fuzzy Inference: Standard Additive Model Approach 
As an alternative to the evidence theory approach to fuzzy inference described in 
the previous section, a crisp output y corresponding to the input state defined by xj is 
obtained by combining all rules for which μRule > 0 to obtain a fuzzy representation of Y, 
then converting the aggregate fuzzy output into a crisp value.  More specifically, the 
aggregate fuzzy representation for Y, bY(x), is obtained from the linear combination of 
fuzzy numbers representing the output for each rule, each weighted according to the 
membership of the corresponding rule k (1 < k ≤ N) as determined from Eq. A-10: 
 




YMkMY yxxxyxxxb μμ ,...,,,,...,, 21Rule,21  (A-32) 
 
where ( )ykYμ  is the membership function of the fuzzy number assigned to the output 
linguistic variable Y according to rule k.  The crisp output for ( )xFy ~=  (letting x imply 
x1, x2, …, xM for brevity) is obtained through defuzzification of Y via the center of gravity 
















,~  (A-33) 
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The fuzzy system obtained via the aggregation and defuzzification operations in Eqs. A-
30 and A-31 is known as an additive fuzzy system (Kosko 1997). 
The crisp value for y obtained from Eq. A-33 can be interpreted as the expected 
value of the output y given the input state defined by xj.  Moreover, it can be shown that 
by defining pk(x) (the discrete probability attached to the centroidal value of the k-th 
output fuzzy set) as: 
 






















Y  is the total area of under the curve associated with the 
membership function ( )ymkY , Eq. A-33 can be rewritten as: 
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The standard deviation of the output y given the input state defined by xj, σY|X, can now be 
expressed as: 
 































1σ  (A-38) 
 
The standard deviation in Eq. A-37 captures the epistemic uncertainty induced by the 
imprecision of the fuzzy numbers used for defining the functional relationship between 
input and output variables. 
 
A.7. Arithmetic on Random Sets with Unknown or Uncertain Dependence 
A generic arithmetic operation @ on two numbers A and B represented by random 
sets on a continuous frame with focal elements a and b produces an output C = A × B 
with focal elements c as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ]babababababababac @,@,@,@max,@,@,@,@min=  (A-39) 
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In the case where A and B are independent credal variables, the basic belief assignment 
associated with each focal element of C, m(C), can be obtained as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )bmamcm =  (A-40) 
 
In general, a copula C exists that characterizes the dependency between the variables X 
and Y.  In the case of unknown dependency between two variables X and Y, Williamson 
and Downs (1990), and later made more explicit by Ferson et al. (2004), showed that the 
cumulative belief and plausibility functions for the output variable Z, Cbel(z) and Cpl(z), 
following an arithmetic operation on X and Y both characterized by random sets can be 































































Ferson et al. (2004) also provide procedures for performing arithmetic operations that 
accommodates partial information about the dependency between X and Y, such as the 
lower bound on the copula or the sign of dependence is known.  Most relevant to this 
research is the case where the dependency is only known to be non-negative.  In this case, 
the cumulative belief and plausibility functions for the output Z following the addition of 
two variables X and Y known to be positive quadrant dependent is given as: 
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111inf  (A-49) 
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Appendix B. Results of the Regional Case Study 
 
B.1. Conditional Public Health & Safety Loss Distribution Given Successful Attack 
 
Figure B-1. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for public health 
and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile (office building) 
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Table B-1. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for public health and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile 
(office building) 
Percentile 












1 6.92 19.11 7.51 6.44 16.24 
5 8.01 26.53 8.69 7.33 21.58 
25 17.17 59.00 19.04 15.24 49.50 
50 31.79 107.70 35.04 28.39 90.05 
75 49.30 154.70 54.19 43.70 132.60 
95 63.04 193.60 70.15 55.40 169.50 




Figure B-2. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for public health 
and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile (hospital) 
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Table B-2. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for public health and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile 
(hospital) 
Percentile 











1 21.58 104.05 24.83 18.22 
5 24.09 123.95 27.90 20.06 
25 41.48 207.11 47.34 35.05 
50 73.04 329.65 82.86 63.10 
75 93.58 404.90 105.17 81.12 
95 107.92 452.30 121.03 93.72 




Figure B-3. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for public health 
and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile (train station) 
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Table B-3. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for public health and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile 
(train station) 
Percentile 











1 2.95 56.45 3.86 2.18 
5 3.03 62.95 4.00 2.22 
25 3.61 90.89 4.74 2.70 
50 6.24 138.38 8.88 4.79 
75 8.90 189.29 12.48 6.83 
95 10.66 225.52 15.12 8.23 




Figure B-4. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for public health 
and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile (stadium) 
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Table B-4. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for public health and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile 
(stadium) 
Percentile 











1 1.25 167.03 2.76 0.36 
5 1.33 184.49 2.97 0.37 
25 1.78 255.50 4.00 0.48 
50 3.22 374.85 8.06 0.95 
75 4.39 464.21 10.63 1.36 
95 5.17 518.46 12.28 1.66 




Figure B-5. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for public health 
and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile (power substation) 
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Table B-5. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for public health and safety loss given adversary success for each attack profile 
(power substation) 
Percentile 











1 0.94 2.71 1.07 0.85 
5 0.98 2.86 1.12 0.88 
25 1.03 3.05 1.18 0.92 
50 1.28 3.82 1.45 1.11 
75 1.59 4.82 1.81 1.35 
95 1.71 5.11 1.94 1.47 
99 1.75 5.19 1.98 1.50 
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B.2. Conditional Disruption Loss Distribution Given Successful Attack 
 
Figure B-6. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for disruption loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (office building) 
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Table B-6. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for disruption loss given adversary success for each attack profile (office 
building) 
Percentile 












1 1.98 8.64 2.34 1.66 7.36 
5 2.29 9.15 2.66 1.94 7.87 
25 3.56 11.26 4.01 3.11 9.98 
50 5.15 13.98 5.68 4.58 12.67 
75 6.02 15.35 6.60 5.38 14.00 
95 6.72 16.46 7.34 6.03 15.11 




Figure B-7. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for disruption loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (hospital) 
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Table B-7. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for disruption loss given adversary success for each attack profile (hospital) 
Percentile 











1 3.36 35.57 4.20 2.88 
5 4.16 36.91 5.04 3.63 
25 7.27 42.38 8.33 6.51 
50 11.26 50.01 12.55 10.25 
75 17.46 55.10 18.93 16.12 
95 23.27 59.12 24.88 21.65 




Figure B-8. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for disruption loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (train station) 
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Table B-8. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for disruption loss given adversary success for each attack profile (train station) 
Percentile 











1 0.05 1.39 0.07 0.04 
5 0.08 1.53 0.10 0.06 
25 0.16 2.11 0.21 0.13 
50 0.27 2.83 0.35 0.21 
75 0.38 3.72 0.49 0.30 
95 0.47 4.47 0.61 0.38 




Figure B-9. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for disruption loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (stadium) 
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Table B-9. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for disruption loss given adversary success for each attack profile (stadium) 
Percentile 











1 0.02 5.71 0.06 0.00 
5 0.03 6.00 0.08 0.00 
25 0.06 7.30 0.13 0.01 
50 0.11 9.00 0.24 0.03 
75 0.15 10.69 0.33 0.05 
95 0.18 6.59 0.35 0.06 




Figure B-10. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for disruption loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (power substation) 
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Table B-10. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for disruption loss given adversary success for each attack profile (power 
substation) 
Percentile 











1 6.69 15.40 7.25 6.04 
5 6.86 15.66 7.43 6.19 
25 7.35 16.51 7.94 6.65 
50 8.33 18.15 8.97 7.56 
75 9.21 19.37 9.90 8.36 
95 9.77 20.30 10.49 8.88 




B.3. Conditional Aggregate Loss Distribution Given Successful Attack 
 
Figure B-11. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for aggregate loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (office building) 
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Table B-11. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for aggregate loss given adversary success for each attack profile (office 
building) 
Percentile 












1 11.55 33.26 12.56 10.36 28.71 
5 15.02 53.76 16.51 13.32 44.55 
25 34.96 126.52 38.87 30.78 105.24 
50 140.63 422.60 152.00 127.73 355.95 
75 236.37 765.00 260.66 207.94 652.50 
95 375.25 1178.80 417.07 329.38 1027.50 




Figure B-12. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for aggregate loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (hospital) 
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Table B-12. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for aggregate loss given adversary success for each attack profile (hospital) 
Percentile 











1 31.25 159.79 35.90 26.86 
5 42.87 240.17 50.41 35.42 
25 86.49 467.38 100.07 73.05 
50 334.92 1320.60 369.75 298.39 
75 481.18 2079.90 543.50 417.92 
95 663.67 2843.10 750.31 576.97 




Figure B-13. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for aggregate loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (train station) 
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Table B-13. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for aggregate loss given adversary success for each attack profile (train station) 
Percentile 











1 3.12 61.11 4.14 2.33 
5 3.98 97.19 5.24 2.89 
25 6.97 184.49 9.25 5.14 
50 28.90 535.91 40.40 22.71 
75 41.62 929.71 59.28 31.86 
95 62.74 1367.69 89.33 48.48 




Figure B-14. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for aggregate loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (stadium) 
 268
Table B-14. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for aggregate loss given adversary success for each attack profile (stadium) 
Percentile 











1 1.34 180.81 2.97 0.38 
5 2.05 288.87 4.55 0.57 
25 3.54 524.29 8.00 0.94 
50 12.18 1449.08 30.74 3.57 
75 21.65 2145.03 52.28 6.67 
95 31.21 2527.97 69.83 9.98 




Figure B-15. Conditional possibilistic cumulative distribution function for aggregate loss 
given adversary success for each attack profile (power substation) 
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Table B-15. Mean values of selected percentile conditional cumulative distribution 
functions for aggregate loss given adversary success for each attack profile (power 
substation) 
Percentile 











1 12.78 26.04 13.75 11.62 
5 12.78 26.04 13.75 11.62 
25 12.78 26.04 13.75 11.62 
50 16.85 37.15 18.28 15.11 
75 19.99 46.20 21.63 17.86 
95 21.57 52.70 23.57 19.08 





B.4. Conditional Aggregate Loss Given Attack: By Attack Profile 
 
Figure B-16. Pignistic percentile cumulative distribution functions for aggregate loss 
given attack for each attack profile (office building) 
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Table B-16. Mean values of selected pignistic percentile conditional cumulative 
distribution functions for aggregate loss given attack for each attack profile (office 
building) 
Percentile 












1 13.62 39.52 19.11 17.95 10.12 
5 23.38 79.03 33.02 27.64 19.89 
10 32.30 115.68 45.14 36.23 29.12 
25 54.14 202.11 73.29 54.74 52.59 
50 92.44 332.24 112.22 77.59 92.17 
75 150.01 497.66 168.51 109.23 158.42 
90 216.28 688.19 230.47 140.03 243.07 
95 256.75 799.47 267.66 158.57 298.88 




Figure B-17. Pignistic percentile cumulative distribution functions for aggregate loss 
given attack for each attack profile (hospital) 
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Table B-17. Mean values of selected pignistic percentile conditional cumulative 
distribution functions for aggregate loss given attack for each attack profile (hospital) 
Percentile 











1 54.44 147.66 77.38 46.00 
5 87.79 247.92 114.37 65.01 
10 118.23 346.92 147.34 83.52 
25 188.57 586.55 215.61 121.62 
50 290.23 952.55 306.06 171.63 
75 401.63 1371.06 404.71 224.16 
90 501.43 1786.58 491.34 268.14 
95 557.05 2009.29 542.80 294.39 




Figure B-18. Pignistic percentile cumulative distribution functions for aggregate loss 
given attack for each attack profile (train station) 
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Table B-18. Mean values of selected pignistic percentile conditional cumulative 
distribution functions for aggregate loss given attack for each attack profile (train station) 
Percentile 











1 3.77 27.14 9.83 3.31 
5 5.24 43.77 13.72 4.59 
10 6.66 58.94 17.56 5.83 
25 9.90 90.57 25.75 8.68 
50 15.02 141.04 37.85 12.97 
75 20.87 210.32 49.28 16.99 
90 28.20 287.08 62.14 21.60 
95 32.84 331.99 69.83 24.17 




Figure B-19. Pignistic percentile cumulative distribution functions for aggregate loss 
given attack for each attack profile (stadium) 
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Table B-19. Mean values of selected pignistic percentile conditional cumulative 
distribution functions for aggregate loss given attack for each attack profile (stadium) 
Percentile 











1 1.45 1.45 9.78 0.89 
5 2.14 3.63 13.11 1.19 
10 2.66 5.74 16.14 1.53 
25 3.71 12.45 21.32 2.19 
50 5.11 29.19 27.81 2.91 
75 6.81 56.07 36.52 3.75 
90 8.79 90.85 46.82 4.63 
95 10.01 114.28 52.70 5.14 




Figure B-20. Pignistic percentile cumulative distribution functions for aggregate loss 
given attack for each attack profile (power substation) 
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Table B-20. Mean values of selected pignistic percentile conditional cumulative 
distribution functions for aggregate loss given attack for each attack profile (power 
substation) 
Percentile 











1 14.61 23.71 9.02 2.63 
5 15.63 25.91 9.56 2.70 
10 16.45 28.03 9.91 2.80 
25 18.40 33.15 10.82 3.05 
50 21.04 40.10 11.99 3.31 
75 22.69 44.57 12.88 3.52 
90 23.76 48.06 13.44 3.67 
95 24.30 50.03 13.77 3.73 




B.5. Conditional Loss-Exceedance Given Attack 
 
Figure B-21. Possibilistic conditional loss-exceedance curve given attack (office 
building) 




















Figure B-22. Possibility distribution for the mean conditional loss given attack for 
selected pignistic percentiles (office building) 
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Figure B-23. Possibilistic conditional loss-exceedance curve given attack (hospital) 
 




















Figure B-24. Possibility distribution for the mean conditional loss given attack for 
selected pignistic percentiles (hospital) 
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Figure B-25. Possibilistic conditional loss-exceedance curve given attack (train station) 
 




















Figure B-26. Possibility distribution for the mean conditional loss given attack for 
selected pignistic percentiles (train station) 
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Figure B-27. Possibilistic conditional loss-exceedance curve given attack (stadium) 
 




















Figure B-28. Possibility distribution for the mean conditional loss given attack for 
selected pignistic percentiles (stadium) 
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Figure B-29. Possibilistic conditional loss-exceedance curve given attack (power 
substation) 
 




















Figure B-30. Possibility distribution for the mean conditional loss given attack for 
selected pignistic percentiles (power substation) 
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